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3 April 1985

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Cumulative Arab Loan Statistics Reported (AL-HAWADITH, 1 Feb 85)	1
---	---

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

Armenian Political Parties Issue Joint Statement (ZARTONK, 13 Feb 85)	3
Beirut Paper: Nothing Has Changed in Ankara's Policy (Editorial; ZARTONK, 16 Feb 85)	5
Armenian SSR Catholicos Sends Message to Churches (ZARTONK, 19 Feb 85)	7
Armenian Official Sends Message to Turkish Ambassador (ZARTONK, 21 Feb 85)	9

ARAB AFRICA

ALGERIA

UGTA Secretary General Belakhdar Speaks on Anniversary (Tayeb Belakhdar Interview; REVOLUTION AFRICAINE, 22- 28 Feb 85)	10
Mohamed Messaadia Addresses Journalists on Role of Press (REVOLUTION AFRICAINE, 22-28 Feb 85)	14
Budget, 5-Year Plan Discussed (EL-DJEICH, No 260, Jan 85)	18
Assembly Debates Bill Minister on Development, Ali Oubouzar Interview	

Vehicle Assembly Plant Planned for 1986 (EL MOUDJAHID, 12 Feb 85)	33
Role of Port of Bejala Described (EL MOUDJAHID, 11 Feb 85)	36
EGYPT	
Mumtaz Nassar Discusses Democracy, Elections in Egypt (Mumtaz Nassar Interview; AL-JUMHURIYAH, 21 Feb 85)	38
Salah Abu Isma'il Speaks on Islamic Law (Salah Abu Isma'il Interview; AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 18, 19 Nov 84)	44
Officials, Party Members, Scholars Discuss Industrial Problems (AKHIR SA'AH, 20 Feb 85)	53
NPUG Dissident Cites Reasons for Leaving Party (Abd-al-'Azim Ramadan; AKHBAR AL-YAWM, 23 Feb 84)	64
Housing Minister Interviewed on Future Plans, Regulations (Muhsin Sidqi Interview; AL-AKHBAR, 10 Jan 85)	71
Heavy FRG Involvement in Expansion of Electrical Supply Grid (FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT, 1 Feb 85)	78
Inconsistencies, Anomalies of Import Rationalization Committees (Mahmud Salim; AKHBAR AL-YAWM, 9 Feb 85)	82
Playwrights Agree to Reappear in Public Theater (Samiyah Labib; AKHBAR AL-YAWM, 9 Feb 85)	87
LIBYA	
Al-Qadhdhafi's Relations With Arabs Criticized (Fu'ad Matar; AL-TADAMUN, No 97, 16-22 Feb 85)	89
Changed Relations With Britain Assessed (AL-TADAMUN, No 97, 16-22 Feb 85)	92
MOROCCO	
Economic Ties With Brazil (LA VIE ECONOMIQUE, 11 Jan 85)	94
Balance of Trade Figures as of October 1984 (LA VIE ECONOMIQUE, 8 Feb 85)	98
Coal Imports Expected to More Than Double in 1985 (LA VIE ECONOMIQUE, 1 Feb 85)	101

Drop in Electric Power Output (LA VIE ECONOMIQUE, 18 Jan 85)	103
---	-----

ARAB EAST/ISRAEL

BAHRAIN

Industrialist Interviewed on Workforce, GCC Economics (AL-HAWADITH, 15 Feb 85)	105
---	-----

ISRAEL

Peres' Decision-Making Style Reported (Akiva Eldar; HA'ARETZ, 10 Feb 85)	108
---	-----

Arab Workers Daily Life Surveyed (Atallah Mansur; HA'ARETZ, 11 Feb 85)	111
---	-----

JORDAN

Sharaf Resignation Letter Published (AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 17 Feb 85)	114
---	-----

Ba'th Secretary Interviewed on Husayn-'Arafat 'Plotting' (Hasan 'Ajaj Interview; TISHRIN, 22 Dec 84)	117
---	-----

KUWAIT

Background on Parliamentary Election Process, Voting Trends Examined (AL-QABAS, various dates)	125
---	-----

Tribal Vote Distribution
Election Trends
Redivision of Electoral Districts

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

CUMULATIVE ARAB LOAN STATISTICS REPORTED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 1 Feb 85 p 45

[Text] Jordan has put out a list of the countries that benefitted from the financing operations of the Arab development establishments up to the middle of 1984. Of an original 99 developing countries in the world that got these loans, Jordan's share was \$1,250,490,000 which was distributed among 72 loans. In other words, Jordan got 6.6 percent of the total Arab economic financing.

Morocco came second among the nations of the world that benefitted from Arab loans. It got \$1,094,510,000 distributed among 55 loans, so it got 5.6 percent of these loans.

Tunisia came third, having got 5.55 percent of the total financing. Its share was equal to that of North Yemen, while the Sudan placed fifth among the developing nations that benefitted from the financing. It got 4.2 percent of the total Arab loans.

These figures were disclosed by a recent report issued by the secretariat for coordination among the development establishments in the Arab world. The report confirms, with respect to the lender nations, that the Kuwait Arab Economic Development Fund put out a list of the eight development establishments in the Arab world in relation to its share of the financing since it was established in 1962 until the middle of last year.

Total loans which the Kuwaiti fund gave out to 62 developing nations during the afore-mentioned period was \$4,451,670,000 which represented 22.8 percent of the total financing by the eight funds together, which was \$19.5 billion.

As for the Saudi Development Fund, its loans were slightly less than those offered by the Kuwait fund, since the total of these loans was \$4,389,030,000 or 22.5 percent of the total Arab financing. Fifty-three developing countries benefitted from the Saudi loans.

The Islamic Development Bank, whose headquarters is in Jiddah, gave out \$3,434,230,000, or 17.6 percent of the total financing, benefitting 36 countries. The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, headquartered in Kuwait, gave out \$1,992,220,000 benefitting 36 countries, or 10.2 percent of the total Arab loans.

The OPEC Fund for International Development gave out 9.6 percent of the loans to 81 countries, and the Iraqi Foreign Development Fund gave out 8.9 percent to 31 countries, and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development gave out 5.4 percent to 40 countries, and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, headquartered in Khartoum, gave out 3 percent, benefitting 37 countries.

12547

CSO: 4404/222

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ARMENIAN POLITICAL PARTIES ISSUE JOINT STATEMENT

GF170546 Beirut ZARTONK in Armenian 13 Feb 85 p 1

["Text" of statement issued by the Armenian Dashnag, Henschak and Ramkavar Parties' Central Committees in Beirut--date not given]

[Text] During the World War I, Turkey perpetrated a premeditated genocide which became the first and greatest genocide of the 20th century.

The peaceable western Armenians were subjected to deportation and mass massacres since 1915, as a result of which over 1.5 million Armenians were martyred, the biggest part of our ancestral fatherland was occupied and we were nationally subjected to immeasurable material and cultural losses.

However, in spite of the anti-Armenian plan of the Turk criminals the Armenian Government was reborn on one part of ancestral Armenia while the Armenians dispersed on foreign lands gradually organized and became vital communities including the Armenians of Lebanon, who in spite of the grave crisis witnessed and being witnessed by this country in the past 10 years, remain in their leading positions.

Following the great genocide, over the past 70 years the Armenian people at all suitable occasions and through all possible means demanded the condemnation of the criminal Turkey, the compensation of the martyrs' blood and the restoration of their fatherland to the legal masters, the Armenian people.

At this important stage of the 70th anniversary of the genocide perpetrated against the Armenian people, the entire Armenian nation with united and uncompromising will once again call on the civilized world to condemn genocidal Turkey, the return of their fatherland, and the correction of all the consequences of the genocide.

Thus, the leading bodies of the Armenian parties of Lebanon considered it a holy duty to unitedly mark this stage and for that purpose and upon the approval of the religious leaders of the three Armenian congregations formed the Lebanese Armenian central body for the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Armenian genocide, comprising the representatives of the three Armenian parties and religious congregations, which will organize and lead all the enterprises and measures dealing with the commemoration and demand of rights.

We declare 1985 the commemoration year of the 70th anniversary of the Armenian genocide and call on all the Armenians in Lebanon to welcome this historic period with corresponding awareness and readiness for sacrifice by following the announcements and arrangements which will be declared.

[Signed] Administrative body of the Armenian Henschak Party of Lebanon, Central Committee of the Armenian Revolutionary Dashnag Party of Lebanon, and regional administration of the Armenian Ramgavar Liberal Party of Lebanon.

CSO: 4605/123

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

BEIRUT PAPER: NOTHING HAS CHANGED IN ANKARA'S POLICY

GE181451 Beirut ZARTONK in Armenian 16 Feb 85 p 1

[Editorial: "Nothing Has Changed in Ankara's Policy"]

[Text] The international news agencies reported from Ankara with an obvious emphasis on a near change in Turkish policy toward the Armenian question. And indeed, the statement by Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal to the GUNES newspaper on 13 February revealed a "new approach" in Turkish policy to the Armenian question.

What are those "changes" and what "new" things did Premier Ozal say during his interview? We have already published the basic ideas in a previous issue.

First, the Armenian question "belongs to the past" and consequently "it is useless today to look for the culprits." Second, "nobody has the right to demand a span of land from Turkey nor the right to blame the Turkish Republic." Third, "it is not important whether or not something has happened in the past; nobody has the right to present demands based on fabrications." And finally, fourth, "it is absurd to demand atonement for events which occurred decades ago, the responsibility of which are buried in the pages of history."

By reading and rereading these above-mentioned ideas, we could not find a single new thing in them. They are all old statements made a thousand times. In particular, until 1965, the 50th anniversary of the great genocide, Turkish policy was based completely on these ideas. For 50 years Turkey wanted to bury the Armenian cause and told us that "the past is forgotten." And now, 70 years after the first genocide of the 20th century, a Turkish prime minister--by repeating the statements of his predecessors--attempts to forget Armenian demands and declares that the Armenian cause does not exist.

Prime Minister Ozal can be a good economist, but it seems that he is a bad student of history and a worse student of international law, or maybe pretends to be so. He must not forget that genocide is an untimely crime and nobody can bury its culprits in the "pages of history." Particularly in the case of Turkey, which considers itself the genuine heir to the Ottoman empire and its leaders; the statue of one of the leaders, the most bloodthirsty one, Talaat, has been erected in Ankara.

Why such an announcement in these days and in such a large-scale form? We are facing very interesting situation. Evidently with his declaration the Turkish prime minister wants to criticize his predecessors of the past 10 years, who during their international and diplomatic contacts discussed the Armenian cause or gave way before the queries of the interlocuters in that regard, unwillingly turning it into an international question. Consequently, according to Ozal, by announcing that "Turkey does not have an Armenian question," Turkish diplomacy from now on will not expound on this issue during talks and will come out from a narrow situation.

All this tells us that henceforth Turkish officials will avoid referring to the Armenian question on official and public levels. That is, they will be like an ostrich in their policy toward us.

However, this does not mean that the Turkish Government will forget us. On the contrary, it will continue to watch our movements and will always try to hatch plots against us.

Therefore, nothing has changed in Ankara's policy.

CSO: 4605/122

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ARMENIAN SSR CATHOLICOS SENDS MESSAGE TO CHURCHES

GF170610 Beirut ZARTONK in Armenian 19 Feb 85 p 2

[Statement issued by the Court of the Mother See of Holy Echmiadzin, Armenian SSR, on the message of all Armenian-Catholicos Vazgen I to Armenian churches 22 January]

[Excerpts] For the knowledge and consolation of our mother apostolic church and the entire religious Armenian people, we hereby inform that His Holiness Catholicos of all Armenians Vazgen I has sent messages on the 18th of this month to the leaders of the sister churches and to the International Churches Council in Geneva on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Armenian genocide which said:

"Our apostolic church of Armenia, its spiritual servants and our entire religious people in the Armenian SSR and throughout the world, on 24 April of this year will mark the 70th anniversary of the 1915 Armenian genocide perpetrated on order of the Ottoman Empire, as a result of which approximately 2 million Armenian Christian residents of western Armenia (Anatolia) were killed including many archbishops and hundreds of clergymen and priests. Approximately 1,000 Armenian historic monasteries and churches built between the 5th and 19th centuries were burned and destroyed, immeasurable church sanctities were lost as well as ancient manuscripts and holy pictures, all representing historic and cultural values.

"Holy masses and ceremonies should be held in all the Armenian churches in the Armenian SSR and the Armenian diaspora on 24 April to pray for the souls of the innocent victims of the 1915 genocide, asking mercy and justice of the compassionate God. On that day we must also pray for the peace of the whole world so that such tragedies will never take place in the life of any nation.

"With this message we apply with the fraternal love of Christ to your holiness to remember in your prayers the Armenian martyrs of 1915 and with your high authority make your just voice heard to the world which always has the need for your consolatory and inspirational messages.

"We also want to assure you that while we commemorate the great tragedy of our nation, we must keep away from us the hostile spirit and the thought of extremist acts. Our sole spiritual drive is to pray for the souls of our 2 million

martyrs and demand justice. To forget the past tragedies means to weaken and obscure the memory of humanity, would mean the distortion of history and truth and the killing of the voice of justice as well as paving the road for new future tragedies and genocides.

"The judgment of the past tragedies, the revelation of the sad historic events and the high and free sounding voice of justice---these are the strong basis for the construction of a new world, where the children of all nations without exception will reach to the salvational knowledge that they are the children of the same God and the citizens of the same human world under the same skies and that all have the same destiny.

"[Signed] Court of Mother See, Holy Echmiadzin, 22 January 1985"

CSO: 4605/125

3 April 1985

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ARMENIAN OFFICIAL SENDS MESSAGE TO TURKISH AMBASSADOR

GF170740 Beirut ZARTONK in Armenian 21 Feb 85 p 2

[Text] Ross Vartian, director of the Armenian Assembly in the United States, has sent a protest message to Turkish Ambassador Elekdag in which he points out the stable and respectable U.S. stance on the great genocide issue. Ross Vartian said: "No type of pressure will be able to change the Armenian or U.S. historic facts. By continuing your government's campaign to deny the Armenian genocide you are harming the U.S.-Turkish relations. With your deeds you are disturbing the special relation between the U.S. citizens of Armenian origin and their chosen officials. The relation is the cornerstone of the U.S. democracy. We protest against your foreign misfeasance."

In conclusion Ross Vartian called on the Turkish Government to look at its past honestly.

CSO: 4605/124

ALGERIA

UGTA SECRETARY GENERAL BELAKHDAR SPEAKS ON ANNIVERSARY

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French 22-28 Feb 85 pp 7, 8

[Interview with Tayeb Belakhdar, secretary general of the UGTA, by Z.B. on occasion of 24 February Anniversary of UGTA establishment; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Mr Secretary General, Algeria is preparing to celebrate the double anniversary of 24 February. What does this event mean to the UGTA today?

[Answer] The celebration this year, 1985, of the 29th anniversary of the founding of the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) and the 14th anniversary of the oil nationalization certainly constitutes an important event for the workers, for our country, and for our revolution, an event that thus has a profound and special significance for many reasons, including political, economic, and social reasons.

Before discussing this aspect of your question in detail, I would like to dwell briefly on what I will call the primary significance of 24 February, to recall the establishment on this day in 1956 of the UGTA, the single revolutionary trade union organization of all Algerian workers, an organization that by its assumed mission is an inseparable part of the history of our national liberation armed struggle, an organization that by the tasks assigned to it in the National Charter is today a basic element of our revolutionary dynamic.

I would add that the establishment of the UGTA was the logical outcome of all the forms of struggle carried out since the beginning of the century by the Algerian workers against the colonial oppressor, both in the colonizing country and in the national territory, that it was also the clear expression, the organized manifestation and confirmation of the determination of the Algerian workers to affirm, by armed struggle, the presence of a genuinely Algerian trade union as a natural extension of the FLN in the labor field.

Finally, this was a striking demonstration of the high level of political awareness of the workers, who formed the vanguard of the armed revolutionary struggle at the side of their brother farmers, under the leadership of the FLN.

That, I believe, is the primary significance of 24 February, an event that thus reminds us that the workers, organized within the UGTA, were the

determined creators of our armed revolution, and remain today a mobilized social force, vigilant and united, committed in the battle for national development and the building of our socialist society, and the path of strengthening our revolutionary process, under the guidance of the political leadership, led by Brother Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic and party secretary general.

I have also stated that the 29th anniversary of establishment of the UGTA is an important event in this year 1985, an event that has great significance for the workers, our country and our revolution.

This is very obvious when I point out that this anniversary occurs as an extension of celebration of the 30th anniversary of the launching of the national liberation armed struggle, a magnificent and historic event, whose success the workers helped to assure, and it gave them the opportunity to strongly affirm their absolute faithfulness to the memory of our martyrs, as well as their unshakable commitment to the sacred ideals of the November 1954 revolution, the ideals fully consecrated by our National Charter.

Likewise, I would stress that 24 February will fall under the slogan of "Work and austerity to guarantee the future," the slogan of the FLN Fifth Party Congress, the slogan that must be for the workers and all the other social forces of the revolution a way of life, a work method, and an objective to be implemented in the field of concrete realities, in the work place and in daily life.

In this connection, I would add that the celebration of the formation of the UGTA will be an occasion for the workers to reaffirm their total support for this slogan and their commitment to insuring its effective application through their sustained efforts for production, their patriotic spirit, and also by a real and total awareness of the responsibilities that fall on them in the battle that our country is conducting for national development, our economic independence, and the construction of our socialist society.

Thus, the demonstration of their ability to mobilize for the tasks of national construction, to remain united and vigilant within their organization to strengthen and consolidate the gains of our socialist revolution, will be one of the aspects contributing to the special importance of this event.

Its importance also derives from the fact that it comes at the time when our country and our revolution are embarking on a decisive phase for the future with implementation of the second 5-year development plan.

And in this connection, be assured that the workers have a profound awareness of the stakes in this new enterprise, whose outcome will affect for decades the future of the working masses of our country and our revolution.

Thus, 24 February will of itself, and by its celebration, demonstrate the commitment of the workers to strive indefatigably to make their contribution to achieving within the deadlines fulfillment of all the objectives of the second 5-year development plan, which is an important condition for the consummation of their justified aspirations for a better life.

Another factor that gives this event its special character is that it will prompt the workers to demonstrate their ability to evaluate and take into account all the constraints and dangers affecting our national development strategy as a result of the multiple effects of the world economic crisis.

The 24 February celebration will thus enable the workers to express their total support for the principle of self-reliance, a principle which necessarily involves total liberation and judicious use of their spirit of initiative, creative imagination and enterprise abilities, but also for the principle of effective management of our enterprises, a principle that requires, on the one hand, participation by the UGTA for its full and proper application, and, on the other, an implacable struggle against all forms of social evils such as absenteeism, indiscipline and indulgence.

That, in a general and rather summary fashion, is the significance of the 24 February celebration.

To complete my answer, I should obviously note that this day is also the 14th anniversary of the oil nationalization.

In this connection, I would like to emphasize that this historic event not only demonstrated our country's determination to regain, master, and exploit all our national wealth to the benefit of the people, but was an opportunity for the workers of that sector, without distinction, to concretely demonstrate their abilities to successfully handle the great technical, economic and political challenge that the foreign oil companies then constituted.

This brief review justifies my expressing my full conviction regarding the capability of the workers to achieve further success in the often difficult battle of national construction and building of our socialist society under the leadership of the FLN party, the guarantee of the revolutionary continuity.

[Question] How is the UGTA going to celebrate this anniversary throughout the country?

[Answer] Traditionally, and this will be the case this year throughout the national territory, our trade union organizations organize meditation ceremonies in memory of our martyred brother workers.

Likewise, elected officials will take the initiative to organize festivities such as sports events, cultural presentations and lecture discussions.

Now, I would like to go beyond your question to deal specifically with what I would call the trade union aspect of this.

Thus, I would say that this 24 February celebration will be the opportunity for the workers to confirm, by their massive participation in all the festivities organized on that day, their irrevocable commitment to the ideals of November 1954, to the country's fundamental choices, and to the principles of the National Charter, as well as to the path defined by the FLN Fifth Party Congress.

This event will also demonstrate, once again, the resolute commitment of the workers to make all the necessary effort to implement all the objectives of the second development plan by concrete and sustained application of the slogan of the FLN Fifth Party Congress: "Work and austerity to guarantee the future."

Likewise, this event will be used by the workers to reaffirm their unfailing support to the political leadership under the direction of Brother Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic and FLN Party secretary general, as well as their total observance of the instructions and orientations of the brother president, particularly those emphasizing the necessity for all to give priority to dialogue and to combining and coordinating efforts to achieve all the tasks of national construction.

Finally, in conclusion, I would like to appeal to all workers, men and women, without any distinction or exception, to be increasingly aware that their mobilization within the UGTA, and hence broadening of the trade union base for which we work unceasingly in accordance with the country's fundamental documents, are a basic condition for successful fulfillment, in the most effective and sustained way, of the mission entrusted to the workers as a social force of the revolution.

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3 April 1985

ALGERIA

MOHAMED MESSAADIA ADDRESSES JOURNALISTS ON ROLE OF PRESS

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French 22-28 Feb 85 pp 19,20

[Article by Z. G.: "Messaadia to the Journalists: Change Attitudes"]

[Text] In an enriching meeting, full of information, with Mohamed Cherif Messaadia, Political Bureau member and chief of the Central Committee permanent secretariat, a very numerous group of journalists, more loquacious than ever, could not resist (honor to whom honor is due) expressing their concerns relating to the information situation. How could a meeting of this kind not tackle a subject whose strategic nature needs no emphasis? The reason why the journalists paid a lot of attention to this aspect is that something is going on. Good or bad, but something serious all the same.

Is there discontent in this sector? How can all the problems affecting it be resolved? And, first of all, are there differences in the very concept of information? If that is the case, why not make specific the information policy approved by the Central Committee? Certainly there are some documents that deserve to be saved from the cemetery of resolutions, and basically only documents can reconcile the journalists, even though still issuing some reservations about the information code that would require amendments.

Now, as regards form, there is a situation that hardly gives rise to optimism. Without drawing too many, no doubt hasty, conclusions, it must be said that if the press enterprises are experiencing special situations it is because they are going through difficult phases resulting from the desire to carry out a restructuration established by a plan developed for this purpose. No one doubts that this operation is aimed at giving information people the necessary means to conduct their trade normally. However, these conditions are slow in coming, and the journalists, who only ask to be able to do their work, are expressing intense concern regarding this situation. This prompts speakers to cite the problem of very limited information sources, which sometimes makes information collection very difficult and the product delivered to the public "indigestible." In a field that is also favorable for disinformation, the foreign media, and particularly those that do not hide their hostility toward the Algerian revolution, are overjoyed and find among us an attentive and credulous ear for the most deceitful propaganda. We may ask: how can we strengthen the credibility of our press? Someone may say, by no longer being an "information service of communiqués," by having broad access to the information sources, and by respecting the rights of citizens to objective information, a principle that President Chadli himself has defended on numerous occasions.

Though the issue of the press in general drew the lion's share at this meeting, which attracted a crowd both because of the political stature of the person who presided and his knowledge of the information sector and attention he has always devoted to it, nevertheless very sensitive aspects of the national life and foreign policy were examined, for the very exercise of this profession is linked to the political environment in which the journalists operate.

Put an End to the Dichotomy

Ideological problems, political issues, everything came up during this meeting. The high level of discussion no doubt reflected less a need for information than a concern being expressed, with sometimes more or less intensity, by the journalists. The address by Mohamed Cherif Messaadia, which had the benefit of clarifying some evidently obscure situations, not being limited to circumlocutions and diagram explanations, and the very profound analysis by the chief of the Central Committee permanent secretariat, thus facilitated understanding certain phenomena that escape even the best informed.

In order to put an end to the dichotomy between the Party's press and the state, it is thus necessary to consider establishment of an institution aimed at unifying at least the orientation. In this regard, the information plan has been introduced to remedy this situation. Established after the approval of the national information policy, this structure was thus established with the purpose of achieving unity in orientation, planning and control, and of thus enabling information to accomplish fully and in an effective way its assigned role in view of the rapid evolution in means of communication in the world.

The personal initiative and innovation that the journalist should apply must not depart from the framework of the general orientation and the political program that expresses the masses' aspirations, a program that must be taken into account in carrying out the role of journalist. Stressing the important role of the journalist as the extension of the political leadership, Messaadia provided some guiding principles emphasizing specialization that it would be desirable to pursue.

Establishment of a frank and continuing dialogue among the members of the political leadership and journalists must be a rule that is applied as a natural reflex. In the view of the chief of the Central Committee permanent secretariat, it is primarily a matter of planning and programming the activities of journalists and of mastering the organization of information, a sector that in fact has adequate legal instruments. The whole matter is thus to find out why the laws in effect are not applied and how to make them a reality.

The political discussion on the context of information, which is not in itself restrictive, far from it, turned to the issue of institutional mechanisms and in particular the separation of political and executive functions. It was very evident that as regards the party-state relationship things could not be more clear. The complementarity of the tasks of the organs of each allows for

no ambiguity. On the other hand, if here and there someone feeds the false rifts and a sometimes tenacious antagonism, this is for one of two reasons: either that person is allowing himself to be used in a game thought up by elements hostile to the party's line, or it is a matter of poor understanding of the spirit of the documents or refusal to accept them in all their firmness.

The question that then arises is finding out whether the decisions of the congresses of the party and its Central Committee are being applied in accordance with the commitments made in this regard.

Enrich the Charter

Control and follow-up of application of the program laid down by the party are insured through periodic evaluations and continuous coordination between the FLN structures and those of the state. The principle of complementarity of tasks is thus no longer only a concept and is so fully developed that the idea of separation of powers has been totally buried.

Why should we enrich the national charter? What would be the objectives in amending it; what is one's interest in carrying out certain corrective measures? In this connection, the chief of the Central Committee permanent secretariat, seeking to be very clear and persuasive, and developing a very interesting analysis while reminding of the guidance of the president of the republic, pointed out that the establishment of the constitutional institutions prior to 1976 has not yet been completed. It is thus timely today, 10 years after the drafting of that basic document, to undertake its revision in the light of the experience acquired on the spot, without, however, departing from its basic options derived from the people's will. To put it plainly, the context in which the charter was approved has today evolved.

This enrichment will be carried out in the direction of clarification and will be the subject of a broad discussion within the base structures of the FLN. All we can say about this process leading to updating of some aspects of the document is that it is amply justified, if only because in 1976 during the discussion of the draft it was then emphasized that it was not unchangeable. In the chapter on Algeria's foreign policy, though in general the national charter's orientations remain in accordance with the country's policy, there are some aspects that merit examination.

Europe, Mashriq, Maghreb, and Africa were reviewed. In this context, citing the principle of Maghreb unity and recalling Algeria's initiatives in this direction, Mr Messaadia said: "We are profoundly convinced of the necessity to build Maghreb unity on sound bases in the interest of the region's peoples, with and for the peoples."

Achievement of a regional whole must necessarily proceed through necessary preliminary phases, that is, economic unity, unity of educational programs, etc... Thus, unity of the peoples would involve drawing up a political charter that establishes the choices and that would be submitted to the peoples for substantive discussion before approval. The establishment of a

basic law would have to be preceded by establishment of the unity institutions. In sum, the idea of a regional grouping is excellent, but to insure its durability a process must be carried out that takes into account certain realities of each country and adopts a rational, scientific approach. It must not be given an emotional character that has little chance of achieving completion.

Discussing our country's relations with fraternal and friendly countries and stressing that Algeria's higher interest has priority over any other consideration, Mr Messaadia said that Algeria's relations with other countries are governed by the principle of mutual interest.

In conclusion, Mr Messaadia cited the evolution of the party bodies and the mass organizations, as well as the opportunity offered to all elements of the society to express themselves, to work in the framework of clear political vision, and to mobilize all their energies for the country's progress.

At any rate, the 17 February meeting, which lasted more than 3 hours, was one of those get-togethers that journalists appreciate because of the richness of the discussion and the frankness of the exchanges.

9920

CSO: 4519/113

ALGERIA

BUDGET, 5-YEAR PLAN DISCUSSED

Assembly Debates Bill

Algiers EL-DJEICH in French No 260, Jan 85 pp 9, 10

[Text] The deputies in the APN [Popular National Assembly] spent the middle part of December in sessions which sometimes lasted far into the night, debating the proposed 5-year plan for 1985-1989, the budget bill for 1985 and the annual planning bill.

The topics of debate covered important programs for the future of the nation.

The 5-year plan, which looks ahead to the post-petroleum era, emphasizes internal and external financial equilibrium, improvement of the efficiency of the economic and social machinery, and expansion of the material base of the economy (agricultural development, industrial integration, economic and social infrastructure).

Both the unfavorable international economic situation, dominated by an increasingly acute crisis, and continuing global political tensions make it essential for our country to take even more vigorous steps than in the past to protect us from the repercussions of those crises. In that sense, the plan can be a complete success if all sectors concerned apply themselves seriously and in a more disciplined way, with the help of the public sector enterprises.

Our country has made considerable efforts, the impact of which can be clearly seen. And if the global economic crisis has not hit our own economy, that is but further proof of the durability of the gains we have made in industry. Mobilization of the human and material resources of the country, rigorous management, the building of economic independence in such a way as to thwart all those who resent the successes achieved by our country in overcoming obstacles, and organization of the economy in such a way as to provide for the satisfaction of the economic and social needs of the people: these have been the main focus of this plan, which, in order to accomplish these objectives, calls for a 7.5 percent increase in gross domestic product [GDP].

The strategy of the plan involves expanding the material base of the economy and carrying out some important projects, and in particular completion of several dams and the total electrification of the country by 1989.

The other equally important bill debated by the APN was the 1985 budget bill.

The new financial elements for this year were presented for the government by Finance Minister Boualem Benhamouda, who summarized the main features of the bill for the APN. Analyzing the broad lines of the 1984 budget bill, he indicated that "actual revenue and actual expenses for the 1984 fiscal year will be in balance."

He also said that authorized spending for the operations budget will be covered by ordinary revenue, while the revenue from the oil company will be used for the acquisition of capital goods and for national development.

This bill maintains price supports for basic necessities, encourages investment, and supports financial reform by reducing expenses and increasing revenue.

The bill calls for the adjustment of the ITS [expansion unknown], which has been recalculated to take into account changes in social security withholdings, and for clarification of the oil tax, which has been simplified to take into account the organic restructuring of the hydrocarbon sector. The 1985 budget bill calls for an operating budget of 64.98 billion dinars, an 8.83 percent increase over 1984, and a capital budget of 52 billion dinars, a 12.97 percent increase over the previous year.

Most of the budgetary increases go to cover expenses involved in new projects, the health sector, education and social security, while the sums designated for capital goods will make it possible to complete projects now under way and begin others. The other bill presented to the ANP was the 1985 planning bill, introduced by Mr Ali Oubouzar, the minister of planning and national development, who sketched out the broad lines of the 1985 annual plan and its enumerated objectives, which are based on the following principles:

--Mobilization of revenue, expansion of production and reduction of costs.

--Rigorous planning and administration of activities, efficiency on the part of economic actors, and intensification of coordination between the various sectors.

--Rigorous and continuous oversight to maintain financial stability, both internally and externally.

This annual plan also projects an overall increase of 6.6 percent in domestic product, exclusive of hydrocarbons, an increase of 4.5 percent in actual consumption, no growth in imports and a 10 percent increase in exports of goods and services.

The GDP growth target, said Mr Oubouzar, assumes minimum growth rates of 4.5 percent for agriculture, 6.5 percent for water projects, 8 percent for non-hydrocarbon industry, 8.5 percent for construction and public works, and 5.6 percent for the service sector.

Upon concluding its debates, the ANP adopted the 1958-1989 5-year planning bill, the 1985 finance bill, the operating budget and the 1985 annual plan.

Then, on 24 December 1984, President Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic, secretary general of the FLN [National Liberation Front Party], signed the budget bill in a ceremony attended by members of the political bureau and the government.

Breakdown of Proposed Budgetary Expenses

The 1985 government budget is projected at 64,186,370,000 dinars, divided as follows (in millions of dinars):

Office of the President	611.050
National Defense	4,793.135
Finance	1,252.450
Foreign Affairs	583.514
Interior and Localities	2,847.485
Justice	477.357
Agriculture and Fishing	766.028
Information	350.770
Heavy Industry	94.630
Transport	373.795
National Education	11,026.745
Higher Education	2,764.372
Energy, Chemical and Petrochemical Industry	201.472
Veterans	2,972.350
Commerce	130.610
Religious Affairs	363.680
Professional Training and Labor	1,397.909
Culture and Tourism	218.349
Social Protection	477.897
Hydraulics, Environment and Forests	798.338
Public Works	690.765
Planning and National Development	147.189
Public Health	720.600
Light Industry	137.368
Youth and Sports	403.561
Housing, Construction and Urban Planning	359.452
Non-departmental outlays	27,197.551

Minister on Development

Algiers EL-DJEICH in French No 260, Jan 85 pp 11-16

[Interview with Mr Ali Oubouzar, minister of planning and national development, by A. Silmi and B. Moussa M'Barek; date and place not specified]

[Text] Because of the importance of economic planning and inter-sectoral socio-economic coordination in the overall process of national development, EL-DJEICH has interviewed the minister of planning and national development regarding the

achievements of the first 5-year plan and possible achievements of the second 5-year plan which is just getting under way.]

[Question] First of all, Mr Minister, can we say that our country has achieved all the objectives of the first 5-year plan and all of its programs?

[Answer] The principal achievements are considerable. These include, among others:

--completion of the organic restructuring of the public sector enterprises and the financial restructuring which is on the point of completion. Thus, with an improved financial foundation, the enterprises will be able to focus their efforts on production and management;

--simplification of procedures and the establishment of contractual relations between the public enterprises;

--finally, better organization of the private sector has been achieved by means of various laws adopted in this domain in 1982.

In terms of social progress, we can point in particular to:

--satisfying the demand for jobs;

--a significant increase in consumption (thanks in part to the annual production plans for 1980 and 1981);

--getting a higher percentage of children in the schools and adapting the educational system to conform to the needs of the economy; the law on personnel planning in particular;

--a remarkable enlargement of vocational training capacity, which doubled during this period;

--the launching of several hospital projects, some 40 of which will soon be completed;

--adoption of the health code;

--stopping the cycle of shortages;

--gradual implementation of the SGT [expansion unknown] in various job categories, including most recently the postal workers, for whom it will go into effect in 1985; unification of the social security system.

In terms of national development, we should note the following achievements:

--the launching of major economic infrastructure projects;

--the reorientation of economic activities, primarily through the restructuring of the enterprises;

--steps taken to benefit the rural sector, primarily by means of the communal development plans.

Also, in macroeconomic terms:

--the basic structural proportions of the economy have been preserved;

--our external debt burden has been gradually reduced;

--domestic production (particularly industrial production) has had significant growth (6 to 7 percent);

--the economy's vulnerability to external factors has been reduced, while most other countries had to bear the full effects of the world economic crisis.

In terms of economic regulation, finally:

--we have begun to reform the pricing system and the tax laws;

--the practice of annual reviews of the plan has become a tradition.

However, several inadequacies can be pointed out:

--production increases have not met our expectations, even though significant results have been obtained;

--agricultural production has increased only slightly (even though this was in part because of the drought);

--productivity in construction and public works remains poor;

--rural exodus: even though some signs of migration in the opposite direction have been noticed, we must take even more vigorous action to deal with this phenomenon;

--the poor performance of non-hydrocarbon exports; despite the efforts made and results obtained, certain rigidities remain to be overcome: we must work continuously to improve fluidity and adaptive flexibility;

--In terms of investments, we have introduced a requirement that all proposals be fully worked out before approval can be given, but we have still seen delays and cost overruns.

These significant inadequacies should be overcome during the second 5-year plan.

[Question] Major portions of the first 5-year plan remain to be completed. How importantly do they figure in the second 5-year plan? What are the most important sectors that failed to achieve their targets in the first 5-year plan?

[Answer] This question of uncompleted objectives rests on a notion that stands in need of clarification. This notion lumps together both projects that are under way and those that were never started during the planning period. Any planning exercise takes into account problems that may delay program implementation. Also, it is necessary periodically to review the list of planned investments and update it.

When the first 5-year plan was launched, the importance of projects already under way limited our maneuvering room with respect to the launching of major new projects. Also, we established stricter procedures for project approval, while at the same time insisting on completion of projects that were already under way. These programs represented more than 55 percent of the investments in the first plan.

By the end of the current planning period, the updating of our project list has reduced the size of the backlog.

Programs now under way can be broken down into sectors as follows:

- Industry: 20 percent of program cost;
- Construction: 25 percent;
- Transport: 35 percent;
- Warehousing-distribution: 50 percent;
- Economic infrastructure: 55 percent;
- Social infrastructure: 45 percent.

[Question] What are the main focal points of the next plan, and how have they been determined?

[Answer] Every plan has its major variables and fundamental objectives around which it is constructed. The basic objective in the first triennial plan was employment. The two 4-year plans that followed were focused on the issue of growth and development, by means of exploiting sub-surface resources--the country's primary resources--and by means of industrialization. The first 5-year plan was concerned with reforming the economy, on the one hand, and with a recovery in the level of social consumption, both collective and individual.

The second 5-year plan is a plan for continued growth and development, despite a difficult international economic environment, characterized by a decrease in the price of petroleum, an economic crisis in the developed countries, which, in order to allay the effects of the crisis on their own economies, are exporting their inflation, their unemployment, and manipulating interest rates, thereby causing economic and social imbalances in the developing countries.

The second 5-year plan is thus based on acknowledging the external constraints and reducing our economy's vulnerability to them. The plan devotes particular attention to our energy resources, our debt, and finally to increasing overall demand.

Even though the country's economic balance has been subjected to so much strain, we have determined to achieve minimum growth rates of 6 or 7 percent, by emphasizing the creation of domestic resources which will be established through greater discipline in the execution of the plan and through better organization of the economy.

To mobilize more of our resources, we must intensify the efforts we have already been making on the domestic front vis-a-vis reform, rationalization of

production, financial restructuring, and improved productivity. Also, we need to keep a much closer eye on changes in collective and individual consumption, with regard to domestic production and domestic supply.

That entails significant efforts to mobilize savings available for productive use, and of course better utilization of human resources.

On the external front, the second 5-year plan will concentrate on better exploitation of our hydrocarbon resources, increasing non-hydrocarbon exports and doing something about the weight of our external debt.

Given these constraints, the top priorities will be agricultural development and expanding our hydraulic infrastructure, as well as the major rail and road systems. The other sectors will be called on to meet objectives of integration and substitution with respect to production destined for the development of our industrial plant or for satisfaction of social and individual needs. These same sectors will also need to reorganize themselves to increase their self-financing capability, improve productivity, and become more profitable.

All of these objectives taken together lead to the establishment of the following primary planning parameters:

--GDP growth: 6.5 percent;

--Investment growth: 6.5 percent;

--Import growth: 4.7 percent;

--Export growth: 5.3 percent.

And we consider that the second 5-year plan is a realistic and positive plan which has been carefully and responsibly crafted.

If these objectives seem ambitious, they are nevertheless not beyond Algeria's human and financial capabilities.

We are optimistic about realization of these objectives, because our country is used to meeting challenges. We are also convinced that all of the Algerian people will work to realize these economic and social objectives, which are crucial for the future of Algeria and the rising generations. One might say that the existing material and financial resources are sufficient for the country's development, if they are invested wisely. But these resources are not enough, if they are wasted. Thus it is necessary to wage a constant struggle against complacency, along the lines of the slogan of the 5th Congress, "Work and Rigorousness to Guarantee the Future."

With the help of God we will be successful.

[Question] What are the financial resources for the second 5-year plan, and how much is provided by hydrocarbons?

[Answer] It is important to distinguish between internal and external financing. Balance in one does not necessarily mean balance in the other. In the previous period, we needed only to insure external balance. The state's revenue was sufficient to provide for internal financing needs.

In the upcoming period, the needs of the economy--and their complexity--are such that we must give special attention to maintaining balance both internally and externally.

Internally, there is substantial potential in both public and private sector industry, as well as at the household level.

In the future, each party concerned will have to provide the resources it needs.

The state will cover its expenses from government revenue, in other words it will see that operating expenses are covered by ordinary revenue, so that the oil tax can continue to finance its capital expenses.

Thus, hydrocarbons will finance a little less than half of the 1985-1989 5-year plan.

The rest of the financing will come from:

- household savings estimated at about 58 billion dinars over the period. These savings will have to be mobilized into the financial system in order to assume at least a part of the burden of housing expenses and to avert inflationary pressures.

- institutional savings.

- above all, the savings of the enterprises, which from now on must play a crucial backup role. In effect, the state is justified, on the basis of the organizational and reform measures that it has taken, in expecting improved efficiency from the enterprises, which will mean more substantial financial participation in their own development.

As for external financing, it must conform to two basic principles: reduction in the debt service ratio and greater reliance on non-hydrocarbon exports to provide for the economy's external financing.

[Question] Mr Minister, you have given the APN statistics on changes in production, investment, household consumption and unemployment. What is the significance of these figures for our economy, particularly with respect to jobs?

[Answer] With respect to the significance of the figures I have given the APN regarding the second 5-year plan (in terms of production, investment, consumption and jobs):

- consumption is not growing as rapidly as investment;

- exports need to be increased;

- investment should increase, at a rate less than 7 percent, and be lower than the growth rate of the GDP;

- the economy's openness should be reduced (in other words there should be less reliance on external resources in project implementation);

--production should increase by more than 7 percent; this is critical to achieving balance across the board;

--Jobs: We must create and fill nearly a million jobs, principally in education, health and the productive sectors.

[Question] There are fluctuations and strains in the international hydrocarbon market. Could that situation affect the upcoming plan?

[Answer] Preparation of the 1985-1989 5-year plan began in 1982, and since the initial technical studies began we have taken into consideration the uncertainties of the oil market.

These studies resulted in the development of different possible development scenarios, which led to the development of a primary scenario which was used in the elaboration of the current version of the 1985-1989 5-year plan. By taking into account the most probable eventualities, we should be able to carry the objectives of the second 5-year plan to a successful completion, thanks to the modifications permitted within the framework of the annual plans, even if short-term developments in the hydrocarbon market are unfavorable.

[Question] The plan is of an imperative nature and requires painstaking monitoring in order to see that projects are carried out within the assigned deadlines. Is there evidence that we have the capability?

[Answer] Every project manager has learned that financial resources are not enough to get an investment off the ground, since one must also have:

--human resources;

--preparation of documents;

--careful review of the project;

--various studies (impact on imports, on integration, etc...);

--coordination with contractors at both the national and the local level;

--utilization of analytical accountability;

--physical follow-up, not just financial follow-up (for example: if a project costing 100 units is supposed to create 100 classes, it should not use all the money to build 50 classes).

Cost overruns, in the future, should be the exception rather than the rule, and must be fully justified (initial application of this measure during the first 5-year plan).

Efforts have been made: simplification of procedures, reform of the enterprises, greater delegation of responsibility to project managers, decentralization. These should translate into declining costs and respect for construction deadlines. When implementation of the annual plan is reviewed at the CND [expansion unknown], there will be regular and systematic review of performance in these areas.

[Question] Integration of industry and agriculture is an essential factor in sustaining a national economy with all sectors in balance. How is this important aspect treated in the second 5-year plan?

[Answer] The fundamental objective of the process of economic and social development to which Algeria is committed is the construction of an independent economy that can provide for its own self-development, an economy in which most of the exchanges between branches and sectors of economic activity occur within our own national borders.

This objective of economic integration will systematically be given high priority during the operation of the second 5-year plan, in accordance with the resolutions of the 5th Congress of the FLN Party.

Those resolutions, in effect, strongly underlined the country's determination to reduce our external dependence during the next planning period, and they recommended giving greater attention to programs and activities designed to reinforce integration of domestic economic activity.

In that context, as you indicated in the preface to your question, activities designed to integrate the most important productive sectors (industry and agriculture) are fundamental, especially since agriculture along with hydraulics (which cannot be divorced from agriculture) will be the top priority in the next 5-year plan.

First of all, in terms of integration, it should be recalled that previous development plans made important gains, particularly with respect to industrial production for agriculture. One might cite as examples the manufacture of tractors, agricultural machinery and equipment, hydraulic equipment, fertilizers, plastic fibers, hand-tools, etc...

In the upcoming 5-year plan we will be concerned with consolidating and building on these advances:

- consolidating them by raising the level of domestic production to the level needed to meet domestic needs;

- building on them by expanding the gamut of products manufactured in the country.

More concretely, the following actions will be launched during the new 5-year plan:

- increased production capacity in agricultural tractors, phosphate-based fertilizers, plastic fibers and pipes for hothouse crops, pipes for irrigation, containers, cereal crop processing plants, etc...

- manufacture of mini-tractors and power cultivators, etc...

So much for agriculturally oriented industrial inputs.

With respect to agricultural supplies for use by industry, which is the other side of the process of integration, a still greater effort remains ahead of us to raise agricultural production to a level sufficient to assure continuous, normal operation of the agro-industrial units.

I would add, finally, that over and above the input exchanges between the sectors of agriculture and industry, other actions are being undertaken to promote the growth of exchanges between the two sectors. Thus, for example:

--the price levels for industrial products destined for agriculture are actively supported in order to promote the widest possible distribution (fertilizers, tractors, fuels (F.O.D. [expansion unknown])).

Finally,

--programs of rural electrification will be a positive factor working toward balanced development of the two sectors.

[Question] Mastery of the technology is the foundation for success of any economic project. How capable are Algerian white-collar workers in that regard, particularly if technical cooperation is cut back except in narrowly defined spheres?

[Answer] In effect, mastery of technology in its larger sense is the foundation for the success of any economic project.

In reality, modern technologies are evolving very rapidly, and in all fields of activity, whether the subject is organization of the economy, management or production.

It is a fact that the white-collar workers have an extremely important role to play in terms of mastery of the technology, but one must add that their role must be complemented and supplemented by a corps of technicians indispensable in every productive process, particularly senior and mid-level technicians.

In the early years of our development, the scarcity of white-collar workers and the imperative of building the state and the industrial base dictated concentrating the majority of such workers in administration and the industrial sector; quantitative insufficiency of white-collar workers led us to resort to technical assistance in numerous fields.

Now, as we go into the second 5-year plan, conditions are dramatically different, and the number of engineers, white-collar workers just graduated from school, is growing every year. We can say, from this point of view, that our economy has sufficient white-collar workers to cut back on our reliance on cooperation.

However, for this process to be carried out successfully, two important conditions must be met:

- 1) The first is that the white-collar workers receive training adequate to meet our economic and social development needs, which implies that our educational and vocational training system must be modernized to assume responsibility for the technical and scientific dimension.

Proposed reforms now under study lead us to hope for a renovation of education in this direction.

2) The second is that the skills of the white-collar workers must be utilized judiciously and appreciated, particularly in terms of assuring adequate remuneration for the positions they occupy.

Also, in regard to the rapid progress in knowledge and technology, vocational rehabilitation and recycling of white-collar workers will be essential for our economy.

Despite a few insufficiencies, the process is now under way, and I think we can say that Algerian white-collar workers are currently able, in most fields of activity, to take over responsibility for our development.

[Question] Does our country have enough construction equipment to carry out the projects in the next 5-year plan?

[Answer] A considerable effort was made during the period 1980-1984 to build up the domestic construction industry and decentralize it.

Thus, in the context of the vast reorganization of various sectors of the national economy, nearly 1,000 enterprises were created, including 800 at the local community level.

Simultaneously, a total of 20 billion dinars was appropriated to provide numerous construction enterprises with equipment and technico-administrative infrastructure.

However, the results of that effort, while significant in terms of the level of responsibility which the plan put in Algerian hands, are not yet satisfactory in terms of the percentage of needs to be met from our own resources.

This situation results in part from the poor performance of construction enterprises, largely due to the failure of the buildings and public works sector in terms of setting up sufficiently high quality training, professional standards, technical instruction, organization and project programming.

Also, given the priorities and objectives established for the second 5-year plan for 1985-1989, efforts must be re-oriented, away from massive and extensive investment in the acquisition of equipment that is very costly in terms of foreign exchange, toward intense investment in the training of people and in general organization of construction enterprises.

Convergent policies to motivate workers should be implemented systematically in order to mobilize all participants in the construction process. In particular, the tool of research and development should be used to advance the policy of improving production and reducing costs.

The contribution of the private sector to building up the nation's construction capacity should be encouraged, especially by steps to simplify procedures for obtaining supplies and equipment--a step which would, at the same time, reduce the uncertainties with which these enterprises must contend.

These steps will be implemented with the idea of orienting the private sector portion of the construction industry toward participation in realization of the priority projects in the 1985-1989 5-year plan.

We will resort to foreign research and development capabilities only when confronted with very complex tasks that we ourselves have not yet mastered.

In those exceptional cases where we do resort to foreign firms, we will make use of the appropriate techniques at their disposal, but project direction will remain in the hands of Algerian nationals, thus accomplishing an effective transfer of technology at the minimum cost.

Finally, we shall try to achieve a better sectoral and regional distribution of construction capabilities, taking into account the tasks that need to be performed, organizational capabilities, and above all the policies of decentralization and national development.

In conclusion, the national construction sector, which consists of some 6,000 enterprises (1,500 in the public sector), should be able to take full charge of implementing the investment projects scheduled for the 1985-1989 5-year planning period. In this way the sector will be a critical catalyzing force, an engine driving the process of development, and a key participant in the integration of the national economy.

[Question] Maintenance plays an essential role in preserving the progress we have made in national development. To a certain extent this keeps us dependent on foreign sources. Is special attention given to this aspect in the plan?

[Answer] In effect, in any field of activity, maintenance is a critical determinant of the effectiveness of the development effort. In the past this sector did not receive enough attention, either in terms of organization or in terms of investment. Maintenance has in general been provided by a multitude of operators whose reliability was more or less debatable. The public sector played a minor part in the total maintenance effort, and the small private sector service companies at work in every domain found themselves increasingly faced with the problems of under-qualification, inadequate equipment, and uncertainties with regard to supply of spare parts. In June 1982 the government adopted a plan for rolling stock maintenance. The objective set forth in the 5-year plan is to spell out precisely the kinds of actions called for in the plan and extend those principles to other domains: public works machinery, electric household appliances, and others.

From this point of view, the purposes of the actions called for are:

- rationalization of machinery and vehicle pools, in part by means of standardization;

- improvement of the percentage of time when the equipment is operational;

- extension of the equipment's useable lifetime.

[Question] What is the role of the local communities in the decentralization of the plan, in its requirements, its implementation and its scheduled follow-up activities?

[Answer] The economic and social contributions of the wilayas and the communes to the national development plan have been constantly increasing since 1980. This growing role of the local communities in the decentralization of the plan stems from one of the fundamental principles of our national development policy

in its many aspects. This intensification of local development activity between 1980 and 1984, which has created new momentum by meeting the social needs of the population, will be continued during the upcoming 1985-1989 5-year plan. Local activity, however, should unfold within the context of the decisions made with regard to sectoral priorities, options, national development and organization of the economy. Thus, the priority objectives for the agricultural and hydraulic sectors should be integrated at the local level and supported by rural-oriented efforts. The local communities will need to assure a reasonable balance between production objectives and social objectives, in order to develop harmoniously.

The implementation of decentralized hydro-agricultural development, small and medium-sized industry, geographic integration, rural electrification, and community infrastructure must be an essential dimension of decentralized planning and economic and social integration.

In the upcoming phase, the local communities should have both their activities and their priorities better organized, within the framework of the annual plans which govern them, and they should work toward achieving more balanced land use within their jurisdiction.

Also, they will need to make a special effort to mobilize human and financial resources, as well as make more profitable use of local construction capabilities at their level. In terms of plan follow-up activities, the wilayas and the communes are full-fledged economic actors, and as such they will be subject to the same obligations as those at other planning levels.

Thus, their field of action will be spelled out, according to the organic planning law. In any case, local follow-up is of special importance in relation to the great decentralization move begun in 1980, and it is one of the initiatives aimed at consolidating and insuring planning discipline at all levels.

[Question] President Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic and secretary general of the FLN, has on many occasions affirmed the necessity of gaining control over demographic growth in general as well as urban growth in particular. If the first depends on the intelligence of the individual citizen, the second is the responsibility of the planning authorities. What is your opinion on this, Mr Minister?

[Answer] The issue of urbanization which you have raised has been a constant concern of the country's top authorities, particularly since implementation of the current 5-year plan was begun.

This concern has often been the subject of pertinent guidelines and directives issued by the president of the republic and secretary general of the FLN in his working visits to the wilayas.

No effort has been spared to make available to local authorities all of the indispensable tools for better management of urban land use and rational administration of our land resources.

In that regard, presidential directive 13 both spells out our present shortcomings and provides a frame of reference for our actions in the field of urban planning.

In effect, with respect to the excessive tendency toward urbanization of the peripheral areas around cities and towns, the presidential directive says it is necessary to stop that phenomenon.

To do that, the local authorities have at their disposal all the legislative and regulatory tools, as well as all the urban planning tools, necessary to gain effective control over urban growth.

In that connection, I would specifically refer to:

- the basic law on communal land reserves, which is a critical planning tool for the local communities;

- the legislative statutes regarding building permits and land subdivision, as well as the regulations that appertain to them;

- the emergency measures to protect urban land by the process of provisional demarcation of urban boundary lines;

- increasingly numerous studies on directive urban planning;

- specific research and development programs on new urban housing zones;

- the numerous research and development programs on urban renewal zones.

The complementary measures envisioned to realize the objectives set forth in directive 13 are of several different kinds:

- 1)--Gradual introduction of integrated housing throughout all the urban areas, which is provided for in recent government directives.

- 2)--Reduction if not termination of the big housing programs, in favor of smaller programs that can be easily integrated into the existing urban fabric.

- 3)--Reorganization of the major new urban housing zones.

- 4)--More sustained attention to the development of medium-sized urban areas (a new administrative category).

It is important to stress the preponderant role of local authorities in the implementation of our vision of urban planning.

In that regard, I might mention that they should closely monitor the rapid elaboration of directive urban plans and see that they are respected.

9516
CSO : 4519/102

3 April 1985

ALGERIA

VEHICLE ASSEMBLY PLANT PLANNED FOR 1986

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 12 Feb 85 p 3

[Text] (APS)--A proposal to assemble passenger cars and utilitarian vehicles was recently passed by the Cabinet, making it possible to outline a program for implementation of the schedule advanced for completion of the project.

The main lines of the program consist of building an initial vehicle assembly plant on a given site, develop subcontracting and undertake the feasibility studies for two more assembly plants.

New subcontracting units might also be undertaken by 1985, along with a program of vertical integration.

The importance of this project, which will mean the introduction of the automobile industry in Algeria for private cars and utilitarian vehicles, was emphasized by the chief of state, particularly with respect to the location of the vehicle assembly units and meeting domestic demand.

While the exact site of the future units has not been picked yet, the region has been selected.

As the chief of state recalled, priority must be given to the High Plateaux and areas possible to serve by rail.

The approach and plan of presentation for the proposals in question were selected based on the international context of the automobile industry, the context of the national market and finally, choices to be made for completion of the projects.

The analysis of the international situation of the automobile industry shows that growth in demand has slowed, going from 10.5 percent at the end of the 1960's to .6 percent in 1981. Competition between producer countries has also grown. Japan alone produces one-third of all world production.

There is also an excess production capacity at present. Effective production is on the order of 32.6 million vehicles for a world capacity of 43 million, not including the production of European socialist countries.

The automobile industry has also undergone profound technological changes in order to reorganize and emerge from the crisis by adapting to innovations and new demands of the market. There is a general tendency to increase the participation of host countries and international firms in order to ensure trade. Finally, the automobile industry requires heavy investments with reductions in personnel.

The analysis of the national automobile market shows that the current number of private cars is 900,000 with an average age of 12, compared with 4 to 5 for European cars. There are over 17 makes, 3 of which account for 76 percent of all cars in the country (Peugeot, 38 percent; Renault, 27 percent; Fiat, 11 percent).

The current supply is 50,000 vehicles, particularly through the AIV [expansion unknown] and emigration. This figure does not include direct importation. However, this supply is far from meeting the national demand. The need for VPU [passenger cars and utilitarian vehicles] was put at between 90,000 and 170,000 by 1990 and at between 150,000 and 300,000 by the year 2000.

Regarding the performance of the automobile industry, the evaluation shows that a large part of the basic technologies already exist in Algeria (SNVI [presumably National Industrial Vehicles Company], PMA [National Enterprise for the Production of Agricultural Machinery] and PROMETAL [National Enterprise for Utilitarian Metallurgical Products] in particular), but that the technologies of operation and design are far from mastered. Finally, many technologies for the manufacture of components must still be introduced and promoted.

Algeria produced 7,350 industrial vehicles in 1984, including 4,700 60-percent assembled and 2,650 35-percent assembled.

Based on these data, one may outline objectives for the choice of vehicle construction projects.

Among the overall objectives, it is a matter of meeting national needs and participating in the development of the territory, contributing to industrial, economic and social integration of the country and finally, encourage the integration of national production into the international market, over minimum levels of accumulation. In addition, so-called "tactical" objectives might be set, including: the creation of an industrial manufacturing dynamic aimed at promoting subcontracting activities; launching and mastering the process of technological accumulation; launching and mastering the process of financial and social accumulation; and finally, furthering knowledge of the terms of choices to be made in vertical integration (stamping, mechanics, metallurgy).

Based on the analyses and evaluations made, it was proposed to build an assembly plant on the order of 30,000 private and utilitarian vehicles a year on an equipped site for a sum of 300 million, the launching of feasibility studies

for the definition of new assembly plants, as well as construction of new assembly plants in the area of the High Plateaux, planned for 1986.

Finally, there will be a stamping unit and gradual program of vertical integration beginning in 1987.

In addition, there are plans for the importation of private cars and utilitarian vehicles to reduce tension on demand in the immediate future.

Contacts at a high level with the different potential partners must be initiated during the first quarter of 1985 in order to obtain agreements in principle on the strategic elements of the proposed undertaking and permit presentation of the dossier on choice of the partner and the contracting of the first unit.

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CSO: 4519/103

ALGERIA

ROLE OF PORT OF BEJAIA DESCRIBED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID Supplement in French 11 Feb 85 p III

[Article by M. B.: "A Regional Vocation"]

[Text] With its port, Bejaia already counts a great deal, not only in the wilaya [governorate], but in all the neighboring regions and the High Plateaux. Its sphere of influence extends over nearly 12 wilayas, in the opinion of officials.

For the time being, its capacity is greatly exceeded. The flow of goods and other specific economic activities is very great. The volume forces the port to work 24 hours a day. Given the rapid development of port traffic, authorities have taken the necessary steps and already, new piers are being built.

On the whole, the port is divided into two main portions: the oil port and the goods port.

The former has three wharves, one of which is outdated for technical reasons (limited depth). Despite this handicap, the oil port handled the exportation of 6,061,000 tons of crude in 1983 and 6,395,000 tons in 1984.

As for the goods port, which has seven piers, it handled 2,148,000 tons of goods in 1983 and 2,323,000 tons in 1984.

However, one must note that the main commodities handled are cement and grain.

The capacity of the port of Bejaia, however great, can be greatly increased with more storage structures. According to port officials, storage appears to be the prime hindrance to improving port performance. For the time being, outside of the goods immediately taken away by customers, the rest is stored in the roadstead. The length of the stay in the roadstead varies depending on the type of merchandise. Demurrage thus becomes important.

However, considerable efforts are being made at the port of Bejaia to reduce the waiting in the roadstead. In 1978, for example, the wait was an average of 12 days, in 1980 7 and in 1984, 2.94 days. These gradual improvements continue, while port traffic increases with every passing year. In addition

to the wait in the roadstead, there is the pier time, meaning the time needed to load and unload the vessel. The length of pier time improved from 3.63 days in 1983 to 3.2 in 1984.

The wait in the roadstead and pier time are not long, but if one calculates the working time lost during the year, one sees a considerable loss. According to port officials, in 1984 alone, there were 4,361 hours of waiting at the pier due to the shortage of means of evacuation and storage areas. These 4,361 hours represent 181 24-hour days, or 181 12-hour work days, representing the handling of some 137,000 tons.

Every ton handled cost 38.41 dinars in 1984, compared with 51.68 in 1983. These are the reasons that caused local officials to develop the port so that it would respond to its regional vocation and make up the losses.

This development underway, whose work is 70-percent completed, concerns 750 linear meters of additional pier with 13 meters draught (depth) and 300 meters of width. The entire port covers 23 hectares.

Alongside the commercial aspect, the Bejaia port has also had a maritime terminal since July 1977. Some 52,000 passengers went through Bejaia in 1984 with an average of two ships a week in the summer and one during the winter weeks.

This brief description of the Bejaia port gives us an idea about its substantial traffic and above all, the need to provide it with the means to take up its real regional vocation.

Along with the purely commercial activity of the port, there is the fishing involving 30 small fishermen mainly working in the spring and summer and some 12 trawlers and sardine boats.

Finally, the operation of the port is ensured by 54 management employees, 266 foremen, 796 workers and 5 women agents.

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EGYPT

MUMTAZ NASSAR DISCUSSES DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS IN EGYPT

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 21 Feb 85 p 2

[Interview with Mumtaz Nassar by Badawi Mahmud in Cairo: "Opposition Leader Mumtaz Nassar Acknowledged Mubarak Is Oriented Toward More Democracy"; date not specified]

[Text] He is a justice; he is a jurist; he knows how to weigh his words and formulate them intelligently to get to the point.

He is a politician, a parliamentarian; his game is dialogue and maneuver in which he uses all his powers of persuasion.

That is why many under the People's Assembly dome may disagree with Justice Mumtaz Nassar, the leader of the Wafdist opposition, over an idea or a thought, but they do not disagree over "him" or over the respect they have for him as a personality who enriches and invigorates parliamentary life and emphasizes the other side of democracy that makes room for the minority as well as the majority.

With this in mind, we present him today on this page.

[Question] What has party experience added to political action in Egypt?

[Answer] Democracy in any country flourishes under the multi-party system. This is what prompted the Egyptian constitution to abolish the Socialist Union and provide for the multi-party system.

If the currently-existing restrictions in the party law are removed and the multi-party system is allowed to exist without [such] a law, this will reinforce democracy. It is the right of any group of citizens to form a political party, a right established in the Human Rights Charter and it should not be regulated by any restrictions.

Any party is judged by the people who have the right to elect it to or remove it from power.

Therefore, I believe that the party system in Egypt, in its present form, does not complement true democracy 100 percent.

[Question] But hasn't the opposition gone overboard in its right to exercise criticism?

[Answer] I do not believe in the development and gradual bestowal of rights. Either we have freedom or we do not.

I think the Third World, the non-aligned countries particularly, need the liberty of practicing freedoms with all their powers, for utilizing freedoms to their fullest is the only outlet for progress.

Mubarak Is Democratic

[Question] Has democracy [in Egypt] not grown in recent times?

[Answer] Fairness requires us to say that President Husni Mubarak's regime has been marked by a trend toward democracy. I think the president believes in integrated democracy, notwithstanding some of the restrictions in our legislation that still hamper the democratic process.

[Question] In view of the 60-member opposition representation in the People's Assembly, people were expecting more animated debates in the assembly's work and radical solutions to our problems. This did not happen. Why?

[Answer] I disagree with you. Suffice it to say that we presented over 100 queries, interpellations and bills during this brief period in the assembly's life.

We submitted a bill for abolishing political isolation, for no citizen should be deprived of his constitutional rights to candidacy or election or of any other right.

We also submitted a bill prohibiting the acceptance of gifts by the state. This is the first legislation in Egypt that represents honesty and integrity in our lives.

What we have done underscores the vitality of the opposition in the assembly.

[Question] But so far you have not presented any alternatives to our economic problems and the government is still way ahead in this domain.

[Answer] We have participated in offering advice and counsel. We participated in the conference held by the government to debate our economic conditions. We presented our ideas, and when the president asked us for an opinion regarding the subsidy question, we submitted a full report to him.

The economic situation does not need a philosophy in order to deal with it. First, it needs government abstinence, then higher production and a freeze in borrowing.

[Question] But improvement of our economic situation is more comprehensive than the subsidy issue.

[Answer] The economic situation is diverse and within the jurisdiction of the ad hoc committee we in the party have created for economic affairs.

Anyhow, the People's Assembly session began last January, after which we had many holidays and the assembly did not reconvene until November. I think at the end of the current session you can ask me about the economic bills I have submitted.

[Question] Why has the opposition not formed a shadow government as opposition parties do in deeply-rooted democracies?

[Answer] A few weeks ago we formed 20 ad hoc party committees, each one opposite a People's Assembly committee. These committees began their meetings as of the first of February. They are studying the issues brought before them and are preparing legislation to be submitted to the assembly.

[Question] In the last People's Assembly elections, the Wafd ran as a front with the Muslim Brotherhood and some other elements from the pre-revolution minority parties. Has this formula proven successful?

[Answer] The party nominated its candidates as Wafdists, irrespective of their previous orientations. Furthermore, the Brotherhood looks upon the Wafd as the party that has not shown any enmity toward them or any assault on their persons or their ideology. Hence the great rapprochement between us. They ran for the elections under the Wafd banner and were nominated on the basis of its principles and as individuals who do not represent anything other than its ideology.

We are still in agreement and the only one who has left is Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il, who disagreed with us in method only.

[Question] Has the resignation of Shaykh Salah [Abu Isma'il] not influenced the stance of a Brotherhood current toward the party?

[Answer] I do not think so because Shaykh Salah attacked everyone, including [brotherhood leader] 'Umar al-Talmasani.

[Question] Does Shaykh Salah's resignation from the Wafd mean he will be dropped from the People's Assembly membership?

[Answer] No. During the last legislative session, a National Party deputy submitted a bill, presented to us in the legislative committee, proposing the dropping of any one who loses his party affiliation from the assembly's membership. But this bill was voted down by both the majority and the opposition.

[Question] Does this mean that the assembly can have independent members?

[Answer] Yes. The law does not deprive independents of their assembly membership. All it does is deprive the independents of the right to candidacy. However, so long as a candidate wins the election as part of a party slate, he has full freedom thereafter.

[Question] What exactly do you mean by the application of the Islamic Shari'ah rules?

[Answer] The civil law was enacted in 1948 by Dr al-Sanhuri, who consulted the Islamic Shari'ah. The terms of the civil law conform to 95 percent of the Shari'ah provisions.

[Question] Then how many civil law provisions are at variance with the Shari'ah?

[Answer] Less than 5 percent. They are the ones dealing with interest on money, usury and some provisions concerning insurance and mortgages. We have replaced them with provisions that conform to the Shari'ah in the committees that were deliberating them, one of which I chaired.

In these committees, we said that the civil law is an old legacy that must be neither abolished nor wasted. Let us eliminate the provisions and the Islamic jurisprudence that have been embedded in the people's minds since 1948; let us eliminate the provisions of the Court of Cassation. This opinion, we underscored, was adapted by the general assembly of the Court of Cassation justices. But Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il wants to change the entire law. Why cause confusion in the people's thinking and interests and among the students of law who apply it although most of its provisions conform to the Shari'ah?

[Question] What about the penal code?

[Answer] In the penal code, we must change the provisions dealing with legal and disciplinary punishments. There is no disagreement over this matter. Instead of imprisonment and hard labored penalties, we apply the legal punishment stipulated by the Koran and the Sunnah. This issue needs no debate, but we must follow the rules set forth in the constitution and the assembly's bylaws to bring about changes. However, Shaykh Salah does not want to follow the said rules, but wants to change everything without rules.

[Question] Are there bills before the People's Assembly now for applying the Islamic Shari'ah?

[Answer] There are no bills, but there are studies made by assembly members in which we participated.

[Question] Your party newspaper defends the consumption open-door policy. It defends Port Sa'id as an outlet for smuggling consumer goods to the interior and the currency dealers. Is this your policy?

[Answer] Everyone calls for a production open-door policy. This will be manifested in the work of the party's economic committee. The newspaper will publish the bills that achieve a production open-door policy for the consumption open-door policy hurts only the people and will have the most dire consequences.

[Question] How far does the party's policy conform to its newspaper policy?

[Answer] Only God is perfect. When we have a point of contention, it is brought up in the party's Higher Body to reach a consensus on it.

[Question] Why did you choose the Wafd?

[Answer] For many reasons. Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha was the founder of the Arab League and the first one to draw up in 1943 the law governing the independence of the judiciary in Egypt and to abolish the capitulations.

I also consulted my family after the enactment of the slate election law. I asked them what party I should join, in view of the ban on the independents, and they all agreed on the Wafd. My family is Wafdist and my father was the party's candidate in the 1939 and 1942 elections.

[Question] Then, were it not for the election law, you would not have joined the Wafd?

[Answer] I wanted to remain independent or to form the Justice Party, but when the door was closed in my face, I found that the Wafd was the closest to my way of thinking.

[Question] In general, the Wafd has been interested, from the minute it re-emerged, in rallying the anti-23 July revolution. What do you say to that?

[Answer] The Wafd supported the revolution at the beginning, and had the revolution achieved the principle of sound democracy, there would not have been any disagreement.

[Question] It is noted, however, that it has lost some of its pre-revolution popularity.

[Answer] The Wafd is still rooted in the young people's minds and I think many of them believe in it. I remember when I went to the al-Qawsiyah center, I found that we were welcomed by the young. When I asked them how they had heard about the Wafd since they had grown up in the revolutionary era, they said the Wafd was an old party with its own history which they read in books.

[Question] There are three Wafdist groupings currently: the New Wafd Party, the Wafdist Vanguard and the Conservative Wafdist. What do you think?

[Answer] The Wafd is an integrated party encompassing all currents. It has the right, the left and the center; the Wafdist Vanguard is the party's youthful wing. A few days ago, Dr 'Abd-al-Muhsin Hammudah came to me, seeking a conciliation.

[Question] What is the difference between the Wafd and the New Wafd?

[Answer] No difference except that the New Wafd has experienced the changes that occurred and was influenced by them, as evidenced by its agreement with us on agricultural reform.

[Question] If you had a chance to form the Justice Party, would you do it?

[Answer] After joining the Wafd, I cannot.

[Question] In the 1976 and 1979 People's Assembly sessions, you were an independent member and now you are the opposition leader. What is the difference between the two sessions?

[Answer] I sense no difference because I am 100 percent objective in my opposition.

[Question] You represent the al-Badari district in the People's Assembly and your district is known for arms smuggling. What have you done about it?

[Answer] What I objected to was the way the Interior Ministry collected weapons from the district villages. There were many violations by the police during the campaign.

I believe that the legal ways are the best method for confiscating any smuggled weapons. If the police learn about individuals possessing arms, they should get a warrant from the prosecution to confiscate such weapons.

[Question] Were these weapons not used in your election campaign?

[Answer] I had to. The governor of Asyut brought to me 5,000 soldiers, with their armored cars and guns, with himself as the head, to terrorize the people. They carried arms to face force with force!

[Question] Do you have friends in the National Party?

[Answer] Many, such as Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Ilah, Hasan Hafiz and others. Each of us has unlimited confidence in the other.

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EGYPT

SALAH ABU ISMA'IL SPEAKS ON ISLAMIC LAW

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 18, 19 Nov 84

[Interview with Salah Abu Isma'il, member of the Egyptian People's Assembly, by 'Adil Salah: "Sudan's Role in Implementing Islamic Law Is a Pioneering One. I Call upon God for the Sudan To Reap the Fruit of Its Sincere Repentance"; date and place not specified]

[18 Nov 84 p 14]

[Text] Al-Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il, member of the Egyptian People's Assembly, is known in the countries of the Islamic world without exception because he is the first to enter the People's Assembly carrying the banner of Islam and calling for the codification and application of the shari'ah.

Al-Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il was one of the great scholars of the Islamic world who took part in the first international conference for implementing Islamic law in the Sudan.

[Question] It was natural that we would begin our conversation with him in his apartment in Cairo by asking him about the law conference and his impressions during his visit to the Sudan, and his perception of the sincerity of the Islamic orientation in that bountiful land?

[Answer] I was happy to learn of President Ja'far Muhammad Numayri's intention to implement Islamic law in Sudan and I hope that this practice achieves the pinnacle of success, so as to offer a model to be emulated the world over.

I was happy with the Sudan's orientation, but was apprehensive because of the abundance of biased propaganda about this orientation towards God in the land of the beloved Sudan.

During the past month of Ramadan I took the opportunity of my meeting with Sudanese scholars in Kuwait to seek them out, with impatience and compassion, and was eager for their report on the Sudanese experiment or experience. I found them by the grace of God Almighty speaking the language of the happy confident savant, pleased with this experiment in the Sudan. No sooner had I received the invitation to participate in the proceedings of the first conference in observance of the first anniversary of the beginning of

implementation of Islamic law in the Sudan, than I hurried to respond, and I was bent on coming. I know that the Sudan is experiencing problems in connection with the economic situation, with the consumption of alcohol which was prevalent there, with the widespread moral and financial crimes, with the hateful and odious winds blowing in from the south, and is experiencing many problems and has its worries, responsibilities and obstacles that stand in its way, but I am absolutely sure that the orientation towards God, may his dominance be exalted, undertaken in good faith is the way for emerging from all this distress, because God Almighty says: "Whoever does good whether male or female and he is a believer, We will most certainly make him live a happy life, and We will most certainly give them their reward for the best of what they did." I am absolutely certain that this change which has come upon the Sudan, in a manner that satisfies God, only indicates that God will rectify whatever crises and problems it is undergoing, for Mighty God spoke truly: "God does not rectify something in a nation until it changes something in itself."

But until this change takes place, it is exposed to the plight mentioned in the saying of Almighty God: "Do men think that they will be left alone on saying, We believe, and not be tried? And certainly We tried those before them, so God will certainly know those who are true and those who are liars."

I went to the Sudan with a yearning heart and an eager spirit, and I was reassured about the thought that has taken shape over there, for President Ja'far Numayri's speech at the first meeting during his opening of the conference was indicative of an alert and intelligent leadership that knows the dimensions of its position and backs it up with a firm unshakeable belief. His speech touched upon economic, political, social and security aspects as well as the situation of the minorities in relation to the Moslem majority. It also touched upon this unity and mobilization between the leadership and the base. It touched upon all these circumstances with comprehensive awareness, in addition to the zakat [alms tax] as an Islamic bulwark and a divine obligation, and the banks and transactions. His speech was actually a balm for the wounds and gratifying to the soul, and I was gladdened by this intelligence.

And this intelligence is in itself a triumph because God, may He be blessed and exalted, says: "If you will not aid him, God certainly aided him when those who disbelieved expelled him." For the triumph--those who disbelieved having expelled him--is the triumph of faith which only became firmer in misfortune, the triumph of the determination which became keener in adversity, the triumph of the believing side that fled to Medina together with its faith, for which it sacrificed home and birthplace. That is the triumph.

On the intellectual level, I rejoiced at the radiant intelligence of President Numayri and the Sudanese leadership, as I rejoiced at the base, and I was intent on communicating with the Sudanese base at various levels. For no sooner had I received invitations to the Umm Durman University, to the African Center and to mosques than I accepted many of those invitations in order to observe the Sudan as it actually is. That is why supporters of the Sudan say: if the material world possesses nuclear warheads, we have heads that have taken in the Book of God and the Sunna of his Prophet, and that have betaken themselves along the true path to the Lord of the Worlds.

I observed the Sudan rise above its pains and rejoice, and you have observed with me how slogans were raised proclaiming: "God is great, and no rule save by the Qur'an," and "This people is an Islamic people, and this leader is an Islamic leader"; they have submitted to God the Lord of the World, submitted their guidance, their leaders and their present.

God, may He be Blessed and Exalted, had desired to grant to the Worlds this precedence in the land of the Sudan in spite of the problems that weigh upon the inhabitants of the Sudan, the obstacles that stand in their way, the responsibilities they bear and the economic conditions they are suffering. God, may He be Blessed and Exalted, had desired to bring out this radiant and brilliant example in order to quash the excuses of the apologists and the pretexts of the pretext-givers through it.

Regional consideration did not play its part in my soul, as an Egyptian, other than on the basis of that happiness that wishes itself on others in equal measure. I might have exaggerated the notion of happiness and arrive at the category of grief, with which I see Egypt, the country of al-Azhar, lagging behind its Sudanese brother, while it was al-Azhar, which is located in Egypt, that over more than 10, or approximately 11, centuries, had preserved language and religion. Egypt should have been the first to respond to the message of al-Azhar, which is embraced by its land and protected by its state, but "God knows best where to bring about His message." Congratulations to the people of Sudan, and congratulations to us, the neighbour of this people and I pray to Almighty God that this spirit be spread and that joy should prevail over the entire valley when integration between the Sudan and ourselves expands until it leaves the material behind to rise to the spiritual and that would not be difficult for God.

[Question] Some say that the beginning of the return to the implementation of Islamic Law in the poorest Moslem country, and in one suffering a stifling economic crisis, could frustrate any attempt to implement Islamic law in the other countries if the Sudan's economic situation does not improve soon; do you have any comment?

[Answer] As for the economic situation, it was taken up in the Qur'an, which showed that economic affluence comes as the fruit of belief and guarding against evil, as God Almighty says: "If the people of the cities had believed and guarded against evil, We would have opened blessings from heaven and earth onto them", moreover He asked the Jews and Christians to establish what was revealed to them from the Torah and the Bible, as the Almighty says: "If they had practiced the Torah and the Bible and what was revealed to them from their God, they would have eaten in plentiful measure." And had they practiced the Torah and the Bible in the manner revealed by God, they would have recognized Muhammad as their Prophet, Islam as their religion and the Qur'an as their law.

The Qur'an has related to us about the owner of the two gardens in the Surah of the Cave and how God, may He be blessed and exalted, had destroyed his garden in spite of the enormous wealth he had spent on it, not begrudging for its upkeep anything material or related to agricultural practice, and He said about

this: "And his wealth was destroyed; so he began to wring his hands for what he had spent on it, while it lay, having fallen down upon its roofs, and he said: Would that I had not associated anyone with my Lord." For God had associated idolatry with destruction, and it was immaterial, while God was destroying his garden, that he had spent on it and did not stint. The Surah of the Pen also related to us about those who denied the zakat on goods and went out at night intending to collect the crop before the poor men, those entitled to the agricultural alms tax, awakened. When they had resolved upon this, God's might overtook them at their garden and the Almighty said: "Then there encompassed it a visitation from your Lord while they were sleeping, so it became as black, barren land." As black as the night, without any sign of fruit in it.

Our Almighty God told us about the community of Saba' and said: "There was a sign for Saba' in their abode: two gardens, to the right and to the left. Eat of the provision of your Lord and be grateful to Him. A good land and forgiving Lord. But they turned away, so We sent against them a fierce flood." And God changed their blessings to distress. "And whoever turns away from My Book will have a life of distress."

For Almighty God had associated hunger with fear on the one side and depravity with rebellion on the other, and the Almighty said: "And God set forth a parable of a city which enjoyed security and peace. Its provisions came to it in plenty from every quarter, but it denied the favours of God, so God made it taste hunger and fear in plenty, because of what they used to do."

Because of all this, you find me completely reassured about the future of the Sudan, by the grace of God Almighty, and in the light of these divine promises. Yes, the reassurance is not absolute, because Almighty God said: "And We will try you with something of fear and hunger, and loss of wealth and lives, and fruits, but give glad tidings to the patient," but I say that it is the hunger which comes with the tribulations of raising standards and testing belief, and not the hunger which comes as punishment for depravity and rebellion. If the Sudan submitted to its Lord in repentance and returned to His right path, then it did so secure in the belief that He would not ruin its economy in punishment or bring down the wrath of God on it, because it had returned to Him and repented, and God Almighty rejoices at His servant when he returns to Him.

I say: Those who have convictions pay no attention to the hardships they encounter in life and our proof of this is Pharoah's magicians who declared their faith and were threatened by the tyrant that he would crucify them on the trunks of palm trees if they did not return to his creed, but they were mocking and making fun of him, saying: "We do not prefer you to what has come to us of clear arguments and to Him who made us, therefore decide what you are going to decide for you can only decide about this world's life." When convictions shine in the hearts and become crystallized in the minds, and when heads flourish with them, then we would sacrifice life, wealth, offspring and the world for them. As for wealth, let it come or let it go, as 'Umar Ibn-l-Khattab said: "If gratitude and patience were two camels I would have been indifferent as to which I rode," because he is able to reach his prize

through gratitude--"God will reward those who are grateful"--, as he is able to reach it through patience, and God Almighty says: "Only the patient will be paid back their reward in full, without measure."

It is not in any way possible that he who has convictions should be on his knees before the wealth of some states, or before their grants and loans because God Almighty says: "O, you who believe, the idolaters are nothing but unclean, so they shall not approach the sacred mosque after this year of theirs; and if you fear poverty then God will enrich you out of His grace if He pleases." And I would like to draw the attention of my brothers, the readers of the esteemed AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, to the phrase "if He pleases" so that divine generosity should not become a bribe for convictions, or an incentive for the orientation towards God, for God Almighty can dispense with the people of this world, while we are in need of Him.

I wish the Sudan to reap the fruits of its return to God, but I deem it above mortgaging its conviction for the sake of prosperity, so that if it lagged behind we would be infidels and if it moved forward we would be believers, because those who possess convictions do not reason in this manner. That is because we are with God Almighty for all time, and the Prophet, may the blessing and salvation of the Lord be upon him, when 'Ammar Ibn-Yasir said to him--along with Yasir Wasmiyah, 'Ammar's father--"Will you not call God to us, will you not intercede for us," he promised them paradise and said: "Of those who preceded you, a man would place a saw over the middle of his head in order to split it in two, and that which diverts him from his religion would fall to the ground." We display our convictions mortgaging them thereby for the sake of the world, for better or for worse. I pray to the Blessed God Almighty to rescue the Sudan from a life of distress and transport it to a life of opulence and plenty, and after it has been established that they are men of patience, to number the Sudanese among the grateful ones.

Tomorrow: Al-Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il speaks about his fervent wish to unite the Islamic deputies in the People's Assembly.

[19 Nov 84 p 12]

[Text] [Question] Egypt was one of the first countries to draft laws that derived from Islamic law; why was the Sudan able to act first in this sphere?

[Answer] Egypt had oriented itself towards God since the dawn of the Islamic conquest in Egypt, and its people is a believing people, and its youth, by the grace of God, is a youth that has been brought up by God Almighty in a manner that always reminds me of the saying of my Lord, praised be His name: "O you who believe, whoever turns back from his religion among you will witness God bring forth a people whom He shall love and they shall love Him. Lowly before the believers, mighty before the unbelievers, they shall strive for God and fear not the censure of any fault-finder."

The youth of Egypt is a believing youth created by God. It was not created by methods of education which are free of any religion in the universities, if we exclude Dar al-'Ulum College and what is being taught of personal statutes in

law schools: marriage, divorce and inheritance. It is a youth that was not created by information or the official milieu, and you see it, in spite of this, a zealous, believing youth.

And if Egypt had tended to stipulate in its constitution that Islamic law is the main source for Egyptian laws, then this is something which is stipulated in the constitution. However, neither codification practices nor the judicial or executive authorities have risen to the level of this tendency; that remains a mere constitutional stipulation which every Egyptian official swears to respect, venerate and implement, and then goes on to purjur his oath.

This item had played its part in the demands I made in the People's Assembly to implement Islamic law, and it might please the Blessed Almighty God to fulfill our hopes on the legislative level. The struggle for this end and the battle in God's right path has resulted in the formation of the five well-known committees: the criminal law, the civil law, the economic law, the social law and the procedural committees. There was also the law on evidence, the commercial and maritime laws, followed by the legislation of all this. It was sent to al-Azhar and was considered by the Islamic research academy, and it was sent to the advisory council at al-Azhar, which approved it after making some amendments, after which it was printed in its final version and distributed to the former Assembly, so that each of us had a copy of this Islamic legislation at hand.

What remains then? What remains is that this should be introduced to the People's Assembly for its approval after conducting the necessary Islamic debates on this work. This last point is the arena for the struggle, and the outcome is always in favor of those who are careful: "Let God aid whomever He wants, for God is strong and mighty."

Now my Lord has tested me with success for the third time in the People's Assembly, and I say tested me because we as Muslims look at the world, with its ups and downs, in no other light than the saying of God Almighty: "And We try you by evil and good by way of probation, and to Us you shall be brought back," for we are continuously being tried, tested and afflicted when we were tested with this membership. I am now struggling among colleagues and with the speaker of the Assembly because I want to push this legislation into the legislative current by way of article 208 in the Assembly by-laws which give at least 20 deputies the right to introduce a "proposal with intent" to debate these laws in order to discover what kind of liabilities stand in their way, what is delaying and weighing them down, and what obstacles bar their path. We shall work for the inclusion of this "proposal with intent" in the first agenda after introducing it.

This is what I hope for, and for which I am marshalling the resources of my colleagues. Together with the base, represented by the deputies in the People's Assembly, we are attempting to impose ourselves with the aid of God.

[Question] If we assume that you will be successful in this endeavor, and that the People's Assembly will approve these laws, how will they be implemented?

[Answer] In accordance with democracy it is always assumed that the minority will submit to the opinion of the majority. If in their absolute majority the bases are successful in their advocacy of the constitution, of Islam and of the wishes of the Islamic people, then it is assumed that the government will implement the majority opinion.

An Islamic Grouping

[Question] Some rumours are current that a number of deputies in the Egyptian People's Assembly will form an Islamic front, independent from the other parties, as well as a grouping of ulema' among those deputies, is there any truth to this? And does this mean a change in party loyalty for those deputies?

[Answer] This is something that I hope for from the bottom of my heart, but for which I see no possibility, for the law on parties had stipulated that no party may be formed on the basis of religious belief. A party may be formed--not on the basis of religious belief, so as not to clash with the law--whose members are known among the people as the servants and soldiers of the Islam.

From a considerable number of deputies, I have witnessed a yearning to implement the statutes of God, and I have witnessed their loyalty to God, just as I have witnessed their discomfort with some of the party leaderships, when they see them taking a stand that is incompatible with this orientation.

[Question] The example you cited of a party that is not based on religion even though its members are known for their loyalty to the Blessed Almighty God and to His laws is an example that has been tried by Turkey. However, the results that developed from this Turkish experiment have aborted this idea; will that lead to a similar result here?

[Answer] The abortion of the Islamic experiment or of Islamic practice does not spring from the nature of Islamic legislation, but from the nature of human errors. Islam is always a law unto men and not the other way round, and God Almighty says: "Whatever good has come your way is from God," because He has summoned you to it, commanded you to do it, rewarded you for it, made you covet it and convinced you of the necessity of adhering to it, "and whatever evil has befallen you, is from you yourself" because God Almighty has proscribed you from evil deeds and prevents your conscience from permitting their commission. This is an address from God to all whom He deems necessary to address: "Whatever good has come your way is from God, and whatever evil has befallen you is from you yourself." In this regard, I would like to point out to the honorable reader that Almighty God had said in the previous verse: "And if good fortune should come their way, they would say that it is from God, and if misfortune should befall them, they would say that it is from you. Say: All is from God."

What is meant by good fortune and misfortune here is what raises standards to improve the spirit and what lowers standards to depress the spirit, for everything is from God, because God Almighty tries his servant with affliction, good fortune and misfortune.

As for good behavior and bad behavior, they are something else. For the good is from God and the bad is from the self. So every abortion of the Islamic experiment, anywhere in the world, is no more than one of the evils of mankind, and is not one of the evils of the laws. Almighty God had revealed the Qur'an in truth. The Qur'an is the Book of God which, front to back, encounters no falsehood, for the abortion does not arise from the legislation, but from the misdeeds of those who implement it.

The Jihad Verdicts

[Question] You were one of the witnesses in the Jihad trial. Now that the verdicts have been pronounced, do you have any comment on them?

[Answer] The Lord be praised, I gave my evidence which was published in AL-NUR newspaper, which is not well known and which appeared recently. This newspaper however gets around in the world, and has traveled to Algeria, Kuwait, Iraq, Germany, America, France and the whole world over, and here I am discovering that a lot of people have been informed about this evidence, have photographed it, given it away, and sent it to the whole world, it being the evidence in which I presented the truth, no matter what hardships it might bring.

Counsellor Raja' al-'Arabi, representing the prosecution, had asked me, "Were you previously acquainted with Dr 'Umar Abd-al-Rahman?" I said to him, "This is the first time I have the pleasure of seeing his honorable face, and of taking a long look into the face of one of the active scholars." He asked me, "Do you have any kin among those defendants?" I said to him, "I do not have any kin among them, or any connection with them. They are however consolation for my eye, and a quickening of my heart. They are the blood that course through my veins." He asked me about the "Missing Obligation" [book] and about the al-Azhar commission report, and I related something about this that was read by everyone. Now that the verdicts are in, declaring the innocence of 190, or approximately two thirds of the number of defendants, and convicting others with sentences that correspond to the time served while undergoing trial, I bow down my head thanking God for this verdict, as it is considered a laurel wreath above my head and my testimony, as well as a smack and a slap for those who sold their religion for their worldly possessions, in the unjust report they wrote against my testimony, which I gave for Almighty God alone.

I would like to say that I praise God Almighty who did not make me a judge, despite the exalted honor which jurisprudence enjoys. The Prophet, God bless him and grant him salvation, says: "A judge in heaven, and two in the fire." The great imam, Imam Abu Hanifah, God have mercy on his soul, who was called upon to be a judge, said: "By God, I do not take kindly to judges." When he was criticized in this, and people wanted to force him to assume the position of a judge, he said to them: "I either must be true to my oath, and one who does not take kindly to judges should not assume the position of a judge, or must become a liar, and a liar should not be a judge." I say praise the Lord that he did not turn me into a judge, but had I been a judge, I would not rule on a case until I had considered it from all aspects. As for me, I did not have the opportunity to consider this case in all its aspects, but was a witness who delivered a legal opinion rather than a testimony, as I was not

asked about events which the court had wanted to see with my eyes or to hear about through my ears, but was asked about God's statute, praise be the Almighty, concerning matters affecting those youths and the state. I answered the God's religion as I saw it, and, praise God, I enjoyed this testimony all the more when I saw that great scholars were supporting me in my testimony, and were writing in my favor, as they observed that I was speaking the truth. Some of them consider me to have been the most courageous witness from the initial beginnings of Islam to our own day, in a historic Islamic case.

I do not wish to be unjust to myself by saying that this verdict was fair or unfair, but would rather take a bird's eye view and say: I praise God that 190 have been found not guilty, and that a great number were convicted with judgments that I would say are nearer to innocence than to guilt. As to the verdicts that follow this, I cannot place this judgment in my scales and declare that it is correct or permissible. This is something about which I shall not speak and thereby be unjust to myself, but would say what my Blessed Almighty God said: "Say to them, O originator of the skies and the earth, the knower of the seen and the unseen, that You rule among Your servants in all their diversity."

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EGYPT

OFFICIALS, PARTY MEMBERS, SCHOLARS DISCUSS INDUSTRIAL PROBLEMS

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 20 Feb 85 pp 15-17

[Article: "AKHIR SA'AH Roundtable Discussion: Industry and Public Sector, Where They Are Heading; Opposition, Private Sector and College Professors Face Minister of Industry; Solving Egypt's Industrial Problems Requires Sophisticated Modern Management"]

[Text] Egypt's industry is not a problem. Its industry exists and is alive. But its industry's framework is an issue that requires a planning strategy activated by advanced modern management systems which it must incorporate in order that it may contribute positively to economic development. In a frank dialogue among the minister in charge, the public and private sectors and the chairman of al-Wafd Party's Economic Committee, AKHIR SA'AH put the issue with all its dimensions before the participants in a symposium which lasted many hours at AKHIR SA'AH premises.

The symposium dealt with Egypt's industrial strategy, with how it might develop exports, with the automobile industry and with the scientific and realistic problem of how to boost industry through an economy car that befits Egyptian preferences and capabilities, with the tractor industry and with how to protect local industries from similar imported products. The discussion also dealt with the concept of increasing labor and machine productivity and with the question of whether unemployment may develop in Egypt in the coming years. The issue of the public sector, of its relationship with the private sector and of how the two should move along parallel lines to enrich Egyptian industry for the purpose of both export and local consumption at the same time was also one of the subjects of interest for the symposium members.

Through the dialogue among the participants, this symposium has dotted the i's and crossed the t's in connection with the true significance of the Egyptian industries that have relied on assembly work for a long time.

Now, what are the programs formulated by the ambitious development plan to lead us to full industrialization, both in deed and in word?

AKHIR SA'AH's dialogue has been both frank and comprehensive and includes questions by experts and specialists and questions raised by the man in the street who looks toward this sector with the great hope that it will be one of the means to solve his domestic and external problems.

The symposium started with a question addressed by Dr Ahmad Abu Isma'il, an ex-minister of finance and the chairman of al-Wafd Party's Economic Committee, to the minister of industry:

Dr Ahmad Abu Isma'il: What is the strategy for industry and industrial development in the coming phase? What is industry's role in society's comprehensive development and how do we tie our strategy to the means that make it possible to materialize this strategy?

Eng Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab, minister of industry: Egypt's industrial strategy is clear and public, namely to supply the people's basic needs in an adequate quantity and at the right price, quality and time.

One of the drawbacks from which we suffer is the unavailability of a commodity at the right time.

This is the policy through which we work. It is a flexible, not a rigid, policy. Something that is a basic commodity today may not be one tomorrow and vice versa. The most immediate example of this is home appliances, such as refrigerators which, as a result of social transformation, have become an essential commodity in every home. Generally, the Egyptian citizen's needs have increased. Moreover, this citizen is open to the world and his limits are not confined to this country. Consequently, these needs must be flexible.

AKHIR SA'AH: How can these objectives be achieved?

Minister: We have in the ministry an important agency, namely the Public Industrialization Authority, which has a role defined by law. This authority is entrusted with formulating the industrial plan within the framework of society's goals as viewed by the comprehensive plan. We want industrialization in its clear economic dimension. We have begun in this phase to move from assembling industries to industrial depth.

Securing Foreign Currency

Dr Ahmad Abu Isma'il: To realize this strategy, it is my belief that the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Agriculture must be fundamental parts of the economic group.

Minister Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab: This is what is actually happening. The Ministries of Industry and Agriculture are fundamental parts of the economic group, if we may use the phrase. In previous phases, the economic group was confined to the ministries directly concerned with the economy and financial affairs. But now the group is comprised of the ministries that influence and that are affected by the economy. In addition to the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning, the Ministries of International Cooperation and Investment, of Industry, of Agriculture, of Supply and of War Production have joined the group. All these ministries are members in the Higher Investment Committee and a large number of them are also members of the Higher Policies Committee. Therefore, when a specific problem, such as securing foreign currency and rationalizing its use--a problem on which economic measures were

taken recently--was raised, all these ministries took part in the meetings concerning the issue, whether the meetings were held in the form of ministerial committees headed by the prime minister or of committees headed by the president of the republic. We did not attend these meetings as experts on the issues of dealing with foreign currency, of rationalizing the use of this currency or of gathering the savings of Egyptians abroad or as experts on other aspects. Rather, we reflected the viewpoint of the production sector which is influenced by this issue.

AKHIR SA'AH: It is possible for the Ministry of Industry to secure foreign currency by way of exports. In fact, the issue that comes to mind now is that every official is now talking about increasing exports but that there is no clear idea yet of how to increase our exports. Why?

Eng Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab: This is an objective for which industry is working now. But at present, we hardly (get) 60 percent of our foreign currency from the public industrial sector because the private sector is still very backward insofar as export activities are concerned. It is my opinion that if we manage to meet our intrinsic needs in the industrial sector so that the public sector may no longer extend its hand to the banking pool for loans or to other sources, then we will have achieved a major goal in our exports. This will encourage the private sector to export because exports require daring. What we seek now is to raise our production to a good quality level.

Drop in Quality Level

Dr Raja'i al-Amir: There is no doubt that we are suffering from a drop in quality in the industrial sector. The standard of production in the 1950's was much better than it is now and Egypt used to export cotton textiles to Switzerland. Now, after the passage of a quarter century, the quality of production has declined. Is there a cure for this problem in the current strategy of the Ministry of Industry?

Minister Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab: The issue of quality is one of the most important problems consuming a major portion of the industrial sector's efforts. We, along with the businessmen, are trying to solve the public and private sectors' problems in a number of specific industries, such as the shoe, leather, dairy and textile industries, so as to attain a quality standard that is clear to understand by all those engaged in the industrial sphere, even the consumer who must get good-quality products. If this does not happen, then the consumer must learn how to obtain his rights.

Eng Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab added: This is an important point which the Egyptian consumer still does not understand and to which he has not become accustomed yet. I believe that the time has come for us not to be faced with enraging indifference by the seller when we buy a pair of shoes that turns out to be of poor quality. The fact is that the Ministry of Industry has quality-control agencies. There is the Industrial Control and Standardization Agency, which is a legislative agency that sets the standards on which any industry is founded.

Eng Muhammad 'Addas: Regrettably, the Industrial Control Agency is not performing its duty at all.

Minister: But we will revitalize this agency and bolster its role. This will require some time and the extensive effort and cooperation of all those concerned.

Eng Ihab al-Masiri: There is something that is more surprising than this. I spent 2 full days at the records office in an attempt to obtain the ministerial decree concerning the powers of the Industrial Control Agency but could not find it. I looked for it under the number listed in the ministry but did not find it!

Egyptian Car: How?

AKHIR SA'AH: You have mentioned that we are in the process of moving on from the assembling industries to the phase of in-depth industry. Is this concept behind the slogan we have recently raised of producing a 100 percent Egyptian car?

Minister of Industry: Insofar as the automobile industry is concerned, we all know that the passenger car industry now in existence is an assembling industry--an industry that is recognized the world over and that has a specific technology. But the problem is that this industry lacks the mainstays of a tie to Egypt. Assembling relies on imported parts. If the side supplying the parts experiences a stoppage, then we too experience a stoppage. This is where the idea of an Egyptian car, about which the president of the republic has spoken, emanated. An Egyptian car is one whose production mainstays are found in Egypt. This does not mean that we will manufacture every part of the car because this is impossible in any part of the world. The Mercedes is a German-made car, yet it contains parts manufactured in Italy, Britain and elsewhere. But the ability to produce it is in the hands of Germany.

Eng Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab added: When we embarked on the car industry, we found those who told us to take it easy. It is a big issue and we don't want to return to the tune of "everything from the needle to the rocket."

Generally, the car in itself is a needed product, and one that is needed in large volume at all times. Moreover, the mere presence of the automobile industry as an engineering industry in Egypt will elevate us to the level of the engineering industries. Moreover, this presence will invigorate all kinds of metal industries and chemical industries. The government's main objective at present is to build the infrastructure for an Egyptian automobile industry. A hundred other industries will flourish around this infrastructure.

AKHIR SA'AH: We talked in the past about an economy car and then backed down. What is your opinion?

Ministry of Industry: The automobile industry issue began in the 1960's on the basis of a plan to set up an industry to produce passenger cars, trucks, buses and agricultural tractors, i.e., a major industrial complex. After we started

assembling Fiat cars, we discovered that the production volume did not permit any opportunity for anything other than assembling. We proceeded slowly to produce 5,000-6,000 cars, depending on the foreign currency volume available for imports while operating the assembly plant which produces nearly 20 percent of the cars. Because the demand for trucks and buses is as great as the demand for economy cars, the company proceeded to produce these kinds of vehicles. Currently, the company manufactures locally more than 70 percent of the trucks and nearly 80 percent of the buses. This is something of which everybody engaged in the engineering industries is proud. We have manufactured a new kind of truck which is being tested. This is something that has happened in Egypt for the first time. We have also begun to produce an agricultural tractor.

Dr Ahmad Abu Isma'il: What percentage of the agricultural tractor will we be manufacturing?

Minister: We are presently manufacturing nearly 80 percent of this tractor. It is easier to manufacture tractors than to manufacture cars, of which we are manufacturing 60 percent at the most.

AKHIR SA'AH: What about the economy car and when will this project be implemented?

Minister: There is no such a thing as a popular economy car. This is just a figure of speech.

AKHIR SA'AH: There was the Ramsis car at one time.

Minister: It did not succeed because it was basically a motorcycle with a cabin mounted on it. Regardless of how hard we try, no car can be produced at a cost of less than 5,000 pounds. This is why we say an Egyptian car. I will add another ambitious goal, namely that the car be manufactured 100 percent locally. This is something that cannot be accomplished at present and which will be difficult to achieve. But if we attain 80 percent, then this would be great. This is the president's logic. The phrase "Egyptian car" is not at all intended to mean that we begin drawing up and designing a 100 percent Egyptian car.

AKHIR SA'AH: There are those who have actually said this. What is your opinion?

Minister: I had never said more than I have just said. It is impossible to achieve more at present. What is being done now is to study the bids made so that we may select the most suitable in order that we may then begin production.

AKHIR SA'AH: What is the figure for this plant's annual production volume?

Minister: 100,000 cars, of which 30,000-40,000 will be medium-size cars and 60,000-70,000 small-size cars. There is a study urging that we produce 50,000 medium-size cars and a similar number of small cars because most Egyptian consumers prefer the medium-size car even if it means paying more for it.

Dr Abu Isma'il: Have you studied the export market for these cars?

Minister: The export market for these cars is almost nonexistent. What we are studying now is how to export production components so that we may use that yield to import the rest of what we need for our cars.

Rationalization and Import Committees

Eng Ihab al-Masiri: The biggest problem facing the private sector at present is the problem of the rationalization committees. Insofar as rationalization is concerned, we approve of it as an objective and as a concept. But the rationalization of industry's raw materials cannot be treated in the same way as the rationalization of banana imports. What is your opinion?

Minister: We only rationalize the commodities that are available locally and that have good quality and are at a good price, meaning that it must be proven that one of these elements is missing before we permit importation.

Engineer al-Masiri: Who can prove all this?

Minister: The Ministry of Industry.

Engineer al-Masiri: I have been dealing with Eng Mustafa Salim since last August to prove to him that the dye available locally, is unfit. His response has been: We will form a committee.

Minister: This issue has been brought to our attention on various occasions. The matter is not confined to chemicals only. This is why we have said that the importation of a raw material whose local equivalent has proven not to be successful in industry will continue until the company producing this raw material locally proves that the material is successful in production.

Eng Muhammad 'Addas: Is this a decree or merely instructions?

Minister: Instructions are like decrees.

Engineer al-Masiri: Regrettably, these instructions have not been implemented so far. It is unreasonable that I be required to take 16 steps in order to be able to import 1 kind of dye. The same applies to synthetic silk. It is said that Shabin al-Kawm Company will produce it whereas this company is not prepared to produce it, and we all know this. What is your opinion?

Minister: We are certain that it is likely that mistakes in implementation will happen. But for the first time in Egypt, the rationalization system takes a definite form. The question concerning the raw materials produced locally will be determined shortly.

Engineer al-Masiri: There are raw materials on which a customs protection fee of 166 percent is imposed. Isn't this enough to protect local industry? We have heard the minister of economy say that any product enjoying 100 percent customs protection will be allowed to be imported. But nothing of the sort has happened so far.

Minister: This protection has produced no result whatsoever because the bills are submitted at one-quarter of their real value.

AKHIR SA'AH: What is the main objective behind the rationalization committees?

Minister: The rationalization committees are not [concerned with] literary lists. But we rationalize the importation of any commodity that is available in abundance locally and has a good quality and a reasonable price. We reconsider the lists whenever a company has a problem with any of the three elements and give the producer the opportunity to improve his product and the importer the opportunity to import his needs until the local product is improved and made available.

Eng Muhammad 'Addas: How will this process be crystallized?

Minister: Decrees will be issued on the measures concerning rationalization and these measures will be taken on the recommendation of the Ministry of Industry. There will be specialized committees for each activity. We have done this to eliminate the maze of chambers of commerce where you go to dump your application with 6,000 or 7,000 other applications and then sit and wait. There are importers who submit import applications every week in the hope that one of them will be approved.

Engineer al-Masiri: There are 10 ministerial undersecretaries in the rationalization committees.

Minister: All this will be changed. The main committee about which you are talking will continue to exist as an appeals committee, should the importer disagree with the specialized committees. Our duty in the ministry is not just to protect the local product but also to insure the regularity of the import activities. This may initially sound contradictory, but the two steps must be implemented until the position of Egyptian industry improves completely.

Population Growth and Work Opportunities

Dr Ahmad Abu Isma'il: Egypt's population grows by nearly 1 million people every 9 months. Is there a plan in industry to absorb these new people and to provide work opportunities compatible with this population growth?

Eng Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab, the minister of industry: Egypt's industry has gone through several phases. But let us start with the 1970's when we realized that the plants were in poor condition both technically and in terms of equipment due to the lack of maintenance for this equipment as a result of the shortage of resources and not of negligence. All our resources were channeled toward armaments. When God honored us with victory in the 1973 war, we started to examine the industry. The replacement and renewal processes were begun in our plants and this required great efforts and costs. I hope that the current 5-year plan will be the final phase of this extensive replacement and renewal. What I want to clarify is that the replacement and renewal operations may result in a drop in the need for manpower. The

international industrialization tendencies are inclined to reduce, not increase, the need for manpower.

AKHIR SA'AH: This may apply to Europe where labor is expensive. But in Egypt, labor is available at a reasonable cost.

Minister: This may apply to Europe where labor is expensive. But in Egypt, labor is available at a reasonable cost.

Minister: The question is not one of cost or availability of labor. To produce a commodity with a high quality, we may have to use machinery more extensively at times to reduce as much as possible the potential for human error. Therefore, the involvement of human manpower in industry is no longer a goal.

AKHIR SA'AH: So are we approaching the era of unemployment which may create a serious crisis for a developing country like Egypt?

Minister: Certainly not. It is my belief that industry's objective is to boost the entire business sector and, consequently, to absorb the constant population growth in Egypt. But if we assume that industry will absorb 700,000 workers a year, which is the figure the Ministry of Manpower requires to be employed, then this is an enormous figure, especially when we learn that the total number of industrial workers does not exceed 600,000 workers at present, keeping in mind that the industrial sector represents the biggest business sector in Egypt. It is my opinion that the employment of manpower does not come through the construction of more plants to create work opportunities but through creating an active business sector that relies on industry.

Yarn and Textile: Reexamination

Dr Ahmad Abu Isma'il: You are talking of the public sector. But insofar as the private sector is concerned, I believe that there are small and medium-size industries, such as the yarn and textile industry and the food industries, which can absorb a large number of workers, as is the case in Korea.

Minister: We have opened the door so wide for issuing licenses to the private industries that I have asked the Public Industrialization Authority to stop issuing such licenses, especially for the yarn and textile industry.

Dr Ahmad Abu Isma'il: Why?

Minister Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab: Because we have opened the door wide for a product that may not be in demand. It is my opinion that the yarn and textile issue requires a complete study.

In the past years, this industry has operated in very local conditions and has been governed by low standards. As a result, the world is moving in one direction and we are moving in a totally different direction.

The world is now exporting ready-made clothing at very inexpensive prices and the textile quality has changed.

We must find out how somebody can export a shirt at the cost of \$3 because the cost of cotton in an Egyptian shirt exceeds \$3. We must study this aspect, especially since we are a developing country seeking to achieve a comprehensive development plan. Therefore, it is my opinion that the yarn and textile industry is the true challenge that will be facing the Egyptian industry in the coming phase. There is currently a decree to form a national yarn and textile committee to study this industry's future in Egypt. We have called this committee a national committee because this problem, like the subsidy problem, has become a national problem. It requires sound thinking and conceptualization in order that we may find out where we stand vis-a-vis the world at present.

Eng Ihab al-Masiri: The government is trying to complicate matters.

Minister Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab: Because the problem is complex. What Dr Ahmad Abu Isma'il has just said is sound. But we are trying to find a solution for Egypt. When we permit the opening of new plants when we don't need textiles, the new plant owner will demand yarn of me in order that he may go into operation, or else he will stand there and scream that he is starving. If such an owner were in Korea, he would get one word in response. But we here in Egypt follow a different pattern and try to persuade such a person in two sessions, to no avail.

Minister: I am glad to hear that there is demand for textiles. When we receive a request in advance, we fully meet such a request both qualitatively and quantitatively. In the Ministry of Industry, I cannot conduct my business with the logic of grocers, picking things off the shelf to supply them to whoever requests them. The owner of every business must know the level, quantity and quality of his needs for the next year.

Engineer 'Abd-al-Wahhab added: The most difficult thing to us is to determine the market trend. I wish people would determine what they need. If this were to happen, 90 percent of our problems would be solved.

Eng Ihab al-Masiri: I have requested and the ministry has filed to meet my request.

Minister: You are talking of yarn, not textiles.

AKHIR SA'AH: There are some business owners who complain of the shortage of cotton textiles, especially the (linwah) variety.

Where Is Industrial Planning Headed?

Dr Isma'il al-'Awamiri: I don't imagine that we are asking the people to determine what their needs are. If the leadership cannot predict the market's needs, then it is unsuccessful and there is no place for planning or reform. If we cast a glance at industry's worth, we will find that from 1971 to 1981-82

the worth of the public sector's industry amounted to 3,981,000,000 pounds. The private sector's share amounts to 30 percent of the investment volume. Upon examination, we find that the ratio of investment to production is poor and that capital productivity is low. In the 1960's the investment-to-production ratio amounted to 3.1 million pounds to 1 million pounds in production. In 1982, the ratio declined to 13.1 million pounds in investment for each 1 million pounds in production.

Minister of Industry: How did you make your computations? A real evaluation of the public sector is an issue that requires a long study. Computing 1 percent of this sector probably requires an entire accounting agency. To evaluate the public sector, we must do so on the basis of international prices or on the basis of the actual cost.

Dr Isma'il al-Awamiri: I have evaluated it on the basis of the actual cost. Your excellency has said that we will establish price controls. Price controls are tied to abundant production and to the volume of the country's production. If one assesses the value of industrial production in the recent period at the market price, he would find that this value amounted to more than 100 million pounds whereas the production's actual cost amounted to 300 million pounds. These are published statistics.

Minister: The industrial sector produces nearly 700 million pounds' worth.

Dr Isma'il al-'Awamiri: I am talking of the production figures as a whole.

Minister: I disagree with you. The figures at your disposal are in total disagreement with the reality. But I agree with you that there is a problem of management in Egypt. That is indisputable.

Dr al-'Awamiri: These are published figures.

Ahmad Salih: We are prepared to supply you with the correct figures available at the ministry.

AKHIR SA'AH: Why aren't the correct figures made available to everybody concerned, every researcher and every student, so that studies and research will not be based on faulty figures, especially since it is unreasonable for every individual to resort to the minister to correct his information?

Minister: We have discussed at the Council of Ministers the question of publishing the outcome of the public sector's activities in a manner that clarifies the facts and we have actually given thought to publishing a bulletin which will actually be issued in the near future and which will include all the correct figures and data so that they may be accessible to all. The information will include production figures, the volume of investments, manpower and so forth.

Public Sector's Role

Dr Raja'i al-Amir: To achieve the development objectives and to boost the private sector, is it not necessary to shed light on the limits separating the public sector and private sector projects? To achieve the public interest, is it befitting that the industrial public sector's role be confined to the heavy industries? What is the government's strategy in this regard?

Minister Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab: The public sector is supposed to focus at present on the state's basic industries, such as the yarn and textile industries, the engineering industries and the metal and chemical industries. It is possible for other supplementary industries on which the private sector embarks to be founded on these industries. But there are basic industries which must continue to be confined to the public sector, such as the industries I have just mentioned which are costly industries that the private sector cannot, in its present condition, afford. We hope that with time, a private sector founded on joint stock companies will emerge, with these companies viewing industry as a long-range investment and not from the angle of the businessman who seeks quick profits and who wavers over putting his money in a bank to collect a 13 percent interest or putting his money in a project or a workshop that produces for him thousands of pounds a year. This pattern exists and is necessary and I believe that this is an inevitable phase through which we must pass.

The minister of industry added: Moreover, the public sector builds many industry on which the private sector is reluctant to embark and which we believe is an industry that must be included within the national industrial plan. This means that we will put a heavy burden on the public sector in the coming phase while maintaining it as an economic business sector. This is the difference between industry at present and industry in the 1960's. The public sector must shoulder the burden of development, but with an economical approach.

We have begun to change some work patterns in the public sector as well as the methods of accounting pertaining to the sector's objectives, results and dealings with the private sector. At times, the private sector may find itself in the position of plaintiff. However, let all know that we work only within the framework of achieving coexistence between the two sectors. We do not want either sector to survive at the expense of the other. This logic is no longer acceptable in the Egyptian business sector.

Capitalist or Socialist?

Dr al-'Awamiri: What, specifically, is our economic and industrial identity? Are we part of the capitalist system or the socialist system? It has also been noticed that planning has become the main problem insofar as the production sector is concerned.

Minister of Industry: Do we have an economic identity? Yes. But the statement that the government moves in one direction and work moves in other direction is not due to the absence of an identity but to the absence of enough discipline. This is one of the problems of management in Egypt.

EGYPT

NPUG DISSIDENT CITES REASONS FOR LEAVING PARTY

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 23 Feb 84 p 8

[Open letter by Dr 'Abd-al-'Azim Ramadan: "From Dr 'Abd-al-'Azim Ramadan to Khalid Muhyi-al-Din: For These Reasons I Resigned From the Grouping Party"]

[Text] [To] Mr Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, Leader of the NPUG Party:

Greetings:

I think the intellectual terrorism waged by AL-AHALI newspaper and some Grouping Party authors from other positions against the opinion I voiced in AKHBAR AL-YAWM newspaper on 19 January 1985 concerning the non-withdrawal from the international Book Fair and just boycotting the Israeli pavilion--the same position adopted by the PLO--has convinced me that the conflict between me and the party is no longer just a difference of opinion. It is rather a conflict of principle over the most serious matter affecting the cause of liberation in our country and the Arab nation, which has been afflicted with Israeli occupation since the June 1967 defeat, and over the Palestinian issue as well. This makes it necessary that we bring this conflict before Egyptian and Arab public opinion so that it may define its stand with regard to you on a solid scientific basis and not on the basis of the terrible and boundless abuse that faces anyone who disagrees with your opinion, something that unfortunately has become a distinctive feature of your newspaper and a peculiar characteristic of your writers. Moreover, this same conflict requires that I resign from your party, something I refrained from doing several years ago at a time when our party was suffering from division and was in need of support.

Perhaps you can recall that the conflict between me and your party goes back to November 1977 when the late President al-Sadat announced his initiative to visit Jerusalem and the overwhelming majority of people rallied around him. A number of prominent intellectual and educated leftist writers and I were inspired by such public rallying and I declared my support for the initiative while you announced your unequivocal rejection of it, adopting the so-called Confrontation and Steadfastness Front that waged a formidable propaganda campaign aimed at isolating Egypt, robbing it of its efficacy, neutralizing its efforts in the service of its nation and tarnishing its honorable struggle to liberate occupied Sinai and the rest of the occupied Arab territory.

It has been established now that your stand on the side of the Confrontation and Steadfastness Front was completely wrong, for, since its creation, this front has not had a single true struggle to achieve the principles it advocated and to impose its advocated best solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict: the military solution. Instead, it was motivated by such perfidies, conspiracies, coups and conflicts that turned it from a struggle front into a battlefield. The result was that at the time when Israeli forces have left Arab Egyptian Sinai--which was the first Israeli withdrawal from Arab land occupied during the June 1967 war--these forces are still in the Golan, the West Bank and Gaza and persisting in their shocking aggression against Arab territory and extending their hostile actions to south Lebanon. This black front in the history of the Arab struggle did not hesitate to split the PLO by a civil war unprecedented in the history of national liberation movements. Israel is still spreading its settlements on the West Bank and changing the inhabitants' demographic makeup from Palestinian to Jewish, bringing in Jewish elements from the various continents of the world. Your party's adherence to this policy that has failed to achieve any benefits for our nation has led to its isolation from the people.

At any rate, the difference of opinion between me and you over the Jerusalem initiative did not warrant, at the time, my resignation from your party. [This was] despite my belief that I was on the side of the people and you were against them, and despite the true awareness and good intuition of the masses when Israel was forced to withdraw from 99 percent of Sinai territory, through a long campaign of negotiations embarked upon by al-Sadat, while it is still entrenched in other Arab territories due to the campaign of rhetoric the people read in your newspaper or in those of the rejection front or what is left of it.

Yes, I did not see anything in this political conflict that would have affected the unity of thought that existed between me and your party on the social level, for the social stand is the basis on which the classes are set apart and which determines the true affiliation of the people. Therefore, I preferred to maintain my affiliation with the party, while freezing my activity in it until such time as the social conditions sooner or later overcame the political conditions and, consequently, the elements of healing overcame the elements of division and the progressive forces, torn apart by the cyclones of a tremendous historical political event, represented in the late President al-Sadat's initiative, are clearly re-united.

What eluded me, however, and remained an enigma that puzzled me for all these years until it was solved by the International Book Fair battle, is that even though there is no conflict over the fact that the social issue is the main thing that sets classes apart and determines true affiliation, it assumes with your party a completely different picture than the one I have in mind. The picture I have in mind is an entirely local one, while your party has a totally international one that conforms to the Marxist theory that says that the division of the world's peoples into classes is deeper than their divisions into nationalities. Herein lies the secret of your opposition to the peace initiative with Israel, notwithstanding the fact that the Egyptian left always advocated such a peace because, this time, the peace

initiative was based on the special Israeli-U.S. relationship that can lead to the liberation of the territories occupied by the Israeli forces. In other words, the initiative is based upon an alliance with the imperialist and reactionary forces and a disassociation with international socialist forces, while in the past it was based on the Soviet Union's blessings.

Hence, your party failed to distinguish between the social issue and the political issue. The ideal solution for the national cause, in its opinion, revolves around an international framework, to wit, the framework of international social forces uniting and not around that of the imperialist and reactionary forces. Thus, you condemn the liberation of Sinai at the hands of al-Sadat because of the concessions such a liberation entailed and do not condemn the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's concessions in liberating Sinai in 1957, even though they opened the Red Sea to Israel for the first time since its creation, giving it an opportunity to enjoy, for the first time, the benefits of its location on two seas. The reason is that the liberation at the hands of al-Sadat occurred through an alliance with imperialism and that by 'Abd-al-Nasir was done through an alliance with the USSR and socialist forces.

The same is true for the June 1967 defeat which occurred within the framework of the alliance with the socialist forces and the USSR and the October 1973 crossing victory which culminated in al-Sadat's alliance with the United States and his departure from the socialist camp. 'Abd-al-Nasir's alliance with the socialist forces deserved your glorification despite the shocking June 1976 defeat while al-Sadat's alliance with imperialism following the October war was branded as treason and a squandering of Egypt's gains [in the war].

This move, prompted by international rather than local motives, led you to see in the political split over the space initiative a political as well as a social schism and the social affiliation on the national level became of no use in finding a premise for reuniting with your party.

Likewise, this move by international motives impels you to adopt your current stand toward any rapprochement between Egypt and Jordan, or between Jordan and the PLO, or among the three sides. Such a rapprochement under the aegis of imperialism is rejected by your party and the writers of the international left in the Arab world because it is based on an alliance that includes Egypt, Israel and the United States within the Camp David framework and another alliance that includes Egypt, Jordan and the PLO. Such an alliance within an imperialist and reactionary alliance, in your opinion, leads to the liquidation of the Palestinian cause and, therefore, you are impelled to fight it and try to stop it at any cost.

This international orientation, in my opinion, is a dangerous direction that prompts me to point out its historic and political error on the following bases:

First, Marxist ideology has never rejected an alliance with imperialism in national liberation and national defense battles. During World War II, Stalin

did not hesitate to ally with the United States, Great Britain, France and other imperialist countries against the fascist danger, as did all the resistance movements in East Europe on the national and nationalist level.

Hence, if current conditions in the Arab world do not allow it to regain the usurped Arab territory by military means, and if the special American-Israeli relations can be influenced in a way that can stop the deterioration of the current situation and regain the occupied Arab territory, there is nothing, ideologically, to stand in the way of undertaking such an attempt. We do not believe that Arab concessions will be larger than the concessions of the greatest revolutionary, Lenin, in the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. But to persist in this policy that is being followed by the Grouping Party is a very dangerous matter by any standard.

Second, this international thinking was dropped a long time ago with the partition of the communist world between the USSR and China, that partition that began taking root at the expense of Marxist theory that put the nationalist factor above the ideological factor, thus rendering the contradictions between the USSR and China--its association with one ideology notwithstanding--stronger than the contradictions between China and the United States. That is the reason for China's recent declarations that Marxism-Leninism is a classical theory that has been overtaken by events.

Third, to understand national interests in an international framework is to ignore the national contradictions which contemporary historical experiences have proved to be stronger than the class contradictions and, consequently, to expose the nation's national security to danger. The current conflict in the Middle East is a conflict between national interests, not class interests. It is a conflict between Arab nationalism and Israeli nationalism, a conflict between Arab nationalism and Iranian nationalism, a conflict between every Arab country and its Arab neighbor. In such a conflict, each state adopts what is compatible with its interests, without any regard to whether this is within the framework of a reactionary imperialist alliance or a progressive socialist framework. Iraq's recent stance on cooperation with the United States attests to the triumph of national interest over ideological interest.

This perilous international policy towards the most serious matter of destiny facing our nation, the cause of liberation, is supported by an ideological gangsterism unprecedented in the history of the Egyptian left and is being irresponsibly practiced by your newspaper in a fashion that recalls the days of the military prisons and the dominance of the intelligence and military criminal investigations state, without differentiation between friend and foe or ally and adversary.

I am not trying to incriminate you. I myself am a witness to history. I have come across attacks by some immature Grouping writers because of a difference in opinion or principle which I have never met in the most radical rightist newspaper, leading me to wonder whether you were so hard up to find an enemy that you had to penetrate the heart of the national left, attacking writers who often warded off attacks against you and soiling the names of those who have cleared the way for you. I was the first Egyptian historian

in the national movement to take the leftist road at a time when the left was considered by Egyptian historians to be merely a destructive movement aimed at undermining the foundation of the social system and, therefore, unworthy of any attention or even mention. All the efforts of the great leftist intellectuals, like Shuhdi 'Atiyah al-Shafi'i and Ibrahim 'Amir, to lend a national tinge to an action that incited the classes against each other and kindled hatred in the hearts of the working class came to no avail, thus creating a need for a working class historian to put leftist action in its proper national framework and cleanse it of the contamination that has afflicted it.

Nonetheless, a Grouping "boy" who is a professional in intellectual gangsterism in the "al-Ihbariyah" column wanted to intimidate me with his literary dung, referring to me as Dr 'Abd-al-'Azim Ramadan, the "spastic," thus undermining the ethics of a dialogue! What if, sir, a writer like myself, who grew up in the ghettos and alleys of Giza and mingled with all classes, were to afford the "al-Ihbariyah" page equal treatment by exchanging unpleasant jesting, calling Mr Salah 'Isa "Salah 'Isa, the tub," or Mr Husayn 'Abd-al-Raziq "Husayn 'Abd-al-Raziq, the basket," or Dr Rif'at al-Sa'id "Rif'at al-Sa'id, the bucket" and, to give the Grouping shaykh a taste of such exalted literature as overflows from your newspaper, I weir to call Mr Khalid Muhyi-al-Din "Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, the sock" and Dr Latifah al-Zayyat "Latifah, the cooking pot," etc. Would we not all have done unforgivable damage to political dialogue and disgraced this democratic page which we obtained the hard way? Do the Egyptian people not have the right to spit on us and turn away from us, saying: "We want nothing to do with this disgusting terrorist left!" Ideed, are we not mobilizing the people's classes against us, particularly the working class to which I had the honor of belonging during my struggle in my younger days, the class that taught me Sufism and the most honorable methods of struggle?

Yes, this page in your newspaper, which you call "al-Ihbariyah," is a disgrace in the history of the honorable leftist press which has never experienced such a pattern of ideological terrorism, gangsterism and decline.

This does not mean that the left is incapable of ridicule; it is just that it does it at a much higher level, in the style of [the Russian writer] Gogol and 'Abdallah al-Nadim, but does not stoop to the club level, using the methods of third-rate night-club bullies in talking to its adversaries!

If this is what you are dishing out to your adversaries in opinion while you are still out of power, what would you do if you were to lay hold of their necks, control the people's destiny and open the doors of hell?

What great harm you have done to the honorable left in Egypt. What a sad end to half a century of struggle undertaken by honorable comrades who knew how to be trustworthy and faithful writers with a style that shall live forever. Yes, what a vast difference exists between the terrorist left, represented by the group that dominates your ranks, and the struggling left whose history we have written in our historic scientific works and who is still represented by honorable patriotic writers who entered the Sinai battle

of liberation inspired by our inner-most national and nationalistic conscience without any other consideration. This difference between those who participated in the liberation of Sinai and those who made fun of it shall live forever in the history of the Egyptian left!

Now I come to the spurious campaign you ignited on the occasion of the International Book Fair where the state of Israel got official permission to set up a pavilion. You ignited it under the slogan, "struggle against normalization with Israel and resistance to Israeli cultural infiltration and Israeli cultural, political and economic supremacy." You called for the withdrawal of all Arab publishers and for the thwarting of the greatest cultural demonstration in Egypt awaited by our Arab homeland from year to year.

Was the fear of normalization and Israeli cultural infiltration and Egypt's subjection to Israeli cultural supremacy the [true] reason? Or was the real reason the agreement with the designs of the remnants of the late Confrontation and Steadfastness Front, represented by Syria and Libya, to outbid each other with regard to the PLO and to expose and embarrass it so as to prevent it from reaching any agreement with Jordan, with Egypt's help, to solve the Palestinian question? Is this not the reason for the horrible slander campaign against me because I defended the PLO's right to stay in the international fair, saying that the elimination of the Arab presence is a confirmation of the Israeli presence? You called what I advocated "normalization," although you know the PLO's position very well, with a view to making it applicable to the PLO, and then you set out to write that the PLO "is not a sacred subject."

In order to bring this point to rest, I ask your conscience in the name of Marxist theory, your authors, your intellectuals and the group that controls your party's fate as well: "How can you make out of the Israeli cultural infiltration a mighty giant about to devour Egypt, along with its educated people, while closing your eyes to American cultural infiltration, as if no one can feel it at all?"

What is the extent of American cultural infiltration compared to that of Israeli infiltration? Which is the source and which is the branch? Is it not startling that the party should draw the curtain on the source and sound the alarm against the branch? Is it not pure deception to raise such a tremendous hubbub and go out in enormous demonstrations against the Israeli pavilion while the pavilion of venerable imperialism enjoys visits by your educated and the public without any embarrassment, worry or tumult?

Those articles that abound in deception and fallacy and attack the Arab-Israeli dialogue, why are they silent about the American-Arab dialogue, unless they want to tell our masses that there is no relationship whatsoever between America and Israel? How can these writers permit themselves to attend conferences held by the Americans in their own country and abroad? If the Israelis participate in them, they are banned to the Arabs. These minds want the intellectuals to give in to their twisted logic; they do not hesitate to use literary terrorism and gangsterism. What is the difference between meeting an American professor with Zionist tendencies and an Israeli

professor? Dr 'Abd-al-'Azim Anis, in his AL-AHALI article of 6 February 1985, rightly referred to the United States as the main enemy of the contemporary Arab liberation movement.

But Dr 'Abd-al-'Azim Anis attacked all the Egyptian people who he thought had normal relations with Israel and excluded those who had normal relations with the United States, including, of course, Grouping Party members. I have had an experience in normalization and cooperation with Princeton University in which such Grouping stars as Dr 'Amr Muhyi-al-Din and other friends participated, but I could not see it through to the end due to my going to London University.

Thus, we arrive at this irony: a writer like myself who has never in his life visited Israel, has not cooperated with its agents or in any project [involving Israel], has not accepted any invitation to visit its universities or attend its conferences and has not worked at its scientific institutes is being slandered by the Grouping boys while the Grouping scientists, who have visited Washington, have worked in American universities, have attended American conferences and have cooperated with American agents in every possible way, are honored and glorified because they are dealing with "the main enemy" and not the secondary enemy.

I say this with regret for I do not mean to harm any of the friends who cooperated on the Princeton University project. I only mean to show the readers the irony and to demonstrate the falsity of the campaign being waged under the slogan of resisting normalization with Israel, fearing Israeli cultural infiltration and the brainwashing operation undertaken by the party against the public. I am not against any scientific or cultural cooperation with any side so long as we have national and nationalistic consciousness. If the USSR can hold joint space experiments with the United States without fear of falling under American cultural infiltration, I am not ready to accept the tutelage of the Marxists priests in the Grouping Party who want to tell me with what side to deal or not to deal, be it the main enemy or the secondary enemy!

Therefore, I declare my resignation from your party because its policy has harmed the Egyptian leftist movement and has isolated it from the public.

It has been totally incapable of grasping the new developments in ideology and politics that have forced the leftist parties in Europe and Asia to change their positions so as not to miss the boat. Moreover, the ideological terrorism your newspaper is practicing against those who differ in opinion is an affront to the ideology of the working class, which is portrayed as ruthless and aggressive. Furthermore, the party has failed to represent the Grouping concept on which we founded it and has been controlled by a fanatic and terrorist Marxist minority that does not tolerate any opinion other than its own and that represents ideological rigidity.

My pen shall remain independent in the service of the toiling masses, the history of our Arab nation and the future of our ancient people.

15 February 1985

Dr 'Abd-al-'Azim Ramadan

3 April 1985

EGYPT

HOUSING MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON FUTURE PLANS, REGULATIONS

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 10 Jan 85 pp 3-4

[Interview with Eng Muhsin Sidqi, housing minister, by Mahmud Ghunaym: "A New Law for All Housing Laws Next June; We Will Not Permit the Leasing of Furnished Apartments Distributed by the State; 1 Million Meters of Land Ready at Nominal Prices To Provide Members of Vocational Unions with Housing"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Eng Muhsin Sidqi, the housing minister, has granted a comprehensive interview, which is published below, to AL-AKHBAR on the housing problem in Egypt and on its nature and the specific plan for confronting this problem in its various sectors.

The minister spoke of the many instances in which housing laws and legislation have ramifications and are in conflict, with harmful effects on the problem. Therefore, a unified and comprehensive law is now being prepared for submission to the People's Assembly next June. This new law combines the previous ones and addresses their pressure points and loopholes, achieves justice between landlord and tenant and encourages the private sector to contribute to the attack on the problem with the huge resources it possesses.

The minister spoke of the problem created by closed apartments, by apartments to be struck off and by the furnished apartments and their role in the crisis and of the measures which are being taken in this respect. These housing units are an inactive national resource and it is imperative to exploit it through all means. The state has gone to great expense in these apartments and a yield from this enormous investment is a must.

The minister said: "There is a ready plan for area replanning in the large cities and for the rebuilding and renovation of the derelict quarters and the unexploited places, such as timber yards, cemeteries and one-story buildings."

He stated that there are 250,000 meters of waste land which will be ready for the vocational unions within the coming 3 months in the vicinity of the military area in Hikestep at nominal prices on which the unions may build housing units for their members on these lands. The state will furnish these

with utilities (sanitary drainage, drinking water, electricity and roads) and will provide them with building materials and the loans that are required for great facilities. Furthermore, the state will also assign building companies for these lands. This area is totally independent of Cairo, so far as its utilities are concerned.

Eng Muhsin Sidqi said: "The armed forces' national service organ is implementing for the housing ministry 7,000 housing units in an urgent sheltering project for cemetery dwellers. Furthermore, there is an integrated plan which the ministry has initiated for the maintenance of old houses. This plan was begun with a complex including 1,500 housing units in Halwan, which will subsequently be generalized as a plan for the renovation of old quarters."

The minister added: "We do not ban luxury housing, but they must be built without any commitments, aid or subsidies from the state. This kind of housing bears the cost of utilities and roads, procures building materials by its own means and pays dues to the benefit of popular housing."

The minister emphasized that the state will not permit the citizens to dispose of the apartments which it has given them for leasing or appropriation or for leasing them as furnished apartments.

However, he who builds an apartment with his sweat and toil is entitled to lease it as a furnished apartment. We respect private ownership, the law and the constitution.

Eng Muhsin Sidqi spoke of building materials, a cornerstone of the building issue, saying: "We are making tangible progress in this matter. We are on our way to self-sufficiency in the production of building materials for consumption--some within the remaining 2 years of the 5-year plan, and the remainder within the coming plan.

New Comprehensive Law

To a question about the many instances in which housing laws and legislations have ramifications and conflicts with one another, Eng Muhsin Sidqi answered: "Next June, a new comprehensive law for everything connected with the topic of housing will be submitted to the People's Assembly for approval in the Assembly's current session and for promulgation. The law is aimed at making investments in buildings yield rewarding returns to the investors, which will encourage them to build. The law is also aimed at establishing a good relationship between landlord and tenant or the owner of the housing unit and at addressing all the loopholes used in circumventing the law or the rigid articles which had precluded this kind of investment. The law is also geared to realizing rewarding returns for real estate owners, which will enable them to carry out maintenance work on real estate in its capacity as a national resource and to tighten control on, and to oversee, buildings within the framework of specifications which are respected by law enforcement officers and which prescribe penalties for violators."

Legal committees at the housing ministry are now undertaking the task of drafting these laws so that a comprehensive law will be issued.

The minister elucidated that the outcome of the previous laws and legislations, which were promulgated under special circumstances, now no longer conform with the circumstances under which we live and with the building sector, which is allotted 35 percent of the volume of investments under the 5-year plan--and this is a large volume.

In answering a question about the closed apartments which have been struck off, or which are being struck off, whose owners rely on refraining from disposing of them through appropriation or leasing for the purpose of making further annual profits, the minister said: "The state will not stand with folded hands in the face of premeditation in this matter. These units are a national resource for which the state had earmarked a great deal of investment, such as loans and building materials made locally or imported with hard currency, and for which the state had allotted vacant land, roads and utilities (water, electricity, sanitary drainage). After all this, is it acceptable that this resource remains inactive, while the state exerts all its efforts to find a solution for the problem?"

The minister added: "There is a pause. We must tackle this matter with wisdom and deliberation. It might be that the owner of the closed apartment is loaned to another country or that he is a student abroad or that he might have been transferred to another governorate, and in all these instances he will return to his apartment. It is our duty to preserve it for him and we refuse to resort to violence in this matter."

With regard to the apartments which are deliberately closed to realize profit, the state will organize next year a census which will reveal the owners of more than one apartment to bring them to task and withdraw what exceeds to their pressing needs.

The apartments which have not been struck off have been referred to all their excellencies the governors to count and grade them in accordance with their order or precedence and to take action on them. However, concerning the apartments which have not been struck off because of reasons beyond the owner's control, such as a shortage of building materials, then it is our duty to provide these owners with these materials if it is because of a lack of cash fluidity, then we will grant them adequate loans with easy repayment terms.

With regard to the apartments which have not been struck off deliberately, while waiting for their prices to go up or for receipt of additional sums from the tenants or the purchasers of these apartments, I emphasize that the state will not permit this thing to be done, because the state regards these apartments as inactive investments harmful to the state, because of the things which the state had offered, and also as harmful to the citizens. It is imperative to intervene to eliminate the harm through a quick striking off and through disposal of these apartments. These measures are:

The owners of these apartments are first served with a warning for a specific period.

Concerning the furnished apartments and whether an organization exists for them which would guarantee their contribution to the solution of the crisis, Eng Muhsin Sidqi answered: "The furnished apartments are not a burden and they are of two kinds: one kind is useful because it helps resolve the problem of temporary residence and encourages tourism. We will take action concerning what transgresses these purposes. With regard to the cooperative or economic apartments, or the apartments in the new cities which are leased by the citizens or are appropriated to them by the state, only for the citizens to turn them into furnished apartments, well, we will not permit these things to be done. The state builds for those who are indeed in need of housing. In this case, it is imperative for the state to take its dues, either by withdrawing the allotment of this kind of apartment or by imposing dues on these apartments whose returns will be exploited in building economical houses, and the new housing law will regulate these procedures."

Vacant Land Planning

In answering a question about the role played by vacant land in contributing to the resolution of the housing problem, Minister Muhsin Sidqi said: "The ministry stands prepared with a plan for area replanning in the large cities, especially in those cities in which the networks of the new and huge resources will be introduced. This planning is based on preparing these cities to receive larger numbers of citizens within the coming 15 years. Furthermore, the plan includes the replacement and renovation of derelict or unexploited quarters, such as timber yards, cemeteries and one-story houses.

This new planning takes into account the policy of insuring that these areas have integrated utilities and services (sanitary drainage, drinking water, roads and electricity) as well as garages, schools, maternity houses, hospitals, marketplaces, drug stores and places of worship in such a way that these areas will be independent and will not burden other areas, that is, on the pattern of the two areas of Misr al-Jadidah and al-Ma'adi.

This planning also takes into consideration expansion in the direction of desert lands. This is two-pronged: the first prong is the development of the new cities, whose establishment we encourage, provided we bear in mind that the source of work and livelihood exists in these cities so that the workers in them will not continue to reside in Cairo or its suburbs, which complicates the housing and traffic problems.

The other prong is expansion around the key cities and in the direction of uncultivable lands to preserve the area of greenery. This is represented in the eastern direction of expansion toward Suez, Isma'ilia and Bilbays and of expansion in the direction of Alexandria (the desert road).

An example of this planning is the implementation underway of the housing ministry's urgent project at the al-Qitamiyah approach to benefit from this project in moving well over 500 families to replan their residential areas so that these areas can be used for the benefit of a larger number of families.

The minister was asked a question about the situation concerning building materials, which represent the nerve center of the issue of construction and building. Eng Muhsin Sidqi answered: "Building materials are a principal factor in the problem and the ministry exercises care to make them available and to keep the freedom of applying for building materials to eliminate the black market, and so that we will remove the phenomenon of more than one price per commodity, which creates black markets in view of the existence of exploitative parasites--and neither the state nor the citizens will benefit from this state of affairs."

We began with cement. We standardized its price and we released its sale without licenses. We also want to make cement available to consumers. It is true that we now depend on some imports according to plan and to the needs of the projects. However, at the conclusion of the 5-year plan, local production will achieve self-sufficiency. We will dispense with imports and we will save 350 million pounds in hard currency which we now use for annual imports. Some 2 years from now, our production will reach well over 15 million tons a year, which is enough for our consumption. I like to clarify that we began implementing the plan 3 years ago, when our production was only 3 million tons. We are planning from now to increase production in the Second 5-year Plan to face the expected increase in consumption and to try to provide a surplus for export.

With regard to reinforcing rods, we produce 20 percent of our consumption. Therefore, we began covering this shortage by backing local production so that it will increase by another 20 percent from next month. We will provide the remainder by importing it through agreements on commodity exchange. At this point, we fulfill other objectives, that is, marketing our goods and emerging from the circle of demand for the dollar to contribute to the solution of its problem, in addition to guaranteeing the availability of this material, which is vital for construction, in a regular manner and in addition to extricating this material from the circle of bottlenecks.

So far as iron is concerned the state's present plan, represented in the housing ministry, calls for procuring at least 80 percent of consumption needs, so that we will be able to release the circulation of iron, as we have done with cement, and so that this objective will be achieved, God willing, within the coming 3 months.

Local Production Increase

At the same time, we work to increase local production. The state encourages the private-sector factories by exempting this sector from paying taxes on raw materials. Concerning the public sector, al-Dakhilah factory will go into production a year from now with approximately 100,000 tons a year. This production will gradually increase until it reaches 750,000 tons. Prime Minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali has issued his instructions that the necessary measures be taken now so that al-Dakhilah factory production will reach 1.2 million tons; the industry ministry is taking the executive measures for this purpose.

As far as glass is concerned, we lack 3 million flat meters and measures are now being taken to import them all at one time to make them available at a fixed price without quotas, pricing or licenses. The Higher Committee on Policies has decided to begin immediately to set up a factory in the Sinai where raw materials may be available. The industry ministry is now taking the executive measures for the project and, with the beginning of the Second 5-year Plan, we will dispense with glass imports.

With regard to bricks, we have made a decision, on which we will not go back under any circumstances, to stop finally the production of burnt bricks in Egypt next August to prevent raking and to preserve the cultivable terrain. Another decision will be implemented this month: government and private-sector companies will use burnt bricks in building and in the projects which they implement and undertake. In return, the ministry will ask all facilities and assistance to produce alternatives to clay bricks and cement. We have actually begun implementing this decision by removing obstacles by standardizing the price of energy and lowering it for the private sector from 120 to 30 pounds per ton, by preparing 11 quarries in the governorates to provide brick factories with ready yellow clay and by facilitating bank loans.

Our plan calls for encouraging the private-sector factories under construction to produce 2.8 billion bricks a year. A decision is now being made on announcing an international tender for the importation of equipment for the production of another billion bricks in one shift, which will rise to 2 billions in two shifts. We also encourage the owners of burnt-brick kilns to develop them and produce alternatives. Furthermore, executive measures are now being taken to establish cement brick production lines in all the present cement factories and in the factories to be built in the future.

The conversation then shifted to the problem of sanitary drainage and drinking water from which the citizens in some areas suffer to varying degrees. Muhsin Sidqi said: "The utilities have long since been used up. However, God willing, in mid-1985, the citizens will feel that service has improved. The sanitary drainage network in Cairo, al-Jizah, al-Iskandariyah and some other large cities are now being replaced and renovated. Up to this time, there has been a 60 percent increase in the production of drinking water. The problem will end completely 3 years from now when the huge networks, which have now entered the phase of implementation, go into operation. Until this is done, the water network will not handle the water quantities. It is imperative to rationalize water pumping so that no flooding and pipe explosions occur in some areas. In this respect, the information media shoulder a great responsibility. Every citizen must know that the meter of water for which he pays 15 mils, for instance, costs the state 170 mils. One example is enough: under the 5-year plan ending in 1987, the state has allocated 3 billion pounds for sanitary drainage and drinking water."

Utility Returns

Therefore, at this point I stress an important point. These enormous projects, on which the state spends 11 million pounds [figure as published] as a

comprehensive solution for their problem, cannot be left without an economic management through which the state will receive a return which will cover just the costs of operation and maintenance.

Therefore, a study is now being prepared on the pricing of water in accordance with various shares: those who consume more will pay more in doing social justice. It is not in keeping with justice to equalize those who consume drinking water in projects, factories, hotels or plants, or those who process water and sell it at the prices which we all know, with those who pay to drink. The state will subsidize water for drinking and for moderate consumption. However, the investment quarters will pay the price of the cost.

Al-Muqattam Problem

At this meeting, I was careful to ask the minister about the al-Muqattam problem. He answered: "The management of al-Muqattam has been assigned to a new company to implement a main objective which contributes to the resolution of the housing problem. This objective is to have al-Muqattam lands sold for building and construction, not for the purpose of land speculation. This objective is also to formulate plans for these lands in large areas with enough space to accommodate the setting up of utilities and services. It is preferable that planning be undertaken by one of the ministry's companies. Furthermore, priority precedence in the purchase of al-Muqattam lands will be given to organizations and trade unions.

Another remark which touches on the general subject about which we are talking, namely, the housing problem: it is incumbent upon every industrial complex to provide housing and services to the workers near their work locations. Furthermore, the cost of every new factory or project must take into account the allocations for the building of housing units to preserve the time and efforts of the workers, and the benefits of production, especially on lands that are available for construction in the vicinity of labor concentrations.

Both the minister of industry and manpower are now working to benefit from the rate of 10 percent that has been allocated to housing. So far as the iron and steel mills and the cement factories in Halwan are concerned, the construction of 7,200 housing units has begun in the first phase of the construction of 20,000 units. A discussion is underway on doing the same thing in Kafr al-Dawwar, where a census of applications is being conducted. The ministry will back industrial housing through the Cooperatives Authority and the Construction and Housing Bank.

12839

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EGYPT

HEAVY FRG INVOLVEMENT IN EXPANSION OF ELECTRICAL SUPPLY GRID

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German
1 Feb 85 p 2

[Text] In Egypt, where electrical consumption is increasing by more than 10 percent per year, further progress has been made in the expansion of the energy supply grid. New projects have been undertaken and the financing of power stations already under construction has been guaranteed through foreign aid. Awarding of contracts for construction of the first nuclear power plant is imminent. The FRG, like other industrialized nations and international organizations (World Bank Group, European Investment Bank), is offering significant financial assistance. FRG companies were considered in the bidding.

The FRG granted a loan of DM 8.7 million in June 1984 and a finance credit of DM 11.3 million guaranteed by Hermes for switchgear installation components, especially heavy duty circuit breakers and load break switches. These are needed for the manufacture of medium and low voltage switchgear installations by two German-Egyptian joint ventures. The first of these is the Egyptian German Electrical Manufacturing Company S.A.E. (Egemac) of Cairo, consisting of the indigenous Elmaco, Siemens AG of Munich/Berlin and the German Development Commission (DEG) of Cologne. The second joint venture is the Arab Contractors of Electric Industries. S.A.E. (Arabb) of Cairo whose members are the Egyptian Arab Contractors and Brown, Boverie and Co. AG (BBC) of Mannheim. The switchgear installations produced by the two joint ventures are needed for the Egyptian energy supply grid. The sponsor of the project is the national Egyptian Electricity Authority (EEA) of Cairo.

In July 1983, the FRG granted a loan of DM 43.5 million, within its material assistance program intended for projects, which is essential for creation of a protective system for high tension power lines. The goals of the EEA project in question are securing the stability of the network, protecting stored systems as well as increasing transmission capacity. The entire plan is to be drawn up by the end of 1985.

An international consortium, led by AEG-Kanis Turbinen GmbH of Nuremberg, joined by the Swiss Gebrueder Sulzer AG of Winterthur and the Austrian AEG-Telefunken GmbH of Vienna, booked an order in the fall of 1984 from the

national General Organization for Industrialization (Gofi) of Cairo, with a value of DM 40 million. This is for construction of a steam power plant with an installed capacity of 20 MW, intended to meet the energy and heat supply needs of the large textile factory of the Misr Fine Spinning and Weaving Company in Kafr ad Dawwar by the summer of 1985, AEG-Kanis Turbinen GmbH, a member of the AEG-Telefunken AG Frankfurt group, is delivering the steam turbine generator and the comprehensive measurement and control engineering.

In the fall of 1983 AEG-Telefunken AG received a DM 9 million order for delivery of a turnkey transformer station needed to supply power to the foundry under construction for the El Nasr Casting Company (ENC) of Cairo. The 66/11 kilovolt feeder station will be installed in Tanash near Cairo.

Earlier, in the summer of 1983, AEG-Telefunken AG received a DM 7.4 million order for the complete electrical outfitting of a spinning and weaving mill in the expansion project for the Misr Shibin al-Kawm textile factory. The order includes delivery of energy supply equipment, lighting systems, clock and signal systems as well as the equipment for the electrical workshops. The new system is scheduled to be put into operation in early 1985.

Braunschweigische Maschinenbauanstalt AG (BMA) of Braunschweig, which is building a cane sugar factory with a daily processing capacity of 6,000 tons of sugar cane for the Societe des Sucreries et de Distillerie d'Egypte in Jira' (Upper Egypt), placed its order for complete electrical outfitting with AEG-Telefunken AG at the end of 1984. Operation of the sugar factory is expected to begin early in 1987.

At the end of December 1983, an international consortium consisting of six companies led by Kraftwerk Union AG (KWU) of Muelheim/Ruhr, a Siemens AG company, received an order for expansion of the thermal power plant under construction at Suez with an additional oil-fired generator unit with an installed capacity of 300 MW. In contrast to the first two power plant units, each equipped with a 150 MU KWU turbine generator, the expansion will be delivered turnkey. KWU has assumed total engineering of the new unit as well as delivery of the turbine with capacitor, boiler-fed turbine and management. The value of the entire order is reported to be approximately DM 40 million. Another partner in the consortium is the Japanese Fuji Electric Company, which is delivering primarily the generator.

The World Bank has recently guaranteed two loans with a total value of \$59 million for the expansion financing of two power station projects already under construction. The first, for \$42 million, is for the thermal power station in Shubra al-Khaymah north east of Cairo, which includes three units (315 MW each). Total investment in this project has been estimated at \$635 million. The project is being managed by the American firm Bechtel Overseas of San Francisco, California. The World Bank had already participated in the financing with \$195 million.

The second World Bank loan for \$17 million is being used for the completion of the second power plant at the old Aswan High Dam. This will be equipped

with four turbogenerator groups with a capacity of 67.5 MW each and is expected to cost about \$150 million. The power plant is being constructed by a consortium led by the French company Grands Travaux de Marseille (GTM) of Nanterre and the American Allis-Chalmers Corporation of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The World Bank had already granted a loan of \$52 million to finance this project. The previously constructed first hydroelectric plant at the old Aswan High Dam operates with an installed capacity of 345 MW.

In the spring of 1984, the European Investment Bank (EIB) of Luxembourg granted a 40 million ecu loan (1 ecu equals approximately DM 2.24) for connection of the thermal power plant at Shubra al-Khaymah to the Egyptian electrical grid. The project, partially financed by the EIB and to be completed in 1987, includes the building of power lines with a total length of 150 km, the construction of switching and transformer stations as well as other installation.

Around the beginning of 1985, Hungary promised a loan of \$150 million for construction of a thermal power plant with an installed capacity of 300 MU to be built in Tabbin near an already existing installation (50 MW). Japan has recently promised a 12.7 billion yen loan. This is to be applied to the delivery of a floating power plant (60 MW) which will lie off the Mediterranean coast near Marsa al-Matruh. The length of the hull has been reported at 97.5 m.

In the spring of 1984, Egypt received a promise from the American U.S. agency for International Development (USAID) for financing of the fourth and last generating unit (150MW) of the thermal power plant at Abu Sultan near Ismailia. The financing contributions amount to \$95 million. The American company General Electric (GE) of Fairfield, Connecticut received the order, as it had for the first three, for the construction of the fourth stage, which is to be operational by May 1985. The physical plant will be built by the American firm Gilbert Associates. Total investment costs for the expansion were estimated at \$117 million.

In the fall of 1983, the Egyptian government awarded the Swiss company Brown, Boverie & Cie (BBC) of Baden an order with a value of 80 million Swiss francs for construction of a gas turbine power plant with an installed capacity of 100 MW, which was to be operational by the end of 1984. The project's financing was carried out by a bank consortium led by Schweizerischer Kreditanstalt (SKA). Three neighboring cement factories are to be supplied with electricity from this new gas turbine power plant. BBC has already built two gas turbine power plants of the same capacity in Egypt.

In mid-December 1983, the Swiss company BBD received an order worth 93 million Swiss francs for the complete installation of a power plant (45 MW) which can be fired with either natural gas or fuel oil. It will be erected south east of Alexandria for the national Egyptian Petrochemical Company (EPTCO) and is to be ready for operation in the spring of 1986. The construction of the building itself was entrusted to the Swiss company Geilinger AG of Winterthur.

At the beginning of July 1984, it was announced that Canada had promised financial assistance amounting to 123 million dollars for the financing of Egyptian energy projects. Of that, 60 million dollars would be a loan and 40 million dollars would be a grant for the construction of a hydro-electric power plant (120 MW) at Isna on the Nile, some 700 km south of Cairo. A grant of 12.5 million dollars is to provide for the training of technical personnel and executives for the Egyptian electric power industry.

Another 5 million dollars was earmarked by Canada for the financing of preliminary studies dealing with the construction of a thermal power plant at Sidi Krir, 32 km west of Alexandria, with a installed capacity of 1260 MW. In July 1984, the European Community designated a sum of 2 million ecus for a feasibility study for the Sidi Krir power plant which is to be concluded by March 1985. Thermal power plants with the same capacity are being contemplated for Kurimat in the Nile Delta and for 'Ayn Musa. The 'Ayn Musa power plant, which interests the Japanese, is to be supplied with coal from a mine in Al Maghara in the Sinai Peninsula.

Al Dabaa, about 160 km west of Alexandria, has been chosen as the site for Egypt's first nuclear power plant. It is to be equipped with two pressurized water reactors (1000 MW each). Three companies are being considered for the contract: KWU, the American firm Westinghouse Electric Corporation and the French firm Framatome. The sponsor of the project is the national Nuclear Power Plants Authority (NPPA) of Cairo. The Qattara Project advocated by the Swedish consulting firm Sweco of Stockholm is being further pursued by the Organization for the Execution of Hydroelectric Power Station Projects of Cairo. The project is based on obtaining electrical energy from the diversion of water from the Mediterranean Sea into the Qattara Depression which lies 134 m below sea level.

12666

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3 April 1985

EGYPT

INCONSISTENCIES, ANOMALIES OF IMPORT RATIONALIZATION COMMITTEES

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 9 Feb 85 p 3

/Article by Mahmud Salim: "What Is Going on in the Import Rationalization Committees? Complaints about Committees Are Continuing and the Officials Say 'We Reject Imports of Artificial Eyelashes and Exotic Birds!'"

/Text/ Following the issuance of the new economic decrees, the talk about imports has been incessant. In the talk about imports, the committees guiding these imports are in the forefront of the points raised for discussion. Importers, for their part, continue their questions about import applications which are rejected or not reviewed, and officials, for their part, say "We just reject applications which are given the designation 'provocative!' Foremost among these are goods such as artificial eyelashes and exotic birds!"

In the office of the foreign communications department manager in the Bank of Cairo, I listened last week with the director of the department to the problem of an importer for whom credit to import a commodity from abroad was not opened up.

Two days after that episode, in the office of a sector head in the General Investment Authority, I listened to the problem of another importer for whom credit was not opened up regarding the import of a different commodity.

Each of those two exporters's complaints concerned the import guidance committees, which had not given agreement to the import applications, so that consequently credits were not opened for either of them!

Talk about import guidance committees fills the streets of Egypt. Everyone is talking from his own point of view!

The person involved in the first incident we heard of, in the office of Wadi' Ya'qub, manager of the Bank of Cairo foreign communications department, continued to describe it for almost an hour, in a state of extreme anger because the credit for importing the commodity had not been opened. The commodity was exotic birds!

It is true that the volume of the credit did not exceed \$5,000, but the commodity to be imported made the department manager listen to his problem until he had finished his discussion, after which he told him that the credit would be opened "shortly!"

The second incident I listened to in the Investment Authority was totally different: an investment company that produces fodder requested bids from local companies producing plastic to supply 3 million plastic bags. The company received more than one bid from public and private sector companies, the price per bag ranging from 41 to 45 piasters in accordance with their bids. After that, the investment company asked for a tender from a foreign company to submit a bid to supply the same quantity, and it was quoted a price of 33 piasters per bag. At that point the company considered that in the event it imported, it would save about 300,000 pounds. It submitted an application to the guidance committees to obtain agreement to import the quantity from the foreign company, but the committee's response was negative because the commodity was available locally. After this rejection the investment company requested new bids from local companies. The old bids had lapsed with the passage of time, but the company was surprised to find that the local companies had raised the price to 47.5 piasters per bag in their new bids, after learning of the investment committees' rejection. As the owner of the company says, with a simple calculation the company found that the difference between the two prices exceeded 300,000 pounds and went to 411,000.

Artificial Eyelashes

Each of these two incidents raises questions about the import guidance committees. Anyone listening to the first story will support the committees' rejection of the application to import the commodities concerned. We do not need to import them and indeed they inspire the ridicule of some importers, who submit applications to import commodities of which the least that could be said, also, is that they are provocative. For example, an importer submitted an application about 3 months ago to import \$1 million in artificial eyelashes and other commodities. One importer submitted an application to import the rattan required to manufacture rattan chairs. No one listening to such examples can defend the view of these importers, who fill the world with cries that the guidance committees are obstructing the importation of their goods.

That is a subject over which there is no argument. What does provoke argument, however, is the rejection which takes place in the committees concerning some applications for other commodities. Foremost among these perhaps is what happened to the import company, which produced poultry fodder. The issue involves not so much an attack on the guidance committees as a discussion of what goes on.

If the goal is to reject applications to import commodities for which there is a local alternative, this issue has two sides. The first is that if the local company whose production is to be encouraged is a public sector

company, it must seek ways to make it strengthen competition over the price of the commodity it produces and the imported commodity. If the company belongs to the private sector, it must not go to excess regarding the profit margin it requests.

In many people's opinion, that does not happen in many public and private sector companies.

Consequently, the guidance committees' rejection of applications to import goods for which there are local equivalents will have no strong justification. People who hold this view say that permitting imports in such cases will compel these companies to guide their production costs and avoid going to excess regarding the profit margin they set, and, if this happens on the part of the local companies, importers will not seek recourse to apply to import goods for which there is a local equivalent.

Idling Factory Capacity

Here the accountant Majdi Khalifah, owner of an investment company which produces iron frames, says that there are many public sector companies which produce such frames, in addition to private sector companies. They can be satisfied with the country's need for prefabricated iron equipment installations, but it is to be observed that these factories are not operating at more than half capacity. Opening the door wide to imports of prefabricated buildings will help make these factories' capacities idle.

A Thousand Applications a Week

In general, each side has a point.

On Tuesday every week, at 0830 hours, the guidance committee holds its weekly meeting under the chairmanship of Ahmad al-Banna, first deputy minister of economy.

These committees review close to 1,000 import applications a week at the one meeting, after the technical committees have studied these applications. The committee meeting lasts about 5 hours. The Ministries of Industry, War Production, Economy, Electricity, Housing and Health, in addition to the Central Bank, customs, the Federation of Industries, the Federation of Chambers of Industry and the Investment Authority are represented in it.

This meeting took place with Mahmud Hilal, the counsellor of the Ministry of Industry and the ministry's representatives at these committees, concerning the dealings in the guidance committee.

He said that guidance policy was not a heretical innovation; all the countries in the world follow the guidance system, whether they are advanced or developing.

But what is happening in Egypt? Mahmud Hilal said, "331 commodities which are subject to guidance have been defined. In the list of these commodities the name of the commodity and the customs duty to which it is subject have been specified so that problems will not arise during application. What used to happen was that a specific importer would ask to import a specific commodity through customs. It sometimes happened that goods which had actually been imported would reach customs and the importers would be surprised to be told that these goods were subject to guidance. Unlimited problems would arise."

I stated "Some importers raise complaints about the current system. There are goods for which there is no local alternative and these are not luxury commodities. They face difficulties getting the approval of the guidance committees."

He said, "we agree to any applications which are presented to us, to which this situation applies, immediately, but there are commodities which we also reject immediately, such as the artificial eyelashes and other provocative goods. In addition to this, some importers generally present approximately 20 import applications in the same name for the same commodity with the same invoice; their intention is that if one application is rejected, another one, or more than one, will be accepted.

"Therefore it has been decided that agreement will be given to an importer for only one application, if his application contains the same commodity and the same invoice." Mahmud Hilal said, "In confirmation of this, we made a list of the approvals which were given during the past year, and it became apparent that approximately half the approvals were actually carried out; agreement was made to import commodities for about \$4 billion, and only about \$2 billion of these were carried out."

The Problem of Plastic

I asked him, "What about a problem such as that of the company producing poultry fodder?"

He said, "This application was not approved because the person submitting it did not present anything to confirm that there were bids from foreign companies at the prices he mentioned in his complaint. In addition, there are five companies producing plastic bags in Egypt. Assuming that local prices are higher than foreign ones, the importer is leaving out customs and transportation expenses."

He said, "In general, this problem is under study."

I asked, "Why isn't the private sector represented on these committees? It is not reasonable that these committees should be an adversary and an arbiter at the same time, as Sa'id al-Tawil, chairman of the Society of Egyptian Businessmen, says."

Mahmud Hilal said, "The private sector, represented by the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and the Federation of Industries, is represented in the form of 'federations,' not in the form of 'persons.' It is not acceptable that that should take place, since the import applications are considered secret, and it is not reasonable that an importer's application for a specific commodity should be presented to a private sector figure who might be an importer of the same commodity."

310 Approvals

Finally, the latest Ministry of Economy figures show that the number of approvals the guidance committees issued to import companies last January came to 310, as compared with 260 in January of last year and 232 last December.

Although these figures mean that the guidance committees have not suspended private sector imports, complaints are still being raised by men in the private sector which are in reality problems that lie at the heart of production, whether it is industrial or agricultural.

All that is desired is flexibility regarding decrees approving import applications--without, of course, a review of applications for exotic birds or artificial eyelashes.

11887

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EGYPT

PLAYWRIGHTS AGREE TO REAPPEAR IN PUBLIC THEATER

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 9 Feb 85 p 9

/Article by Samiyah Labib: "Nu'man 'Ashur and Yusuf Idris Return to the Public Sector Stage"/

/Text/ After a long boycott of 15 years on the part of the major theater writers, serious negotiations are now taking place with these writers to bring them back to government theaters once again.

Recently Hamdi Ahmad, director of the Comedy Theater, reached agreement with the great writer Nu'man 'Ashur to present his play "The Effect of a Painful Event" on the Comedy Theater stage at its next season. Hamdi Ahmad also proposed to the minister of culture, 'Abd-al-Hamid Radwan, that agreement be reached with Yusuf Idris to buy his latest play "The Acrobat" for the Comedy Theater. The minister was favorable to having Yusuf Idris' play presented on the public sector stages, because he is a great writer who has literary merit and must have his place on the stage, even if there is a dispute in points of view between him and the minister.

Hamdi Ahmad sent an express telegram to Yusuf Idris, who is now in America, to get his agreement to the purchase of his play "The Acrobat."

The director of the Comedy Theater, Hamdi Ahmad, also gave his agreement to another group of young writers to give them an opportunity to present their comedies on government stages.

At present, Nu'man 'Ashur's play "The Effect of a Painful Event" is being prepared for presentation on the Floating Theater in the early days of Lesser Bayram. "The delay in its presentation," Hamdi Ahmad said, "can be attributed to the reason that the rehearsals have been going on for 2 months and will end next April, which is the examination month. That time is not suitable for all the members of the family, because I have decided that the comic stage should be a stage for the family, and not a boutique for jokes."

While the directors of the private sector troupes are competing to attract movie stars to act on stage at the highest prices, Hamdi Ahmad has decided to nominate young stars for leading roles in his coming plays, in order to

present a new generation of stage actors, so that that generation will not be afflicted with sterility.

Hamdi Ahmad said, "The theater is language and it is dependent on good texts. It is possible that it can create a new generation and new stars, as was the case with television theater when movie stars refused to participate in it, because of the difficulty of working on television, causing television to give young stars at that time a chance to appear, including 'Izzat al-'Alayili, Salah Qabil and Zizi al-Badrawi."

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3 April 1985

LIBYA

AL-QADHDHAFI'S RELATIONS WITH ARABS CRITICIZED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 97, 16-22 Feb 85 p 3

[Editorial by Fu'ad Matar: "Role Sought from al-Qadhdhafi"]

[Text] We have evidence of Col Mu'ammr al-Qadhdhafi's skill in guiding the helm of negotiations with the British on the release of the four Britons arrested in Libya 9 months ago in response to the British government's handling of the affair of the killing of a British policewoman in front of the Libyan embassy in London. He has not permitted the bigger country to harm the dignity of the smaller country. He responded to pressure with double the pressure, and to scorn in the same way. He made his people proud of themselves and their president; to that end he left the matter to the people, who debated it and then delivered the judgment before it reached him.

More important than all of this was that it took over a few hours of television and radio in Britain and Europe generally, and several British and European newspaper columns, in which the British and Europeans saw meetings of the people's committees, and got an idea of what goes on in this developing country. They also saw Colonel al-Qadhdhafi receiving his visitors in a humble tent, and presenting a copy of the Qur'an to the head of the Anglican church through the British intermediary whom the church had sent. They then saw the intermediary, and the hostages whose release was accomplished, being transported through the city of Tripoli to its airport.

Usually, in cases of this kind, this does not happen--the radio and television stations and newspapers and magazines give Libya and its president and its people's committees only a few seconds of coverage. This is not due to the unimportance of the country and its affairs, but to the indifference of the bigger country for the smaller country.

At the same time that we have evidence of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's skill in guiding the helm of negotiations, so that Libya realized a great public relations benefit, we find ourselves asking several questions, among them:

--How is it possible that Colonel al-Qadhdhafi ended this crisis with Britain, and released four Britons, and put relations on a path to normalization, but has not ended a crisis with the Palestinian leadership, a tragedy which

still continues, in a time when there is need to normalize relations among Arabs? If someone reflects on the Libyan-Palestinian break, he finds himself asking about its causes and about the secret of its continuation. He finds himself dissatisfied by the reasons, and without discovery of the secret of its continuation.

--How is it that Colonel al-Qadhdhafi ends a crisis with Britain, and releases four Britons, and puts relations on the path to normalization, while not ending a crisis with Jordan in a manner similar to that in which he ended a previous crisis with Saudi Arabia?

--How is it that Colonel al-Qadhdhafi ends a crisis with Britain, and releases four Britons, while not ending a crisis with Egypt in a manner similar to that by which he ended a previous crisis with Lebanon?

--How is it that Colonel al-Qadhdhafi ends a crisis with Britain, and releases four Britons, and puts relations on a path to normalization, while not ending a crisis with Sudan, entering its 14th year, which passes from stridency to violence?

--How is it that Colonel al-Qadhdhafi ends a crisis with Britain, and sends four people back to their children and their wives and their people after detaining them for 9 months, and does not venture an effort to end the 5-year old war between Iraq and Iran, or at least to arrange a procedure for the exchange of prisoners, so that this problem does not become a tragedy, particularly since Iran--supported by Colonel al-Qadhdhafi with money and arms in great quantity--has begun to practice against the prisoners procedures which make the matter worse.

Certainly, there are problems and differences and stormy crises between Colonel al-Qadhdhafi and some international parties, but it is noticeable that they are not as stormy as those between him and some Arab parties. The crisis between him and Britain has not reached the shrillness of the crises between him and Egypt or the Sudan or the Palestinian leadership or Iraq.

Even the crisis between him and the United States does not reach the shrillness of the crisis between him and some Arab parties.

A matter such as this calls for lengthy consideration. The question arises: Why are these feelings of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi toward some Arabs so violent that we find it impossible for him to end a crisis with a foreigner but not with Arabs?

If he is afraid of them, or of some of them, then the matter calls for a non-interference pact of some form. This type of pact is not customarily written, but rather depends on the skills of intermediaries.

If he is afraid for them, or for some of them, then the matter calls for review of the situation and methods of mutual conduct.

We say this on the basis of the development of affairs, which have confirmed some facts, among them that in the Arab political arena, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi imitates the example of the Soviet Union in the international arena. He is able to play the spoiler if he is displeased, and he is able to explode a situation if there is imminent danger. He is able to annoy if annoyed, regardless of considerations.

Perhaps what confirms all this, is the persistence of the bigger country, Britain, to resolve the problem of the four hostages amicably, since they could have remained hostages for many years. Even though the state was able to solve the problem, it entrusted the matter to the church, taking into consideration the fact that the clergyman might have luck as an ally in negotiations and in the end he represents the state.

It remains for one to wish that Colonel al-Qadhdhafi--in this critical, profound stage through which the [Arab] nation is passing--would participate in healing the Arab and Islamic wound in the manner in which the British-Libyan wound was healed. If the settlement of the British-Libyan crisis was a major or noteworthy accomplishment, the continuation of the Libyan-Arab crises are major and minor relapses.

12780

CSO: 4504/238

LIBYA

CHANGED RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN ASSESSED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 97, 16-22 Feb 85 pp 5, 6

[Text] Observers of the popular and media demonstration in London which accompanied the release of four British subjects detained in Libya remarked that the interest was limited to popular levels, without official support. The four Britons had been detained in Libya for about 9 months, on suspicion of providing information to British radio and transmitting messages attacking Libya. Their release was preceded by lengthy negotiations in Libya conducted by Terry Wyeth, a representative of the Anglican church. It is as if the affair was intended to suggest that Libyan lenience in the release of the Britons will not be linked by the Thatcher government to political bargaining concerning the trials of the four Libyans charged with bombing a number of nightclubs and establishments of opponents of al-Qadhdhafi in Britain.

It should be mentioned that prior to the release, criticism was widespread in British political circles of the way the Thatcher government dealt with the issue, which contributed to the incident at the Libyan embassy in January of last year and the killing of policewoman Evonne Fletcher, causing relations between Britain and Libya to worsen. According to well-informed sources of AL-TADAMUN, this matter contributed to the Libyan authorities' hardness concerning the release of the four Britons.

In spite of Thatcher's eventual involvement, and her request that the archbishop of Canterbury intensify his efforts with the authorities in Libya, with the goal of resolving the problem, the problem took on political dimensions by al-Qadhdhafi's referring the issue of the release of the Britons to the People's Committees. It appears that the release on bail of an al-Qadhdhafi relation, in custody in Britain, enabling him to escape to Libya, led to expediting the release.

However, some knowledgeable sources told AL-TADAMUN that the release is connected with a political concession by the Thatcher government being called "returning British-Libyan relations to their normal state," and improving treatment of Libyans residing in Britain, including restricting Libyans opposed to the Libyan government who are continually increasing their activities in Britain.

What confirms this information is the new steps which it is anticipated the British government will resort to in order to improve its relations with Libya, such as sending a senior official in the British Foreign Office to Tripoli to conduct discussions with Libyan functionaries with the goal of improving relations between the two countries, which were broken off in April of last year.

12780

CSO: 4504/238

MOROCCO

ECONOMIC TIES WITH BRAZIL

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 11 Jan 85 pp 12, 20

[Text] Pursuing its investigation into the state of economic and commercial relations between Morocco and the countries represented in Rabat, LA VIE ECONOMIQUE met with First Secretary Luiz Antonio Fachini Gomes at the Brazilian embassy in Rabat; in Casablanca it interviewed Mr Castro Boanerges Aguiar, the director of the Bank of Brazil for Morocco.

These two individuals expressed their willingness to set out for our readers the several aspects of the Brazilian economy, its accomplishments, its projects; and of course, they made observations concerning the commercial conjuncture and the Moroccan-Brazilian trade agreements; here is what emerged from these interviews:

A simple glance at the statistics shows that Morocco imports goods from Brazil on a much broader scale than Brazil from Morocco; and until the present time, Moroccan products imported by Brazil have consisted basically of phosphates and phosphoric acid. Now the figures for these imports have fallen off considerably since Brazil has practically suspended its purchases of Moroccan phosphates.

Thus in 1980, Morocco had imported from Brazil a total of 110,273 tons of merchandise (basically unrefined sugar, spices, sisal fibers and leaf tobacco), with a value of 326,208,000 dirhams. For its part, Brazil had purchased from Morocco phosphates and phosphoric acid--a total volume of 469,123 tons and an overall value of 176,168,000 dirhams; in their bilateral trade relations, each country stood 12th on the other's list of trading partners.

The following year, 1981, Brazil became 33rd on the list of Moroccan clients, basically because of its purchase of 209,276 tons of phosphates, at a value of 51,264,480 dirhams, and 18th on its list of suppliers, with 84,537 tons (basically unrefined sugar, sisal fibers, leaf tobacco and spices) valued at 333,875,162 dirhams.

In 1982, Brazil boosted itself up to 16th place among our suppliers, with 114,050 tons of merchandise, valued at 396,514,435 dirhams (basically soybean

oil and unrefined sugar), while Morocco fell back to 54th place among the suppliers of Brazil, with 42,894 tons (basically natural phosphates of calcium and alpista, though not the seed crop), at a value of 10,678,884 dirhams.

In 1983, Brazil moved up to 14th place on the list of our suppliers, with 798,566 tons of merchandise (basically soybean oil, unrefined sugar and soybean seed), at a value of 365,613,199 dirhams. That same year, 1983, Brazil purchased 14,358 tons from Morocco (basically phosphoric acid), valued at 32,090,300 dirhams, our country thus becoming 41st on the list of Brazilian suppliers. Obviously, it is too early to have an exact idea of the commercial figures for 1984, but it would seem not far off the mark to hope for a certain increase in both directions.

Thus, as is evident, Brazil basically bought from us phosphates and chemical products derived from phosphates; it is also on our list of clients, but in minuscule proportions: it purchases our woolen rugs stamped with the state seal (123 kg, valued at 16,263 dirhams in 1981), our leather goods, copper products, inlaid wares and various small industrial accessories such as leaden storage battery plates: 1 kg in 1982, with a value of 23 dirhams. Several tables illustrate these Moroccan-Brazilian commercial exchanges:

I. MOROCCAN-BRAZILIAN TRADE BALANCES IN DIRHAMS

YEARS	TOTALS OF MOROCCAN EXPORTS		TOTALS OF MOROCCAN IMPORTS	
	Tonnage	Value in Dirhams	Tonnage	Value in Dirhams
1980	469,123	176,168,000	110,273	326,208,000
1981	209,276	51,331,726	84,537	333,875,162
1982	42,894	10,679,884	114,050	396,514,435
1983	14,358	32,090,300	79,856	365,613,199

II. MOROCCO AND BRAZIL: COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES BETWEEN 1978 AND 1983

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	Jan.-Nov. 1983
EXPORTS						
In thousands of US dollars	18,238	29,072	80,823	36,079	55,912	45,619
Nominal variation (in percentages)	- 40.1	59.4	178.0	- 55.4	55.0	- 6.8
Real variation (in percentages)	- 44.4	41.6	143.9	- 59.1	51.0	---
IMPORTS						
In thousands of US dollars	18,570	38,441	43,227	10,149	1 603	2 690
Nominal variation (in percentages)	- 42.5	107.0	12.5	- 76.5	- 84.2	67.8
Real variation (in percentages)	46.6	83.9	- 1.3	- 78.5	- 84.5	---
TRADE BALANCE	- 332	9 369	37,596	25,930	54,309	42,929

III. MOROCCO-BRAZIL: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IN U.S. DOLLARS

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
A) Goods and services	27,177	19,807	48,700
Trade balance	37,596	25,930	54,309
Exports (FOB)	80,823	36,079	55,912
Imports (FOB)	43,227	10,149	1 603
Services (liquid)	-10,419	-6 123	-5 609
Income	1 410	2 479	1 144
Outgo	11,829	8 602	6 753
B) Unilateral transfers			
Liquid	-7	-5	3
Income	1	4	10
Outgo	8	9	7
C) Current transactions (A + B)	27,170	19,802	48,703
D) Movement of capital			
Liquid	-635	2 811	-12,635
Receipts	---	3 027	7 285
Expenditures	635	216	19,921
E) Total (C + D)	26,535	22,613	36,068

Having said all of this, what might we consider to be the perspectives for trade between these two friendly countries? As we have noted elsewhere, Brazil, by the major savings it has made on petroleum purchases, thanks to the conversion of numerous vehicles to alcohol- rather than gasoline-run engines, is at the present time able to devote considerable attention to imports; on this subject, it would doubtless be desirable for private citizens from Morocco to go to Brazil and see for themselves the market possibilities that this immense Latin American nation offers for our products.

Marrakesh and Brazil

Among the latter is tourism, one of the priorities of our 5-year plans; it is obvious that in Brazil as elsewhere in the world, the name of Marrakesh immediately evokes tales from the Thousand and One Nights, with all the mystery, poetry and attractiveness of a dreamy longing for far-away places more or less obscurely desired by a great many travelers. The name of Marrakesh even serves as a rhyme (that is already an indication) in a popular song celebrating the loves of its author, Gaetano Velloso.

Samba and Couscous

On the other hand, Brazilian gourmets have adopted the couscous, made not with wheat but with corn flour and on occasion with manioc; one may even say that

corn couscous is one of the national dishes of Brazil, which is one more stitch in the fabric of rapprochement between the two countries; let the gourmets take notice that this dish is basted with a sauce made from coconut mixed with cinnamon and sugar; the presentation of the dish, with the couscous itself in the center, surmounted and surrounded with vegetables and pieces of meat, looks astonishingly like the couscous served in Morocco! This aura, in which the name of Marrakesh profitably bathes, as well as that of our national cuisine, can be valid arguments for the promotion of our tourism in Brazil; still, people's tastes must be formed to it, and the necessary efforts should be made by both government officials and private individuals.

The "Dam Politics"

Brazil is an immense market, already operative but with a still greater potential; for several decades into the future its population figure will still be increasing in considerable proportions and also its needs; what is more, Brazil has launched an enormous program of immense works projects in the northern part of the country; it has a considerable amount of experience in the construction of dams, and has, moreover, submitted bids on various Moroccan dam proposals; Moroccan-Brazilian cooperation in certain industries is also foreseeable; here, too, it is probably necessary to go directly to the site to see what horizons are opening up for these exchanges.

Brazil Turns toward Africa

Brazilian officials, in accordance with the deep-felt desires of the Brazilian people in this matter, are inclined to undertake the best possible cooperation with a number of African countries, in particular those that share with it the shores of the Atlantic Ocean (to which the Moroccan mountain range gave its name). Morocco could therefore soon become a privileged partner in the great Brazilian federation, to the greater profit of both countries, but once again, for all that it is indispensable for the will to accomplish objectives be efficacious, especially on the Moroccan side, for on the Brazilian side, the doors are open; it is up to our businessmen of all stamp to understand this.

The figures quoted in this study (not exhaustive) are drawn from documents emanating from the Moroccan Bank for Foreign Trade and from the Foreign Exchange Office, in all that concerns Morocco; as far as Brazil is concerned, they are from CACEX [Foreign Trade Department], from CIEF and from the Central Bank of Brazil in Brasilia, from the commercial services of the Brazilian embassy in Rabat, and from the management of the Bank of Brazil for Morocco, all of which we thank for their cooperative spirit and their kind attention.

8117

GSO: 4519/97

MOROCCO

BALANCE OF TRADE FIGURES AS OF OCTOBER 1984

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 8 Feb 85 pp 4, 20

[Text] Expressed in cost and freight/free on board figures, the commercial transactions between Morocco and foreign countries have, over the course of the first 10 months of 1984, ended up with a trade deficit something on the order of 13,765 million dirhams, in comparison with the 9,423 million dirhams at the end of the same period of time the previous year, in other words an increase of 46.1 percent.

This increased deficit can be explained essentially by the strong increase in imports (up 37.5 percent) in comparison to the same period a year before.

As for the rate at which exports covered imports, it dropped by about three points, from 54.1 percent in October 1983 to 51.2 percent.

The Development of Imports

During the first 10 months of 1984, imports amounted to 28,220 million dirhams, in comparison with the 20,519 million dirhams of the previous year, thus marking an increase of 37.5 percent, and representing 66.1 percent of the total transactions.

Representing 27.5 percent of the total imports, energy products counted heavily among our purchases; thus their charges increased by 36.5 percent, to reach 7,764 million dirhams, in comparison with 5,686 million dirhams at the end of the first 10 months of 1983

Increasing by 56.8 percent, expenditures related to the purchase of food products represent 16.9 percent of the overall imports and thus reach the amount of 4,764 million dirhams, in comparison to the 3,033 million dirhams of the end of October 1983. The products that best illustrate this development are coffee, tea, wheat and sugar, for which consumers had to pay, respectively, 97.2 percent, 76.7 percent, 80.1 percent and 37.2 percent more than they did the previous year.

With a total value of 3,448 million dirhams, in comparison to the 2,418 million of 12 months earlier, product acquisition rose by 42.6 percent. This development may be attributed to crude vegetable oils, with a value of 828.6

million dirhams (up 111 percent), unfinished wood, squared or roughly planked: 530.5 million dirhams (up 58.7 percent), cotton: 160 million dirhams (up 18.3 percent).

With regard to unfinished products, they rose from 3 911 million dirhams in October 1983 to 5 211 million dirhams, or an increase of 33.2 percent. At this level are found the increases in purchases of natural fertilizers and chemicals (up 34.1 percent), tubing and metal construction accessories (up 300.5 percent), plastic and artificial materials (up 22.5 percent).

TRADE BALANCE FOR THE FIRST TEN MONTHS

	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>Rate of Development</u>
Import	20,519	28,220	up 37.5%
Export	11,097	14,455	up 30.3%
Deficit	9,423	13,765	up 46.1%
Cover of imports by exports	34.1 percent	51.2 percent	--

As for purchases of industrial equipment materiel, costs increased by 35.6 percent, to reach a figure of 5,135 million dirhams, in comparison with the 3,786 million dirhams of a year earlier. It is believed that the reason for this development lies particularly in the purchases of pumps and compressors, with a total value of 250.3 million dirhams (up 144.6 percent), various machines and apparatus: 710.8 million dirhams (up 28.0 percent), electrical switching apparatus: 348.3 million dirhams (up 307.8 percent) and ocean-going vessels: 927.7 million dirhams (up 230.5 percent).

Finally, our imports of consumer goods reached 1,719 million dirhams in comparison with 1,419 million dirhams at the end of the first 10 months of 1983. In this increase one finds the purchases of medications, which from one period to the other rose from 159 million dirhams to 185.7 million, or an increase of 16.8 percent, tour buses: from 232.9 million dirhams up to 244.4 million (up 4.9 percent), finished paper and other paper products: from 154.4 million dirhams up to 172 million (up 11.4 percent).

Development of Exports

At free-on-board rates, Moroccan sales to foreign countries at the end of the first 10 months of 1984 rose to a total of 14,455 million dirhams, in comparison with the 11,097 million of the end of October 1983. Revenues have therefore increased from one period to the other by 30.3 percent.

This advance in our exports is ascribable to the increased sales of all product groups without exception.

Food products rose to a value of 3,156 million dirhams, an increase of 16.9 percent in comparison with the corresponding period of 1983 and it was basically because of crustaceans, mollusks and shellfish (up 18.0 percent), fresh, salted, dried or smoked fish (up 36.4 percent), canned fish (up 20.2 percent) and canned vegetables (up 35.9 percent).

TRADE BALANCE OF THE FIRST TEN MONTHS BY SECTOR

CONSUMER	IMPORTS		EXPORTS	
	Jan.-Oct. 1983	Jan.-Oct. 1984	Jan.-Oct. 1983	Jan.-Oct. 1984
Food, beverage and tobacco	3 038	4 764	2 700	3 156
Energy and lubricants	5 686	7 764	494	650
Raw materials of animal and vegetable origin	1 358	2 162	280	362
Raw materials of mineral origin	1 060	1 286	2 936	3 875
Unfinished products	3 911	5 211	2 955	4 061
Agricultural equipment and materiel	261	179	--	3
Industrial equipment and materiel	3 786	5 135	54	95
Consumer goods	1 419	1 719	1 678	2 253
TOTAL	20,519	28,220	11,097	14,455

With regard to the revenues earned from our exports of raw materials, they increased by 31.7 percent in comparison with the same period of the previous year. This growth is attributable in a particular way to our exports of paper pulp: 164.2 million dirhams (up 63.4 percent), plants and plant parts: 40.3 million dirhams (up 36.5 percent). At this level, let us recall that the revenues earned from phosphate exports, which represent 21.8 percent of the total exports have come to an overall figure of 3,157.5 million dirhams, or an increase of 33.3 percent.

The exports of unfinished products saw a growth of 37.4 percent, climbing from 2,955 million dirhams at the end of October 1983 to 4,061 million dirhams, attributable especially to the increase of our export shipments of phosphoric acid (up 78.0 percent) and cotton thread (up 87.8 percent).

Finally, as far as sales of finished consumer goods is concerned, they rose by 34.3 percent, to reach 2,253 million dirhams, in comparison with the 1,678 million of the previous year. This increase includes rugs: with a total of 327.3 million dirhams (up 10.1 percent), hosiery items: 247.9 million dirhams (up 34.1 percent), ready-to-wear clothing: 830 million dirhams (up 51.9 percent) and footwear: 191 million dirhams (up 27.8 percent).

8117

CSO: 4519/97

MOROCCO

COAL IMPORTS EXPECTED TO MORE THAN DOUBLE IN 1985

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 1 Feb 85 p 16

[Text] The total amount of coal and coke imported by SOCOCHARBO during 1984 reached a figure of 217,951 tons, in comparison to the 281,865 tons imported in 1983, in other words, a drop of 22.7 percent. This decrease in imports is linked to the development of production in the Jerada Basin, which in 1984 reached the record figure of 840,000 tons.

I. DISTRIBUTION BY CATEGORY AND CONSUMER GROUP

	<u>1983/tons</u>	<u>1984/tons</u>
National Electricity Board	151,712	42,328
Cement factories	53,598	107,187
Petroleum coke for cement factories	35,160	39,876
Sugar refineries	10,981	5 646
Miscellaneous	500	600
Coke for sugar refineries	15,457	9 030
Coke for foundries	14,457	13,284
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	281,865	217,951

The decrease, in comparison with the previous year, is basically attributable to the low production levels both at the National Electricity Board's Roches Noires power plant during the second half of 1984 and at the sugar refineries.

The cost, insurance and freight value for all imports reached 119.15 million dirhams, in comparison with the 151.46 million dirhams of 1983.

II. DISTRIBUTION OF IMPORTS BY PORT

	<u>1983/tons</u>	<u>1984/tons</u>
Port of Casablanca	223,650	174,440
Port of Jorf Lasfar	---	3 571
Port of Agadir	---	23,092
Port of Tanger	16,348	6 176
Port of Nador	41,867	10,672

In all, 27 ships were unloaded, in contrast to 35 ships in 1983.

In 1984 a third cement factory, Agadir Cement Producers, fueled by coal, started up operations, in addition to Lafarge of Casablanca and CADEM of Meknes.

III. ORIGIN OF IMPORTED COAL SUPPLIES

Coal for Power Plants and Cement Factories

Of the 149,515 tons of coal imported under the terms of a contract with the NCB [National Coal Board], 78,438 tons come from Australia, and more immediately from the NCB reserve supplies in Rotterdam. In fact, because of the British miners' strike, which has now lasted for 11 months, SOCOCHARBO was able to persuade the NCB to send a supply of coal to replace the missing order, under the same contractual conditions, to guarantee its clients their normal supplies.

Petroleum coke (39,876 tons) was imported from the US for the use of CADEM.

The coal and coke for the sugar refineries and foundries come from the German producer, Ruhrkohle (28,560 tons).

IV. SALES

Sales were on the order of 241,895 tons, in comparison with the 256,478 tons of 1983, or a decrease of 5.7 percent.

	<u>1983/tons</u>	<u>1984/tons</u>
National Electricity board	128,915 (including 26,747 tons for Jerada)	72,716 (including 16,465 tons for Jerada)
Cement Factories	87,363	129,770
Sugar Refineries	25,723	14,425
Foundries and miscellaneous	14,477	14,984
TOTAL	256,478	241,895

V. IMPORT OUTLOOK FOR 1985

With the Mohammedia power plant that will begin operations toward the end of 1985 and the inauguration of the two coal-powered installations of CIOR [Oriental Cement Factory]--ASMAR in Marrakesh and ASMENT in Temara--the coal and coke imports will be on the order of 580,000 to 680,000 tons, including:

250,000 to 300,000 tons for the National Electricity Board,

280,000 to 340,000 tons for the cement factories, and

40,000 tons for the sugar refineries and the foundries.

The port of Casablanca is preparing to receive more than 450,000 tons; the rest will be distributed for the most part through the ports of Nador and Agadir.

MOROCCO

DROP IN ELECTRIC POWER OUTPUT

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 18 Jan 85 p 4

[Text] Under normal conditions, the hydraulic power plants supply 30 percent of the electrical energy used in the kingdom: in 1984, because of the drought, this figure fell to 6.1 percent, the rest being supplied by the thermal power plants, with a total production of 5,066 GWH, an increase of three percent over 1983; fuel consumption was thus 1,125,000 tons of fuel-oil, 10,000 tons of diesel oil and 760,000 tons of coal.

These figures were supplied at the time of the executive board meeting of the National Electricity Board, chaired by Mr Moussa Saadi, the minister of energy and mines.

Still within fiscal 1984, investment expenses have risen to 926 million dirhams, including the 310 million dirhams that were spent on the Mohammedia thermal power plant alone, in comparison with the 695 million dirhams spent in 1983. The expenditures earmarked for the rail connections for SONASID in Nador and those for Jorf-Lasfar came to a total of 56 million dirhams.

Other projects have entered their completion phase. This is notably the case for the electric power plants at Lalla-Takerkoust and Amougguez, the latter linked to the completion of the Ait-Chouarrit Dam. There was also the national train dispatching center in Casablanca.

In 1983, the investments made within the domain of developing the transportation network and that of the transformation of electric energy had totaled 94 million dirhams; in 1984, they came to more than 165 million dirhams.

All the supply programs and the works projects of the first segment of the National Program of Rural Electrification (NPRE) were completed during 1984; by the end of October, 70 power plants, spread over 10 provinces, were in operation, to the great satisfaction of the people living there; the electrification of the Saharan provinces was intensified through investments on the order of 113 million dirhams, in conformity with the 5-year plan.

With an eye to reducing our energy dependence, numerous studies have been undertaken, examining in particular certain water-harnessing projects such as

the mini-power plants, the hydro-solar project at Sebkha-Tah, the construction of units that burn bituminous schists, and another unit whose chief fuel is esparto grass, located in Oriental--all of this without neglecting the feasibility studies concerning the first electro-nuclear power plant.

Energy savings were on the order of 40,000 tons of fuel, or a value of more than 75 million dirhams, representing a gain of two percent over the preceding fiscal year.

8117

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BAHRAIN

INDUSTRIALIST INTERVIEWED ON WORKFORCE, GCC ECONOMICS

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 15 Feb 85 p 45

[Text] There is one complaint: one can scarcely interview a Gulf industrialist but one hears from him criticism and blame about the lack of interest by officials in the industrial sector, which is the essential base on which the Arab Gulf region will depend in the future.

Jasim al-Khajah, director general of the al-Khajah factories in the Sitrah region of Bahrain, did not add anything new to what his fellow industrialists have complained about, but perhaps the man was more positive in what he said, and more knowledgeable of his industrial field. He is considered to be one of the most successful men in that field in Bahrain.

When this young engineer set out to establish his factory for producing air conditioners in 1980, he did not consider the difficulties he would encounter in the field of his industry...except, "when I set out to enter this world encompassed with danger and continuous hard work, and which does not enjoy the slightest bit of protection, especially since the industry is arising in Arab societies where the idea of foreign goods dominates."

Engineer al-Khajah adds: "I can never understand what industry is encouraged only on paper and in the media, at a time when the opposite should be true, which is that the governments of the Gulf should cast their weight into the industrial arena so they will be able open the way before it to complete its course of development and to participate in the course of the national economy.

"For national industry gives the nation more than it takes; it aids in the process of development in many ways, including and most importantly employing the national labour force, which is also a factor in local development, because when a working Bahraini citizen is paid 500 dinars a month, that amount stays within the country, at a time when huge amounts of money amounting to millions are flowing out of the country through the import of foreign goods. I am not asking here that imports be banned, because that would also have negative effects on the state, rather I am asking that the state impose high customs tariffs on foreign imported industrial goods when similar goods are being manufactured in the country. That method is used by all the countries in the world to protect their own industries and thus to impel them towards progress and prosperity.

[Question] How many Bahrainis are working in your factories?

[Answer] More than 250 workers, 85 percent of whom are Bahraini.

[Question] You mentioned something to the effect that "the Arab person is not a well-educated consumer." Does not that go back to the fact that national industry has not yet reached a level that would induce the Arab consumer to demand its products?

[Answer] Never. Let me give as an example our industry. We import the most important component of the air conditioning unit, the compressor, from outside, and it is in accordance with world specifications. We also give the consumer a 5-year guaranty which he obtains from the agents. In addition, there are other advantages such as fast service and greater care to make certain of the manufactured piece than is taken in world factories, so we will not be criticized by the consumer because we know that consumer confidence in the national industry is weak. In addition, we offer prices that are more than 20 percent lower. But these advantages are not enough if the government does not protect and encourage the industry.

[Question] So, where is the missing link in persuading the Arab consumer to demand products of the national industry?

[Answer] It lies with the officials responsible for the industrial sector. As further clarification, the government should aid in arousing the citizen's consciousness to demand his country's manufactured products, and from there to protect the industry by increasing the rate of customs tariffs on imported goods. After that it is the turn of the factory owners, who should guard against any shortcoming. But without awareness and protection, industry in the region of the Cooperation Council countries will never be able to put up a fight.

[Question] Is there an organization of industrialists in Bahrain?

[Answer] Yes, there is.

[Question] Has this organization contacted the officials responsible for industry to explain to them its point of view?

[Answer] Yes, it has, more than once. The answer has been that we are following a free system and we cannot at the present time issue new laws on this matter.

[Question] Does every industry in the nations of the Cooperation Council complain about what you as an industrialist have complained about?

[Answer] Certainly...certainly every Gulf industry complains about its lack of protection.

[Question] What is the role of the economic agreement among the nations of the Cooperation Council?

[Answer] So far, we as industrialists have not seen anything. Even if restrictions on our movements and exchange of goods in the region have become less routine, nothing tangible has happened so far.

12547

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ISRAEL

PERES' DECISION-MAKING STYLE REPORTED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 10 Feb 85 p 7

[Article by Akiva Eldar: "The National Decision Maker"]

[Text] In a small room, not far from the office of Shimon Peres, Diaspora advisor Avraham Burg prepares a position statement concerning right-wing minister Jerry Falwell, leader of the Moral Majority in the United States. Falwell is scheduled to visit Israel in 2 weeks with 2,000 believers, and he is asking Peres to appear before them at a meeting they will hold in Jerusalem. Should the prime minister answer this man, whose feelings for Israel bear no relationship to his love for Jews. Or should Peres find a way to get rid of him and avoid a conflict. Burg recommends a brief, closed meeting so as not to hurt the pride of a friend's friend (Falwell is very close to President Reagan). Peres will, as a matter of course, hear his media advisor's comments on how a meeting or refusal will be accepted by the media. And, as always, he will listen to government secretary Yosi Beilin, who is very close to him, and to his political advisor, Nimrod Novik, who specialized in American politics. After all that, Peres will make his own private decision based on intuition and common sense. Peres' advisors are unanimous on one issue--the prime minister is a solitary man who makes decisions, for better or for worse, on his own.

According to comedian Safi Rivlin, the Likud's campaign slogan was "Peres Yes and No." Now he is the man who must decide yes and no for a government in which the Likud participates. Peres is perhaps the most decisive prime minister in the history of the state. He even volunteers to make decisions as to whether the department store "Ata" should be closed or whether the government should continue its support, and whether to interfere in the dispute between the orthodox and the "Ganei Hamat" investors, or to let them fight it out on their own. "I see the government as the state's housekeeper and I cannot sit on the sidelines while pieces of it burn," said Peres to the cabinet ministers who criticized his excessive interference in the Tiberias hotel scandal. Those close to him in the party say that this is the way Peres behaved even when he was party chairman: When a problem arose in the Bene Braq branch, Peres showed up there and did not desist until the solution was found.

In order to improve his maneuvering ability within his complex government, Peres established several forums in which his decisions are formulated:

--The committee of security ministers (the reduced cabinet): Here he airs foreign policy and defense issues after they have been thoroughly discussed within the Labor bloc. If only one minister from the Likud can be swayed, Labor will have a majority. That is how it was, for example, on the issue of the withdrawal from Lebanon: Deputy Prime Minister David Levi was designated as the objective to break through to the national camp. After Levi had been completely softened up, the road was paved for a majority in the government. Peres often brings proposals to the government only after he is convinced that they will be accepted by a majority.

--The socio-economic council: This forum was established to pass important economic decisions. The council is a kind of pressure cooker in which all the ingredients of the economy build up pressure prior to a decision. It was here that the Histadrut relinquished \$1.2 billion in subsidies and a significant portion of the increases originally contained in package deal B. It was here that Treasury Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i gave in to partial cost of living compensation and tax exemptions. In effect, for the first time in the history of Israel, the government gave up some of its sovereignty in favor of extra-governmental factions (although it is important to remember which party rules the Histadrut).

Peres ascribes supreme importance to this forum and exercises most of his strategies herein. On the eve of signing the package deal, after midnight, all the council members left the negotiation room worn and bewildered. The gap between Moda'i and Kaisar was proven impossible to bridge. The following morning, Peres appeared before the unhappy faces of Yosi Bailin and Communications Minister Uri Savir with a smile on his face. "We've got a deal. It's finished." His aides were convinced that Peres had made secret contacts after they had parted company earlier that morning. They looked in vain for a secret pact. Afterward, it became evident that this was one of Shimon Peres' tricks: When he saw that things were not moving, he decided to create an atmosphere of crisis, to jolt the hawks into signing out of fear that everything was falling apart.

--The four-minister committee for budget cuts: Four ministers, two from each camp, took the budget by the horns. Instead of the traditional scenario wherein ministers restrict the power of the treasury ministry and budget branch economists, they face a parity committee with three ministers sitting alongside the minister of the treasury (Ya'akovi, Arens and Weitzman). And it is no coincidence that they are from opposing ministries. The decisions of this committee on many issues are seen as governmental decisions with no room for appeal. This has taken the burden off the treasury minister and his economists insofar as the standard complaints against their hard line.

--The seven-minister committee for defense budget cuts: The prime minister makes every effort not to lock horns with the Ministry of Defense. To avoid direct confrontations, he has appointed a special committee which in the end lent their imprimatur to the agreement reached with Rabin on the issue

of the \$400-\$500 million defense budget deficit. Peres did not hesitate to assign Yitzhaq Shamir to the committee, at the suggestion of Moshe Nisim, tilting the scales in favor of the Likud. He felt sure that his decision would be passed whatever the composition of the committee.

The proliferation of ministerial committees has traditionally been seen as a sign of the government's desperation. Over the years, conflicts have been "solved" by burying them in one ministerial committee or another. Peres frequently establishes ad hoc committees to help pass decisions (the budget cut committee), to stem resistance to decisions he is trying to pass (the defense cabinet) and as a tool for absorbing tension (the Ata and Ganei Hamat committees). The secondary benefit Peres derives from these committees is the variety of positions he can offer the complement of ministers surrounding him. The prime minister pays for excessive use of this tool with the deceleration of the decisionmaking process, although in any event he is known to prefer a slow but steady path to quick action riddled with the danger of stepping on toes. Very rarely does Peres impose his will on his opponents. Since he needs only 4 hours sleep a day, he tires everyone out with long discussions lasting well into the night. One important economic decision was reached without the treasury minister's approval, the latter having simply dozed off in the meeting room.

Behind every committee is concealed a uniquely individualistic prime minister. After meeting with Moshe Shahal at midnight (on issues of coalition and law), with Ezer Weitzman (on Egypt) or Yitzhak Navon (on education and broadcasting), the prime minister withdraws into himself and sails off into a world of vision and optimism (sometimes exaggerated). He has moments of depression and hopelessness, too, but these have been few and far between of late. Peres is mostly surrounded by advisors, although they know that his decisions are reached alone and that it is perhaps no coincidence that he prefers his advisors to be young and short on experience. A man like Peres does not take well to professional advisors, and in any event, in the end, he relies only on himself. Which of them has really gone through more in their public lives than he?

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ISRAEL

ARAB WORKERS DAILY LIFE SURVEYED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Feb 85 p 7

[Article by Atallah Mansur: "Caravans from the Territories Leave at Dawn"]

[Text] Before the first light, they leave their homes on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, heading for urban transportation centers, some on foot and some by car. They gather throughout Gaza, near the Ali Abu Marwan minaret, near the vegetable market in Janin, and in other central locations. Excitedly, they load onto buses, small trucks, taxis--a long caravan that blocks the roads for a short time. At 5:00 am the caravan leaves from the Erez check-point on the Gaza border and the Megido intersection, northwest of Janin, and enters Israeli territory on its way to work.

The radio on the bus is playing the "Voice of the Arab World" from Cairo. The first news broadcast of the morning begins: Egyptian minister of labor marks the 20th anniversary of the armed Palestinian struggle. Yasir 'Arafat announced his intention to strengthen cooperation with King Husayn." The bus riders who awoke so early, tired and drowsy, use this time to catch some extra sleep. Most of the buses in the caravan in which I am riding turn off for Haifa; a few to to Wadi 'Ara.

By early morning, more than 150 workers from the territories are standing at the intersection across from Bank Hapoalim in Hedera. Wearing red kafiyas on their heads and carrying colorful plastic baskets on their arms, they are waiting for someone to come by and take them to work. One wears a knit skull cap, a mutual sign of recognition between him and the green grocer for whom he has brought vegetables for sale from his village. Those standing at this intersection across from Bank Hapoalim are silent; their eyes are watching for any stranger who may approach the spot. A vehicle need only slow down and it will immediately be surrounded by workers offering their services. More than once, these workers have been injured by cars slowing down momentarily which they thought were coming to seek workers.

Children of the Israeli Administration

They sit on the sidewalk as down breaks. Two villagers who have already gone off to work return, having completed their jobs and received payment: 5,000 shekels each. They go home happy and content. Their friends are

jealous of them. A jeep loaded with electrical equipment stops and the workers put down their food and rush toward it. The owner of the jeep needs three workers. Six men jump on the vehicle. He picks the three tallest among them. A private car appears and an Arab contractor from one of the villages in the triangle asks for workers to clean up building materials. After him comes a Jew who invites two young men whom he knows by name to prune the trees along the road across from the bank.

There are unions on the West Bank. Some of the workers know about the unions. They all agree that the heads of these unions live off the workers and use them to get financial aid from Jordan and Palestinian sources. In short, the unions help the rich get richer. The workers do not mince words when they speak about these wheeler dealers whom they accuse of extortion.

Sa'id Hamid left school in the 11th grade. This young man with sad eyes was born in the village of Day Abu Da'if in northern Shomron (Samaria), east of Janin. Sa'id wanted to finish high school and work a clean job, in an office. But last year he was arrested, following a "small disturbance" (in his words) that broke out when he was crossing the main street in Janin. Afraid of being stopped and questioned along with the group that was involved, he ran. But as luck would have it, he was caught. He prefers not to discuss the investigation in detail, but it clearly left a scar on his spirit. He did not return to school. He was not an outstanding student anyway, he says.

The students from his high school class on the West Bank are now busy with Jordanian matriculation exams, as are their counterparts in Gaza who will be taking Egyptian exams. This is the first graduating class from the territories that has known no administration other than the Israeli administration. They number 25,000 in the West Bank and 15,000 in the Gaza Strip. Only half completed their high school studies. The other half dropped out before finishing, or never entered high school at all. Both groups will, for the most part, become members of the band seeking work, due to the economic recession in Israel and the territories and a reduction in employment opportunities.

Hamid does not have many choices in his quest for work. He does not have a profession and he cannot aspire to a decent income. His relatives, who work in a restaurant in Haifa baking cakes and confection, promised to find him a job. But they have not been successful. There is no demand for more workers in Israel. Some of his relatives were even laid off jobs they held with Solel Bonei, the Zakhariyah Drucker Company, Lahmano Industries and Karmel Carpets.

I Earned as Much as Three Engineers

I was talking with Hamid at Paris Square in Haifa, near the Karmelit train station. There were around 100 workers there, all from the Janin area. They come here every day to offer their services to contractors. He knows dozens of builders and developers, Arabs and Jews. They come to Paris Square to look for him when they need workers to finish a job in a hurry. Today, business is slow. He is asked to carry a refrigerator on his back to the top floor of an apartment building, to load furniture or unload building materials from a truck.

"I used to earn as much as three engineers," he says, his eyes lighting up. He watches my facial expression to gauge my reaction. "Nowadays, I wait 3 days to get a job, moving a used refrigerator." He gets up every day at 3:00 am to travel from his village, 'Arava, to Janin, and from Janin to Haifa. His daily traveling expenses run 2,000 shekels. "Last Thursday I earned 5,000 shekels. Since then, I have been standing in this square, waiting. At home, my wife and 9 children are waiting for food."

Hamid, the youth from Janin, is new among those who come down to the squares looking for work. Why didn't he go to the employment office? He heard that the agency had not given a man he knew work for several months, and he heard that the agency makes workers wait months to be paid, and takes a lot of taxes out of their pay. At the square, you get work that you are paid for the same day and the pay is higher. Why doesn't he look for work in Jordan or the oil countries? The Israeli Government would not object if he wanted to leave. And the Hashemite government of Jordan would accept him with open arms. But as a Jordanian subject, he would have to enlist in the king's army for 2 years. Even after his service, he would not be allowed to return to Israel for another 5 years, because he would be in the Jordanian reserves. How could he hope to see his family and the neighbor's daughter with whom he is smitten? This impediment holds for every man on the West Bank up to the age of 26. He must therefore decide between staying in the territories under the Israeli administration or leaving for one of the Arab countries. This impediment has a considerable effect on young people's decisions to seek employment in Israel.

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JORDAN

SHARAF RESIGNATION LETTER PUBLISHED

Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 17 Feb 85 p 24

[Text] The resignation of Mrs Layla Sharaf from the Jordanian Ministry of Information is still the subject of debate, and some Jordanian newspapers have demanded that the circumstances of this resignation be revealed so that public opinion may learn of its true background.

What is the story behind Layla Sharaf's resignation?

Layla Sharaf refuses to add to what appeared in her letter of resignation to the prime minister, and she is right...because this letter covers everything, and in it is the answer to all questions, and more.

AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI has obtained a copy of it, and here is the exclusive publication of its literal text:

Amman, 27 January 85

Your Excellency the Prime Minister:

I send you my greetings and appreciation, and submit to you my resignation from the post of minister of information in your esteemed government.

I had agreed to participate in the government because I believed in the principles that I had learned from the school of 'Abd-al-Hamid Sharaf concerning respect for the Arab and Jordanian person and his intellect, and concerning his appreciation of freedom of expression and freedom of journalistic opinion, as long as it does not threaten the security and stability of the country. Along with him, I believed that Jordan should lay down a clear media policy, based on its eternal national principles, that would close the ideological and intellectual gap that prevails in this country whose mission is great though its size be small--this country which is the heir to the first revolution on behalf of national existence and Arab dignity.

Along with him, I believed that the dignity of the Jordanian person in particular, and the Arab in general, and his membership and pride in his nation great or small, and his intellectual development and that of his civilization, cannot be achieved unless he has a certain amount of freedom

of thought and expression within a national media policy, one with a clear political goal. The national goal and cultivation of the mental and intellectual development of the citizen of our dear Jordan are above getting involved in daily thwarting and restricting the development and expression of thought, and above turning the media into an instrument for blinding the citizen, instead of him being informed about the task and participating in it and in the reasons and circumstances behind decisions.

I had made these concepts clear before I agreed to accept the ministry of information, and I thought, with all my idealism and simplicity together, that I had obtained a blessing for it. However, I have toiled this whole year to achieve some of it in the absence of any collective media policy of this sort. My efforts had a positive effect in the ranks of the local press, and in fact on the reputation and position of this press in the Arab world and internationally, and on its reflection on the readers, and in its relatively poor prosperity that we were able to achieve.

But the official directions, in more than one area, which at first began to harmonize with this new media policy, have lately come to be characterized by obstruction towards this freedom of expression of views even on the simplest of matters, and I sensed that Jordan was officially restricting the citizen and his channels of information and his national media to an extent that he was resorting to hostile media systems. Also, frank communications between the Ministry of Information and the office of the prime minister to lay out short-term media plans at least were lost; even the channels of daily communication were lost amidst the various government apparatuses. Even work within the cabinet became bilateral rather than collective, and we saw that in many instances we were adopting important resolutions in an impromptu and frivolous manner so they would have a negative impact in the society. We would not permit them to be discussed intelligently, whether in our official meetings or on the pages of our newspapers and magazines.

My belief in the principles of respect for the Jordanian citizen and his intellect and responsible freedom which he is guaranteed by the constitution make me tremble when I think that 'Abd-al-Hamid Sharaf is watching me while I am a participant in this policy which the citizen does not like and which he has no confidence in or connection to. It forces me to desire to no longer carry out my responsibilities in the Ministry of Information when it is one of the main channels through which the sincere policies directed at the citizens are carried out. Mr. Prime Minister, I had promised the press in my beloved country that I would not remain at my post if I was unable to protect them in expressing their thoughts and suffering. Also, I do not want the Ministry of Information to be the grindstone in the struggle between powers in this dear country, at such a difficult time as this.

The severing of communication between the Ministry of Information, which is the source of information and directives to the people, and the daily decisions and events, and the failure to study together these new items, events and decisions and the complications that they cause and to agree with

them or oppose them, have caused much of the positive impetus towards building media credibility in Jordan to be lost, along with a clear, frank national media message that neither deceives nor cheats the citizen, and does not harm his national and personal development.

Therefore in view of these circumstances, I believe that I am not prepared to carry out a media policy that is not clear and not obviously subservient to the interests of the nation and its people.

Because of this, I request that you convey my resignation from the government to his majesty the king, along with my prayer that God will guide and protect this beloved country in the face of the dangers that surround it, and that he will guide the steps of its beloved king so he will lead it to the shore of faith and power across this tempestuous sea of contradictions, half-truths, self-importance, obfuscation, and partial solutions which are all around us and which threaten the nation and its internal and foreign security.

Your Excellency the Prime Minister, please accept my deepest gratitude and respect.

Layla 'Abd-al-Hamid Sharaf.

12547

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JORDAN

BA'TH SECRETARY INTERVIEWED ON HUSAYN-'ARAFAT 'PLOTING'

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 22 Dec 84 p 3

[Interview with Hasan 'Ajaj, regional secretary of the Ba'th Party organization in Jordan, by Dr 'Abd-al-Karim al-Samad and 'Ali al-Siwan: "There Are Two, Not Three, Methods for Confronting the Conspiracy: Escalating the Armed Struggle and Building the National Fronts"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Following the dissenting council which 'Arafat convened in Amman, attention has been riveted on the Jordanian arena:

The Arabs who are pledged to the U.S. design envisaged the Jordanian arena as being the second link in the Arabization of Camp David, after they had found it hard to bear the downfall of the 17 May agreement in Lebanon.

The Arab patriots looked to the Jordanian arena, especially after the formation of the national front in Jordan on 29 November 1984, to achieve the feat of defeating the conspiracy against the Arab homeland.

We took these subjects to Comrade Hasan 'Ajat, regional secretary of the Ba'th Party organization in Jordan, and the following dialogue ensued:

[Question] You recently participated in the national seminar of the Arab People's Congress in Tripoli, Libya. How do you shape the tasks which were crystallized at the congress?

[Answer] The seminar was held to mark the seventh anniversary of the founding of the Arab People's Congress in reply to the decline led by al-Sadat and in order to confront the capitulationist design which had begun embroiling Egypt's civic weight, as well as Egypt's political position and its large demographic size, in the policy line of capitulation to Zionism.

A set of studies was submitted to the seminar appraising the period of the past 7 years and also aimed at developing the work of the congress in the subsequent phase in the political, intellectual and ideological domains.

It is known that the Arab People's Congress is a frontal and popular framework including most of the liberation organizations, forces and parties in the Arab

homeland, that is, it is a coalition front and its resolution will always constitute common factors for these parties and forces.

The recent seminar has been characterized by the clear inclination to develop the Arab People's Congress so that it will become the popular organization throughout the Arab homeland and so that it will become capable of shouldering the brunt of the confrontation aimed at aborting the imperialist-Zionist design through an Arab popular revolution which would resort to the two forms of armed and political struggle.

We, the national front in Jordan, view the Congress as the quarter which shoulders the responsibility for rallying, mobilizing and leading the Arab masses by building national fronts in the arenas of the Arab homeland to build the Arab national and progressive front—from the ocean to the Gulf.

In the past, we had apprehensions about the Arab People's Congress, including the fact that it engaged in generalities without laying down detailed action programs: the reason is that the slogans calling for aborting suspicious plans, achieving Arab unity, building a socialist society and staging a popular revolution remained nothing more than slogans.

The latest seminar addressed the question of how we achieve these slogans.

The national front in Jordan contributed to the work of the Congress with several interventions which centered on two methods, not three, for confronting the schemes of the conspiracy: the method for escalating the armed struggle within the occupied homeland and outside it, and the method for building national fronts in the Arab countries.

Our front discussed the matter of the cadres devoting their full time to facing up to the tasks of the phase. There are seven or eight branches within the Arab People's Congress without cadres. Therefore, we insisted on the cadres taking full time to implement the resolutions. We announced our readiness to give the cadres full time and to commit ourselves to all the resolutions passed by the Congress, including the carrying out of struggle tasks in our Jordanian arena.

Furthermore, at this seminar, our Jordanian national front gained permanent membership in the General Secretariat of the Congress.

[Question] What is the frontal action which you envisage carrying out to confront the plotting of Husayn and 'Arafat—in both the Jordanian and the Arab domains?

[Answer] Since the proclamation of the formation of the national front in Jordan on 29 November 1984, that is, since 3 weeks ago, we have moved to entrench the front within the Jordanian arena. A series of meetings were held among the leaderships of the patriotic forces within Jordan to widen the scope of the front by incorporating the national forces outside the

front and to strengthen the struggle on a frontal basis in accordance with the announced statement of the front and in accordance with its charter.

During this period, an invitation was extended to us for the first time in our capacity as a front to visit the Libyan Jamahiriyah. I headed a delegation of leaders of our front on an official visit to the Jamahiriyah, where we met with a delegation of leaders and signed a joint working paper. This paper included identical views on the implementation of the struggle tasks shouldered by us in the Jordanian arena--in phases and strategically, and on the continuation of consultations to develop our joint action and our struggle in the pan-Arab domain.

The prominent benefit derived from our visit has been the achievement of a linkage between our struggle in the Levant and the struggle of our brothers in northern Africa on the basis of the wholeness of the Arab struggle throughout the Arab arena.

We are now on the verge of convening a meeting for the leaderships of the founding factions in the front to entrench the front's institutions and to hammer out action plans.

We are inclined toward embarking on a dialogue with all the patriotic quarters which have not yet joined the front by holding continuing meetings with them to work out an agreement formula, so that the front will become the broad-based national framework encompassing all the patriotic forces on the Jordanian scene.

We scrupulously want to make this dialogue successful.

In due course, we will announce the achievements that we will have crystallized on the practical level, and we are optimistic. We are especially optimistic because, since the announcement of the front's emergence, we have felt a positive response on the popular level on the grounds that the step taken in forming the front--as our masses have reiterated--has been the first practical reply to the dissenting Amman conference, and more particularly because the birth of our front is the first of its kind in the Jordanian domain since, up to this time, no formula had been laid down for frontal action among the national political forces.

[Question] This is the front's position on the Jordanian scene. What is its position in the Arab and world liberation movement?

[Answer] We have defined our objectives within this framework. Our front struggles for the formation of the national and progressive front throughout the Arab homeland. From this premise, we work to tighten our relations with all the parties and forces of the Arab national liberation movement. In particular, our wider scope of action, which comes next to our Jordanian arena, is the field of the confrontation states. Therefore, we work to bring about a unified front for the countries which confront the enemy in occupied

Palestine--from al-Naqurah to Aqabah. We will enter a dialogue with our comrades in the national front in Lebanon, with our comrades in the national and progressive front in Syria and with our comrades in the Palestinian national front, which is to be formed soon. This is our course toward escalating our armed struggle within the occupied land and reinforcing the capability of the Lebanese national resistance. Naturally, we will also build our struggle relationship with our comrades in the national pan-Arab democratic front, with the democratic national front (DNF) in Iraq and with the Egyptian national movement.

Our dedication to action in the pan-Arab domain stems from our belief that a regional struggle is of a limited vista. It is futile to confront the imperialist-Zionist front with a regional struggle.

There can be no doubt that imperialism and Zionism seek to perpetuate regionalism in the Arab homeland by trying to isolate the struggle in each arena from those in other arenas. This is what we now see in the Arabian peninsula. We see Arab emirates, whose population does not exceed one-twentieth of the population of the city of Damascus, in which separate entities are established and which have cabinets and in which Arab and international organizations are based. This atmosphere is appropriate for a U.S. imperialist hegemony which extorts national resources and bleeds them. Therefore, we stand opposed to regional entities and even to regional struggles. We stand for a pan-Arab struggle within the framework of a broad-based pan-Arab front for the sake of the one Arab state and for the building of a united Arab socialist society.

On the international level, we have initiated a process of introducing our frontal struggle in the Jordanian domain in conjunction with some of our friends in the states of the socialist system. The announcement of our front has met with a noticeable welcome and response. We will continue developing our relations with dedication until they rise to a higher level. In other words, we are in the same trench with the front of the friendly forces, with the countries of the socialist system and with all the states and movements of national liberation. We form a solid front in confronting the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary onslaught throughout the world.

In this respect, we advocate the view that the Arab liberation movements should convene conferences, which ratify binding resolutions, on the pattern of the conferences which are convened by the Zionist movement.

Such Arab conferences, attended by the world liberation movements, tend to formulate methods of confronting imperialist-Zionist aggressiveness in the world.

We have our policy lines in this matter and we will submit them in the future to our comrades in the front.

[Question] What are the main characteristics of the present situation in the Jordanian arena?

[Answer] Since al-Sadat's regression in Egypt, which has had a great impact on the Arab masses, the negative effect of this regression extended to the Jordanian arena.

Al-Sadat's regression since 1971 has been epitomized in striking at Egypt's economy, which is built on a socialist foundation, and in turning this economy into a capitalist one first by pursuing an open door policy and then by achieving a rapprochement with the United States and expelling the Soviet experts.

Despite all the Syrian efforts and those exerted by the Egyptian army, al-Sadat was treacherous to the October liberation war in harmony with the plan of making the war a dynamic one.

The most prominent negative result of the regression in Egypt has been a drifting away from pan-Arab concerns and an engagement in regional concerns. Al-Sadat continued his treason under the slogan of "Egypt's independent decisionmaking"!

Following the conclusion of the two Camp David agreements, desperation spread, or it was intended to spread, in the pan-Arab arena in implanting the illusion that there can be neither salvation nor hope, except through a settlement.

The Palestinian revolution could have been a beacon of pan-Arab action, and it could have been a deterrent factor against the deviation of al-Sadat and against its proliferation, and for the sake of a pan-Arab and progressive renaissance at the level of the homeland. However, the official Palestinian leadership, the leadership of 'Arafat and some of his entourage, did not sever its links with al-Sadat. This leadership continued dealing with al-Sadat at all times: secretly at one time and openly at other times. This dealing then began to unfold as a collusion, a thing which had its bad negative repercussions on the whole Arab national liberation movement in view of the special relationship which characterizes the relationship between the liberation movement and the Palestinian revolution.

Therefore, it can be said that the prominent characteristic of the national movement in Jordan was distinguished by a regression following the regression in Egypt and because of it. The regression of the national movement in Jordan went in step with the Palestinian regression from the major objectives and from the basic and strategic points of departure, coupled with the tipping of the scales in favor of political and tactical slogans.

The utterance "the armed struggle" has begun receding, and it is being replaced by the utterance of the political settlement, political activity and so on.

The Palestinian right wing has polarized the support of part of official Arab public opinion, which has led to a division in, and a paralysis of, the Arab summit establishment, and to the creation of axes in the official Arab arena.

As is noticeable, there is the Cairo-Amman-Baghdad-'Arafat-Sudan axis. There is also the axis of the so-called Arab Gulf Cooperation Council, and this entails the perpetuation of separate regional action.

[Question] What are the tasks for confronting this state of affairs?

[Answer] One of our most prominent tasks in the Jordanian arena is to settle the issue of how we will perpetuate the unitary and progressive thinking hostile to imperialism, Zionism and reaction and to their methods of action; how we will combat regionalism and its thinking; and how we will escalate the armed struggle through a real national orientation of the patriotic factions opposed to 'Arafat.

This course of action is the sole practical answer to 'Arafat's method of dealing with events, that is, the political and diplomatic course, not the struggle course, and how we will prepare a new formula for the Arab liberation movement on clear-cut social, intellectual, cultural and political bases from a pan-Arab, not a regional, point of departure.

Therefore, it may be said that the duty of all the Arab forces and groups in the following phase is to reconsider their practices and relationships on the basis of making the course of the unitary and progressive struggle prevail in reply to the thing which the makers of al-Sadat's regression wanted to inflict as a state of collapse in the Arab arena.

[Question] How about the positive aspects of the picture of the situation in the pan-Arab arena?

[Answer] Naturally, when we speak of the aspects of the tragic and gloomy picture in the pan-Arab domain, we do not disregard the fact that there are bright, positive and luminous pictures on the path of our struggle.

Al-Sadat had deviated, but his deviation does not mean that his course has succeeded and prevailed.

Nor does it signify that the U.S. design has become the master of the area's fate, despite the diligent work which is being carried out so that this will happen. Why? Because there is a serious attempt to abort the deviationist course and to bring about the downfall of the U.S. design. This attempt is represented by Syria's heading of the Arab liberation current to resist al-Sadat's deviation and prevent the Arabization of Camp David. Syria has succeeded despite the attempts which are now being made to effect a penetration and to market Camp David. At this point, we must not disregard Libya in the process of instigating against al-Sadat's deviation.

The field--in which the forces of Arab liberation led by Syria have succeeded in halting the tide of al-Sadat's deviation and bringing about the downfall of the U.S. design--is Lebanon.

The bringing about the downfall of the 17 May agreement has involved decisive

meanings and indications in the Lebanese, Arab and international domains.

It is impossible for us at this point to forget the role of the uprising in Fatah, and of the other patriotic leaderships on the Palestinian scene, in exposing and denuding 'Arafat's division of the Palestinian ranks in collusion with al-Sadat's deviationist course. This role is now being crystallized, following 'Arafat's dissenting conference, in the reply given to the Palestinian deviation through the establishment of the broad-based Palestinian front, which will wrest the PLO banner from 'Arafat's hand and return it to the hands of the honorable, genuine revolutionary strugglers in the Palestinian arena.

Naturally, there are other bright pictures which are represented in the way Syria and the patriotic forces in Lebanon have defeated the Marines in Lebanon, along with the Multinational Force.

However, the brightest picture at this time is the National Resistance Front in Southern Lebanon: how it fights the Zionist forces and how it pushes these forces toward the option of withdrawing unconditionally, a matter for which we register for the Lebanese national resistance the feat of forcing the Zionist enemy to withdraw unconditionally for the first time in the history of the Arab-Zionist struggle. This feat constitutes a real process of transformation in the pan-Arab struggle.

At this point we must deduce that negative factors are indirectly conducive to the need for crystallizing their positive opposite, and they specify, to a large extent, the formulas and methods of struggle that are capable of repulsing these negative factors.

[Question] After the convening of 'Arafat's council in Amman, King Husayn doubled his activity. He went to Cairo, and then to London and Paris. He then returned, only to send emissaries to Arab capitals. How do you view the king's inclinations at this present phase?

[Answer] We have our own opinion about the king and the king's regime. We have expressed this viewpoint several times and we have said that King Husayn's regime is pledged to the imperialist and Zionist forces. When this regime makes decisions or when it moves, it will be nothing more than a tool of U.S. imperialism in the Arab area, and U.S. imperialism carefully provides it with all the means of survival so that this regime will continue to implement the tasks which it shoulders. However, the step represented in King Husayn's move in the recent phase comes through his full agreement with 'Arafat, through 'Arafat's camouflaging of this move and through misleading the Palestinian masses in the West Bank, and the East Bank of Jordan too, to the effect that Jordan, and especially King Husayn, are dedicated to the Palestinian cause. Naturally, it is impossible for these masses to be misled because they have a historic relationship with this regime. King Husayn's regime has a historic relationship with the Palestinian cause and with the Arab liberation cause in general. This relationship hinges on the fact of King Husayn's continuing and lasting plotting against these causes. Therefore,

the seriousness of this new move stems from the coordination with 'Arafat and the liquidation plan. This seriousness also conforms to the U.S. imperialist and Zionist aspirations in this phase, such as the attempt to generalize Camp David once again in the Arab area, to widen the scope of the reactionary axis attached to U.S. imperialism to halt the state of Arab national renaissance and to launch a counterattack against the national and pan-Arab achievements that have been made so far. Naturally, when King Husayn moves at this time, he moves to preach his initiative which he submitted at the dissenting Amman conference. This initiative has been refused by the masses and the people. We reject it at all times because it is based on the proposed U.S. plans and on Resolution 242--a resolution which is rejected at the Palestinian national level and at the Arab national level. This initiative is also built on the Reagan plan and the remnants of the Zionist-U.S.-Egyptian Camp David agreement. In addition, we consider that the regime's move at this phase comes within the framework of coordination among the regimes of the new reactionary axis and also comes within the context of serving the U.S.-Zionist design and within the framework of the deviationist course which 'Arafat is leading in the area. We are absolutely not surprised by any statement or by any call made by the pillars of the regime in Jordan, whether these be the statements of Tahir al-Masri, in which he announced that he urges the United States to revive the Reagan plan or to create a new U.S. plan, or the statements of King Husayn, who calls for bartering land for peace and tries to intimidate the Palestinian citizens with the processes which the Zionist administration is carrying out in the occupied Arab territories. All these policies and all these statements come within the context of trying to tame the mind of the Arab citizen into accepting the present state of affairs. Naturally, we reject this state of affairs in our capacity as patriotic and progressive Arab forces. The reason is that it is impossible for us to accept any proposal and any solution of the Zionist-Arab conflict through a U.S. vision. Of course, we have previously spoken of the king and of his policy and of all his plans and proposals. I now say that, at this phase, the king has succeeded to some extent in causing a rift within the Palestinian arena, and this is something which we must admit. The Palestinian right wing and its resources stand alongside King Husayn. This harms the Palestinian national struggle. I would like to note that the alignment of this right wing--through the convening of the dissenting Amman conference--has hindered the Palestinian national struggle and has set this struggle back by well over 20 years. Instead of the Palestinian revolution wielding the same tool and having the same targets, it has now become scattered and divided. Thus, King Husayn has succeeded in achieving his old policy, that is, dividing the PLO and weakening it to control it. Eventually, voices will be raised which will say that King Husayn, not the PLO, is the Palestinian people's representative. This is what King Husayn has now achieved, while depending on the Palestinian right wing and Arab reaction.

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3 April 1985

KUWAIT

BACKGROUND ON PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION PROCESS, VOTING TRENDS EXAMINED

Tribal Vote Distribution

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 12 Jan 85 pp 1, 4

[Text] In a comprehensive statistical survey of the distribution of votes of the main tribes within the election districts forming what may be called the "tribal belt" surrounding the capital from the west, east and south, AL-QABAS presents here a detailed report on the election situation in 15 districts where the tribal weight is reflected clearly.

The figures, charts and percentages of tribal votes in every election district have been concluded from the outcome of the by-elections that have taken place in most of these districts in the past 2 months. The votes won by each candidate among his tribe members in these by-elections, held in accordance with the official lists and supervised by special committees from the tribes themselves, have been announced.

As for the estimates on tribal votes in the districts where no by-elections have been held, the figures have been obtained from the voter lists and from the outcome of the preceding general elections.

These statistics, data and figures provide an important source for discovering the election forces of each tribe and indicate an existing election reality whose impact on Kuwait's parliamentary and political life must be acknowledged.

Within the election climate, the sharp conflicts and the competition and within the framework of the by-elections taking place these days among some tribes and of what is being rumored about alliances, we have tried to observe the position of the electoral districts with high tribal population density, taking into consideration the absence of main sources on which to rely. Therefore, the working team of AL-QABAS has, in following up on the by-elections phenomenon, observed these districts to verify the number of voters registered in the official voter lists, taking into consideration the position and density of some tribes through what has been published in the press, especially in connection with the by-elections and with the attendance or voting percentages. Meanwhile, we have been compelled to resort to some tribal leaders or to some people familiar with the tribal numbers, density and distribution on the Kuwaiti electoral map to verify the correctness of these figures.


We are not about to define the distribution of what may be called the tribal belt, considering the nature of the tribal distribution and its geographic symmetry (see map on page 1).

In the charts cited below, we have taken into consideration the tribal position in 15 electoral districts which, in our estimate and as a result of our observations, form the center of weight.

While presenting these results, we stress that what is intended is to offer a vital and realistic picture of the distribution of the tribal population density in a number of districts, without consideration for the current phase or for the tribal alliances or agreements that have materialized or may materialize with the approach of the election date.

Calculating the tribal votes in comparison with the number of voters registered in these districts does not mean the absence of other tribes. We have not ignored the presence of such tribes intentionally but have done so either due to the small numbers of this presence, to the unavailability of accurate figures on this presence or to the conflicting nature of such figures to the extent that it casts doubt on their credibility. This has motivated us to avoid these figures.

These figures do not mean ignoring the position of the other groups in some of the electoral districts with which we will deal. What we are interested in clarifying and stressing here is that though we will only review this data in this edition, we will study and analyze this data in future editions in light of the distribution of Kuwait's electoral districts, the degree by which this distribution influences and is affected by this map and then the degree by which it influences and is affected by the general election condition and the demographic structure.



[Map on p 1]

- District 18--Al-Sulaybikhat: 'Awazim [Tribe] 320 votes.
- District 8--Mushrif: 'Awazim 300 votes
- District 12--Al-Salimiyah: 'Awazim 1,050 votes.
- District 13--Al-Rumaythiyah: 'Awazim and Kanadirah 1,600 votes (estimated).
- District 22--Al-Raqqah: 'Awazim 650 votes, 'Ajman 600 votes.
- District 23--Al-Sabahiyah: Al-'Ajman 1,149, 'Awazim 1,100 votes.
- District 24--Al-Fuhayhil: 'Awazim 400, Hawajir 384 votes.
- District 17--Jalib al-Shuyukh: Mutran [Tribe] 1,300 votes.
- District 19--Al-Jahra' al-Jadidah: 'Anzah 300, al-Zufayr 300 votes.
- District 20--Al-Jahra' al-Qadimah: 'Anzah 560, 'Ajman 450 votes.
- District 16--Al-'Umariyah: Rashayidah 653 votes.
- District 14--Khitan: 'Atban 620 votes.
- District 15--Al-Farwaniyah: Rashayidah 1,252 votes.
- District 21--Al-Ahmadi: 'Ajman 980 votes.
- District 25--Umm al-Hayman: 'Awazim 800 votes.

[Box on p 1]

Percentage of Tribal Vote in Number of Electoral Districts

<u>Electoral District</u>	<u>Number of Registered Voters</u>	<u>Percentage of Tribal Vote to District's Total Vote</u>
Eighth (Hawalli, Bayan, Mushrif)	(3,295)	9.1%
Twelfth (al-Salimiyah)	1,618	64.89%
Thirteenth (al-Rumaythiyah) (Only votes of 'Awazim, Kanadirah Calculated)	3,809	42.00%
Fourteenth (Khitan)	2,215	27.90%
Fifteenth (al-Farwaniyah)	2,752	70.00%
Sixteenth (al-'Umariyah)	2,811	55.20%
Seventeenth (Jalib al-Shuyukh)	2,004	75.80%
Eighteenth (al-Sulaybikhat)	2,406	13.30%
Nineteenth (al-Jahra' al-Jadidah)	2,006	43.10%
Twentieth District (al-Jahra' al-Qadimah)	3,105	43.70%
Twenty First District (al-Ahmadi)	3,471	50.90%
Twenty Second District (al-Raqqah)	2,264	73.50%
Twenty Third District (al-Sabahiyah)	3,208	70.10%
Twenty Fourth District (al-Fuhayhil)	2,054	38.16%
Twenty Fifth District (Umm al-Hayman)	1,556	51.40%

<u>District</u>	<u>Number of Registered Voters</u>	<u>Tribal Votes According to By-election Figures & Estimates</u>			
Mushrif & Bayan	3,295	'Awazim:	300		
Al-Salimiyah	1,618	'Awazim:	1,050		
Al-Rumaythiyah	3,809	'Awazim & Kanadirah:	1,600		
Khitan	2,215	'Atban:	620		
Al-Farwaniyah	2,752	Rashayidah:	1,252	Mutran:	400
				'Adawin:	150
				'Awazim:	150
Al-'Umariyah	2,811	Rashayidah:	653	Mutran:	545
				'Awazim:	150
				'Adawin:	130
				'Atban:	100
Jalib al-Shuyukh	2,004	Mutran:	1,300	Rashayidah:	150
				'Adawin:	73
Al-Sulaybikhat	2,046	'Awazim:	320	-----	-----
Al-Jahra' al-Jadidah	2,006	Rashayidah:	263	'Anzah:	300
				Zufayr:	300
Al-Jahra' Al-Qadimah	3,105	'Anzah:	560	'Ajman:	450
				Zufayr:	350
Al-Ahmadi	3,471	'Ajman:	980	'Awazim:	300
				'Atban:	350
Al-Raqqah	2,264	'Awaxim:	650	'Ajman:	600
				Mutran:	415
Al-Sabahiyah	3,208	'Ajman:	1,149	'Awazim:	1,100
Al-Fuhayhil	2,054	'Awazim:	400	Hawajir & Qahtan:	384
Umm al-Hayman	1,556	'Awazim:	800		

Eighth District (Hawalli, Bayan, Mushrif and al-Naqrah)

Number of voters registered in electoral lists	3,295
Total tribal votes according to by-elections	300

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Number of Votes</u>	<u>Percentage According to Registered Voters</u>
'Awazim	300	9.1%

Percentage of tribal votes to number of district's registered voters: 9.1%

Twelfth District (Al-Salimiyah)

Number of voters registered in electoral lists	1,618
Number of tribal votes according to by-elections	1,050

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Number of Votes</u>	<u>Percentage According to Registered Voters</u>
'Awazim	1,050	64.89%

Percentage of tribal votes to number of district's registered voters: 64.89%

Thirteenth District (Al-Rumaythiyah)

Number of voters registered in electoral lists	3,089
Number of trival votes (estimated according to some tribal sources)	1,600

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Number of Votes</u>	<u>Percentage According to Registered Voters</u>
'Awazim & Kanadirah (Estimated)	1,600	42%

Percentage of tribal votes to number of district's Registered Voters: 42%

Fourteenth District (Abraq, Khitan)

Number of voters registered in electoral lists	2,215
Total tribal votes	620

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Number of Votes</u>	<u>Percentage According to Registered Voters</u>
'Atban	620	27.9%

Percentage of tribal votes to number of district's registered voters: 27.9%

Fifteenth District (Al-Farwaniyah)

Number of voters registered in electoral lists 2,752
 Total tribal vote (according to by-elections & estimates) 1,952

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Number of Votes</u>	<u>Percentage According to Registered Voters</u>
Rashayidah	1,252	45.49%
Mutran	400	14.50%
'Awazim	150	5.40%
'Adawin	150	5.40%

Percentage of tribal votes to number of district's registered voters: 71%

Sixteenth District (al-'Umariyah)

Number of voters registered in electoral lists 2,811
 Total tribal vote according to by-elections 1,587

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Number of Votes</u>	<u>Percentage According to Registered Voters</u>
Rashayiday	653	22.50%
Mutran	545	19.30%
'Awazim	150	5.30%
'Adawin	130	4.60%
'Atban	100	3.50%

Percentage of tribal votes to district's registered voters: 55.20%

Seventeenth District (Jalib al-Shuykh)

Number of voters registered in electoral lists 2,004
 Total tribal vote according to by-elections (estimated) 1,523

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Number of Votes</u>	<u>Percentage According to Registered Voters</u>
Mutran	1,300	64.80%
Rashayidah	150	7.40%
'Adawin	73	3.60%

Percentage of tribal votes to number of district's registered voters: 75.80%

Eighteenth District (Al-Sulaybikhat)

Number of voters registered in electoral lists 2,406
 Total tribal vote according to by-elections & estimates 320

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Number of Votes</u>	<u>Percentage According to Registered Voters</u>
'Awazim	320	13.30%

Percentage of tribal votes to number of district's registered voters: 13.30%

Nineteenth District (al-Jahra' al-Jadidah)
 Number of voters registered in electoral lists 2,006
 Total tribal vote according to by-elections & estimates 863

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Number of Votes</u>	<u>Percentage According to Registered Voters</u>
'Anzah	300	14.95%
Zufayr	300	14.95%
Rashayidah	263 (estimated)	13.10%

Percentage of tribal votes to number of district's registered voters: 43.10%

Twentieth District (al-Jahra' al-Qadimah)
 Number of voters registered in electoral lists 3,105
 Total tribal vote according to by-elections & estimates 1,360

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Number of Votes</u>	<u>Percentage According to Registered Voters</u>
'Anzah	560	18.00%
'Ajman	450	14.49%
Zufayr	350	11.27%

Percentage of tribal votes to number of district's registered voters: 43.76%

Twenty First District (al-Ahmadi)
 Number of voters registered in electoror lists 3,471
 Total tribal vote according to by-elections & estimates 1,630

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Number of Votes</u>	<u>Percentage According to Registered Voters</u>
'Ajman	980	28.23%
'Awazim	300	8.64%
'Atban	350	10.00%

Percentage of tribal votes to number of district's registered voters: 46.90%

Twenty Second District (al-Raqqah)
 Number of voters registered in electoral lists 2,264
 Total tribal vote according to by-elections 1,665

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Number of Votes</u>	<u>Percentage According to Registered Voters</u>
'Awazim	650	28.70%
'Ajman	600	26.50%
Mutran	415	18.30%

Percentage of tribal votes to number of district's registered voters: 73.50%

Twenty Third District (al-Sabahiyah)
 Number of voters registered in electoral lists 3,208
 Total tribal vote according to by-elections 2,249

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Number of Votes</u>	<u>Percentage According to Registered Voters</u>
'Ajman	1,149	35.80%
'Awazim	1,100	34.20%

Percentage of tribal votes to number of district's registered voters: 70.10%

Twenty Fourth District (al-Fuhayhil)
 Number of voters registered in electoral lists 2,054
 Total tribal vote 784

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Number of Votes</u>	<u>Percentage According to Registered Voters</u>
'Awazim	400	19.40%
Hawajir & Qahtan (together)	384	18.69%
'Atban and Fudul (no data available)		

Percentage of tribal votes to number of district's registered voters: 38.16%

Twenty Fifth District (Umm al-Hayman)
 Number of voters registered in electoral lists 1,556
 Total tribal vote [not given]

<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Number of Votes</u>	<u>Percentage According to Registered Voters</u>
'Awazim	800 (esimated)	51.40%

Percentage of tribal votes to number of district's registered voters: 51.40%

Election Trends

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 19 Jan 85 pp 1, 4

[Text] AL-QABAS continues its investigation of the election situation in Kuwait through observing the important indicators governing the development of the election process throughout a quarter century.

The results of this realistic and field observation demonstrate that the number of registered voters has grown by only 4,000 voters in 10 years (1975-85) whereas the number of voters nearly doubled between 1967 and 1975.

As for the percentage of voters actually voting, it dropped to 51 percent in 1971 whereas it had amounted to 66 percent in the 1967 elections. In the 1981 elections, this percentage rose to 90 percent.

As for the development in the number of candidates, this number reached a record figure in the 1981 elections, totaling 443 candidates.

The interesting phenomenon in the current elections is that the number of registered voters compared to the total population has dropped to its lowest level since the 1960's.

The official season for the election of the members of the next National Assembly began last Thursday, with the elections to take place on 20 February 1985. Thus, the new candidates will have one month to escalate their election campaigns. A large number of these campaigns started 6 months ago and some candidates have been working hard all this time. Others started the preparations for their election campaigns since announcement of the results of the 1981 elections. These include both those who won and those who lost in those elections.

We will begin as of today offering a series of news analyses on the past and current elections in an endeavor to find out the country's main election trends and the characteristics distinguishing Kuwait's democratic experience. It seems that the main two trends in the current elections are tribalism and religion. But before we dwell on these two issues, we must clarify the general election framework as it has developed in the past 23 years.

The number of voters has grown in this period from 11,288 registered voters when the first organized elections (or second organized elections, if we consider the 1938 elections as the first election) were held to elect the members of the Constituent Assembly in 1962 to 40,646 registered voters in 1971 and to 56,848 registered voters in 1985, as demonstrated by chart No 1. In this chart, we notice that the number of registered voters dropped by 11,000 voters or by nearly 21 percent between 1975 and 1981. This is a very high percentage.

This aspect is of special significance because this period witnessed two extremely important events for the elections and the democratic experience, namely dissolving the National Assembly in 1976 and the redivision of the electoral districts, increasing their number from 11 districts to 25 districts in December 1980. This drop in the number of registered voters can perhaps be explained by the confusion created by the modification of the electoral districts. However, we know that a registered voter does not lose his right to vote except in the cases defined by the election law. Another observation to be made is that the number of registered voters rose by only 4,000 voters from 1975-85 whereas the number of voters had nearly doubled between 1967-75. This undoubtedly reflects the citizens' interest in registering their names in the electoral lists. To make sure of this, we have checked the number of voters who actually voted in the years for which such data is available--data demonstrated in chart No 2. This chart shows that the number of voters who actually voted dropped in 1971 to 51 percent from the 66 percent in the previous elections. This is perhaps due to the events which accompanied the 1967 elections and to the forgeries which occurred in some districts and which motivated the opposition's collective resignation from the Assembly. This drop in percentage reflects the voters' disappointment as a result of those events.

But despite the 21 percent drop in the number of registered voters in the 1981 elections in comparison with the preceding elections, the 1981 elections reflect a totally different picture, with the number of those actually voting amounting to 90 percent of the number of registered voters (37,689 votes out of a total 41,953 registered voters). The dissolving of the National Assembly did not have a negative impact on the voters' interest in voting. Rather, it had a positive impact, motivating the voters to cast their vote. This 90 percent is the highest voting percentage recorded since the start of organized democratic life in Kuwait.

We can view this aspect of the election situation from a different angle, namely the development in the number of candidates for the National Assembly elections--a development demonstrated by chart No 3. A total of 205 candidates ran for the first National Assembly election in 1963, with the number rising to 222 candidates for the second session in 1967. In 1971, the number dropped to 183 candidates. Again, we assume that the 1967 events had their negative impact on the citizens' interest in running for those elections. In the 1981 election, there was a record number of 443 candidates.

This phenomenon merits a short pause. In 1981 when the percentage of registered voters to the total population reached its lowest level since the 1960's, the number of candidates rose by nearly 1.72 times, growing from 258 candidates in 1975 to 443 candidates in 1981. It is natural that this would lead to the extreme fragmentation of votes. At the average, there were 17.7 candidates per district. Following is a list of the districts in which the number of candidates exceeded the average:

Fifth District (al-Qadisiyah): 22 candidates.
Eighth District (Hawalli): 19 candidates.
Tenth District (al-'Udayliyah): 22 candidates.
Thirteenth District (al-Rumaythiyah): 31 candidates.
Fourteenth District (Abraq, Khitan): 23 candidates.
Fifteenth District (al-Farwaniyah): 20 candidates.
Sixteenth District (al-'Umariyah): 29 candidates.
Seventeenth District (Jalip al-Shuyukh): 28 candidates.
Eighteenth District (al-Sulaybikhat): 19 candidates.
Nineteenth District (al-Jahra' al-Jadidah): 20 candidates.
Twentieth District (al-Jahra' al-Qadimah): 20 candidates.
Twenty First District (al-Ahmadi): 20 candidates.
Twenty Fifth District (Umm al-Hayman): 23 candidates.

As a result, some candidates got less than 10 votes and others got one vote each (3 candidates in Abraq-Khitan and 4 candidates in al-Jahra' al-Jadidah District got one vote each, for example). A candidate in al-'Umariyah District did not get a single vote!

We have already pointed out that the percentage of registered voters to the total population reached its lowest level in the 1981 elections. This demonstrates to us one of the distinguishing characteristics of the democratic experience in Kuwait. From the angle of the election process, there are 4 groups:

1. Voters who actually cast their votes in the elections.
2. Voters registered in the electoral lists.
3. Those entitled to vote but not registered in the electoral lists (for any reason whatsoever).
4. Kuwaiti males who are 21 years or older in an election year, as listed in the population census.

Considering that we know nothing about the third group, we have compared the three other groups and summed up the conclusions in chart No 4. There are two points which we must note from the outset: The Kuwaiti population numbers in this chart before 1980 reflect estimates of the number of Kuwaitis of voting age calculated on the bases of the population census figures. Second, the number of Kuwaitis of voting age includes all those who said that they are Kuwaitis in the census (meaning that the number includes the second group and a group without citizenship, as well as members of the army and of the police who are not entitled to vote by law).

If we take these two clarifications into consideration, we find that the percentages of actual voters and of registered voters to the Kuwaiti population are as follows:

1967		1971	
<u>Percentage of Actual Voters to Population</u>	<u>Percentage of Registered Voters to Population</u>	<u>Percentage of Actual Voters to Population</u>	<u>Percentage of Registered Voters to Population</u>
37%	56%	29%	58%
1975		1981	
<u>Percentage of Actual Voters to Population</u>	<u>Percentage of Registered Voters to Population</u>	<u>Percentage of Actual Voters to Population</u>	<u>Percentage of Registered Voters to Population</u>
33.5%	56%	35%	39%

In 1981, the percentage of registered voters to the total population dropped to 39 percent, the lowest level recorded so far. This percentage had not dropped below 56 percent since 1967. However, the percentage of those casting their votes to the total population maintained its level at nearly one third the population. This means that the average number of those who cast their votes in all the elections represent no more than one-third the population theoretically. If we tie this percentage to the increase in the number of candidates, then it is normal for some candidates to win the election. But the percentage of the votes they get in their district is small, very small. The overwhelming majority of the candidates get to the National Assembly with less than one third the number of votes in their district, meaning that they represent one third the voters.

If we wished to broaden the base of the deputies' representation of all the Kuwaiti people of election age, we could give Kuwaiti women who are 21 years old or older the right to vote. We can also give women the right to vote while reducing the voting age to 18 years for all, including both males and females. In this case, we can attain the highest percentage of representation of the Kuwaiti people in the National Assembly. The following chart demonstrate these two possibilities quantitatively:

First possibility: Giving Kuwaiti women who are 21 years old or older the right to vote as of 20 February 1985:

Kuwaiti males: 127,998.

Kuwaiti femans: 136,545.

Kuwaiti population total: 264,543.

Registered voters on 20 February 1985: 56,848.

Second possibility: Giving women the right to vote while reducing voting age to 18 years as of 20 February 1985:

Kuwaiti males: 149,047.

Kuwaiti females: 157,585.


Kuwaiti population total: 306,632.

Voters registered on 20 February 1985: 56,848.

Considering that the issue of representation has not been brought up for discussion so far and that the election law does not set a minimum number of votes which a candidate must obtain to win an election, it remains possible for some deputies to reach the National Assembly while getting a small percentage of the voters in their districts. Rather, this will continue to be a widespread phenomenon, especially if the number of candidates increases and leads to the extreme division of votes, as happened in the 1981 elections.

Chart No 1

Development of Numbers of Voters in National Assembly Elections
(Including Those Registered in Electoral Lists)



- A. Constituent Assembly
- B. First Assembly
- C. Second Assembly
- D. Third Assembly
- E. Fourth Assembly
- F. Fifth Assembly
- G. Sixth Assembly

- | | |
|-----------|-----------|
| a. 10,000 | 1. 11,288 |
| b. 20,000 | 2. 16,889 |
| c. 30,000 | 3. 27,296 |
| d. 40,000 | 4. 40,646 |
| e. 50,000 | 5. 52,994 |
| f. 60,000 | 6. 56,848 |

Chart No 2

Development of Percentage of Voters Casting Their Vote in National Assembly Elections





Chart No 3

Development in Number of Voters [Meaning Candidates] for National Assembly Election




- A. Constituent Assembly
- B. First Assembly
- C. Second Assembly
- D. Third Assembly
- E. Fourth Assembly
- F. Fifth Assembly

Distribution of Population According to Education [Key on following page]

Hawalli Governorate


محافظة حولي



I	ابتدائي ومتوسط
II	ثانوي
III	جامعي
IV	امي او يقرأ ويكتب

Capital Governorate


محافظة العاصمة



I	ابتدائي ومتوسط
II	ثانوي
III	جامعي
IV	امي او يقرأ ويكتب

Al-Jahra Governorate


محافظة الاحمدي



I	ابتدائي ومتوسط
II	ثانوي
III	جامعي
IV	امي او يقرأ ويكتب

Al-Jahra Governorate

محافظة الجهراء



I	ابتدائي ومتوسط
II	ثانوي
III	جامعي
IV	امي او يقرأ ويكتب

كتب فريق عمليات «القيس» :

- A. 26.7 Percent Elementary and Junior High School Education.
- B. 28.7 Percent High School Education.
- C. 13 Percent College Education
- D. 31.6 Percent Illiterate or (Can Barely Read and Write).


- a. 31.3 Percent Elementary and Junior High School Education.
- b. 19.6 Percent High School Education.
- c. 6.9 Percent College Education
- d. 42 Percent Illiterate (or Can Barely Read and Write).

- 1. 22.4 Percent Elementary and Junior High School Education.
- 2. 4.2 Percent High School Education.
- 3. 0.8 Percent College Education.
- 4. 72.5 Percent Illiterate (or Can Barely Read and Write).

- I. 28.2 Percent Elementary and Junior High School Education.
- II. 8.5 Percent High School Education.
- III. 1.7 Percent College Education.
- IV. 61.6 Percent Illiterate (or Can Barely Read and Write).

Chart No 4

Comparison Between Those Entitled to Vote Theoretically (Kuwaiti Males Age 21 Years or Older) and Voters Registered in Electoral Lists



- A. Voters casting vote
- B. Registered voters
- C. Kuwaitis of voting age

Redivision of Electoral Districts

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 26 Jan 85 pp 1, 6

[Text] AL-QABAS published today a field study on the real situation of Kuwait's electoral map and on the impact of the population movement and of the redivision of the electoral districts and on the ramifications of all of this to the country's election process. AL-QABAS will do so through the data and statistics available on the types of voters in the various districts and through the objective indicators pointing out the type of candidates created by the existing population situation and by the political division of the electoral districts.

Since the start of its organized democratic life, Kuwait was divided into 10 electoral districts. Four years after the National Assembly was dissolved, Kuwait was redivided in December 1980 into 25 electoral districts. In this news report, we will try to discover the consequences emanating from the decision to redive the electoral districts.

Three traditional groupings developed in Kuwait at an early stage: The Qiblah [south] deputies (Sunna), the Sharq [east] deputies (Shi'ite) and the tribal deputies. By virtue of the [population] movement and of the construction development trends, these groupings have extended geographically northward to al-Sulaybikhat and al-Jahra' and southward to al-Salimiyah, al-Rumaythiyah, al-Fuhayhil and al-Ahmadi. This geographic dimension can be noticed in the population distribution, considering that most of the Sharq deputies came between 1963 and 1975 from the coastal strip extending eastward through Dasman, Bunayd al-Qar, al-Dasmah, al-Da'iyah, al-Sha'b, al-Salimiyah and al-Rumaythiyah.

The same thing can be noticed insofar as the Qiblah deputies are concerned. These deputies have been elected from the areas extending geographically south of al-Qiblah: Al-Shuwaykh, al-Shamiyah, Kayfan, al-Fayha', al-'Udayliyah, al-Khalidiyah and Hawalli. As for the tribal deputies, most of them have come from the areas located south of the fifth circle from the tribal belt extending from al-Jahra' in the north to Jalibal-Shuyukh, al-Farwaniyah, Abraq Khitan, al-Sabahiyah, al-Raqqah and Umm al-Hayman in the southernmost part (we have already dealt with the tribal belt).

This sectarian concentration (Shi'tes all along the east) and tribal concentration beyond the fifth circle has allowed the National Assembly's traditional structure to crystallize and has allowed the seats to be distributed according to geographic dimension, with the eastern deputies monopolizing the votes of Sharq (first) District and al-Dasmah (seventh) District and with the Qiblah deputies monopolizing the votes of al-Qiblah (second) District, al-Qadisiyah (seventh) District and Hawalli (eighth) District. Meanwhile, the tribal deputies monopolize the votes of al-Jahra' (third) District, al-Farwaniyah (fourth) District, al-Salimiyah (ninth) District and al-Ahmadi (tenth) District. The only district where there has been a mixture of Qiblah deputies and tribal deputies is Kayfan (fifth) District which has usually voted by a ratio of 3 to 2 in favor of the tribal candidates.

When the decree redividing the 10 districts into 25 districts was issued, this decree did not so much seek to establish a balance between the traditional political groupings as it sought to entrench and bolster the division of action between the three groupings. The redistribution decree has favored the Qiblah deputies at the expense of the eastern deputies in particular, even though it has fragmented the areas that vote for the opposition. To make this clear, let us compare between the two divisions (10 and 25 districts) and the number of deputies in each district.

A quick glance at the comparison list shows us that the first and seventh districts (al-Sharq and al-Dasmah) have remained unchanged [geographically] whereas the number of deputies from each dropped from 5 deputies under the old division to two deputies under the new division. Meanwhile, the third district has been redivided into three districts, with the number of its deputies thus increasing from 5 deputies (per district according to the old division) to six deputies (two deputies per district according to the new division). The fourth district in the old division has been redivided into three districts, all of which are in tribal areas (al-Farwaniyah, al-'Umariyah and Jalib al-Shuyukh).

A similar situation has developed in the fifth district which has been redivided into three districts, one of them in a semi-tribal area (Abraq Khitan). The sixth, eighth and ninth district have been split into two districts each, as shown in the comparison chart. The seventh district (al-Da'iyah) has remained unchanged, thus losing three deputies, as we have already pointed out. The tenth district (al-Ahmadi) has been split into five districts, meaning that the number of its deputies has increased from five to ten deputies. Thus, the redivision decree has entrenched the sectarian situation and given the tribal situation [vote] a greater election weight.

We can discern the dimensions of these balances by comparing the sectarian and tribal structures of the 1975 and 1981 (fourth and fifth) Assemblies:

Chart No 1

Comparison Between Traditional Political Groupings in 1975 & 1981 Assemblies

<u>Traditional Grouping</u>	<u>1975 Assembly</u>		<u>1981 Assembly</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Sharq deputies	10	20%	5	10%
Qiblah deputies	18	36%	18	36%
Tribal deputies	22	44%	27	54%

The figures in this chart need no comment, considering that the number of Sharq deputies has decreased by one half under the new redivision (10 to 5 deputies), the number of tribal deputies has risen from 22 to 27 and the number of Qiblah deputies has remained unchanged.

The matter does not concern the fact that the causes calling for the redivision are all purely political. The population movement has led to demographic concentration in some areas and not others. The expansion in the past 20 years has also led to the growth of the external areas (such as al-Jahra' al-Jadidah, ak-Raqqah and al-Sabahiyah) and to the emergence of new population centers (such as Mushrif and Bayan). All these are weighty reasons that justify the redistribution of the districts so that there may be geographic expansion and population balance between the areas.

But the redivision could have been made without the intentional and premeditated undermining of the balances between the traditional groupings with the aim of upsetting and muddling the sectarian and tribal structure. It would have behooved the new redivision, for example, to seek latitudinal expansion toward the areas along the coastal strip, such as merging al-Dahiyah with al-Mansuriyah and al-Dasmah and merging al-Fayha' with al-Nuzhah, al-Qadisiyah and al-Da'iyah. It would have also behooved the new redivision to aim at longitudinal expansion toward the tribal areas, such as merging al-Khalidiyah with al-Yarmuk and Abraq Khitan, and so forth.

Moreover, the new redivision has reduced the number of deputies to be elected [per district] from five to two deputies. If we link this with the small number of voters, it is natural to expect two consequences which we have already pointed out, namely: First, the possibility of guaranteeing the outcome of the election if the candidate wins a [certain] number of votes in the by-elections (Umm al-Hayman, for example); second, the extreme division of the votes. When there is a large number of candidates in a district according to the new redivision, then the number of votes [each candidates] gets dwindle so much that the majority of the deputies elected to the fifth Assembly (1981) attained membership of the National Assembly with less than one third the votes of their districts.

We must draw attention to another point, namely that there is another obvious pattern to the distribution of votes according to income, profession, educational standard and other indicators of the socio-economic background in the electoral districts. Steps should have been taken to obviate the long-range negative consequences of this pattern. What we mean is that the new redivision has led to the concentration of the groups with the higher incomes, education and professions in the model districts and the concentration of the groups with the lower incomes, educational levels and professions in the outer districts. To demonstrate this situation quantitatively, we have compared the Kuwaiti population in the electoral districts according to the governorates, breaking down this population on the basis of educational qualifications and main profession, as demonstrated in the 1980 census.

In chart No 2, we have combined the districts in the governorates to which they belong to give a general, not detailed, picture even though it is claimed that the general picture of each governorate remains unchanged and that this applies to the districts within each governorate, except for the second governorate, i.e. Hawalli, which includes 10 electoral districts. This does not make Hawalli the biggest governorate in terms of population but enables it to combine all

the traditional groupings, including, for example: al-Rumaythiyah (Sharq), al-'Udayliyah (Qiblah) and Abraq Khitan (tribal). However, the distribution pattern remains obvious. In the case of educational qualification, we have reduced it from seven categories to four categories, those with elementary and junior high school degrees in one category, those with high-school and sub-college degrees in one category and those with college degrees in a fourth category so as to make it easier to compare.

The data in chart No 2 is arranged horizontally, not vertically. This is why it should be read as follows: Kuwait's male population of age 21 years or older is divided into 4 categories of which 52.1 percent is either illiterate or can barely read and write (52,214 persons). Of these, only 9.8 percent live in the Capital Governorate whereas two thirds live in Hawalli and al-Jahra' and one fourth in al-Ahmadi. As for those with university degrees, they constituted until 1980 no more than 5.3 percent of Kuwait's males of legal age or 5,495 persons, the overwhelming majority of whom live in the Capital and Hawalli Governorates (39.6 percent and 49.5 percent successively) whereas the percentage of college graduates living in al-Jahra' and al-Ahmadi Governorates together does not exceed 10 percent. The same pattern of concentration in the Capital and Hawalli Governorates applies to those with high school degrees and sub-college level degrees. The share of these two governorates is 81 percent compared to 19 percent for al-Jahra' and al-Ahmadi Governorates, keeping in mind that the total number of Kuwaitis of voting age amounted to 104,177 persons in 1980.

As to finding out the distribution of population according to the highest educational qualification in every governorate, we have summed up the results in chart No 1. Here also we notice an obvious pattern of concentration of the educational categories: Whereas the illiterate and those who can barely read and write represent 31.6 percent of the Capital Governorate population, this percentage doubles in al-Ahmadi Governorate, amounting to 61.6 percent, and more than doubles in al-Jahra' Governorate, amounting to 72.5 percent. The highest concentration of college and high school graduates is in the Capital Governorate (13 percent and 28.7 percent), followed by Hawalli Governorate (6.9 percent and 19.6 percent) whereas they represent a very small percentage in al-Jahra' Governorate (0.8 percent and 4.2 percent successively). Nearly the same concentration applies to al-Ahmadi Governorate.

Through a simple calculation, we can say that 41.7 percent of the Capital Governorate population is educated while 31.6 percent are illiterate or can barely read and write. In the other governorates, these percentages are as follows:

<u>Educational Group</u>	<u>Capital Governorate</u>	<u>Hawalli Governorate</u>	<u>Al-Jahra' Governorate</u>	<u>Al-Ahmadi Governorate</u>
Illiterate or Can Barely Read & Write	31.6%	42.0%	72.5%	61.6%
High School Education or Above (Including Higher Education)	41.7%	26.5%	5.0%	10.2%

Is there similar population concentration in the governorates according to main professions? This is what chart No 3 answers. Again, we find that those with technical and scientific professions are concentrated in the Capital and Hawalli Governorates (20.9 percent and 14.4 percent successively). Nearly one third the Capital Governorate's population and 29 percent Hawalli Governorate population are engaged in office jobs whereas those engaged in such jobs in al-Jahra' and al-Ahmadi Governorates constitute a comparatively small percentage. On the other hand, more than two thirds the population of al-Jahra' and al-Ahmadi Governorates are engaged either in service jobs (64.91 percent and 45.9 percent successively), in operating transportation means (10.5 percent and 23.6 percent successively). Most of those engaged in service jobs are employed by government and public services, meaning that they are government employees.

What this professional concentration means is a concentration in the distribution of income emanating from the various professions usually. Because we have no data on the distribution of income among governorate populations, we can assume that the concentration of the higher income categories follows the pattern of concentration of the higher level professions in the Capital and Hawalli Governorates. The majority of the population of these two governorates are engaged in the top four professions (see chart No 3) which yield the top incomes in the Kuwaiti economy whereas the majority of the population of al-Jahra' and al-Ahmadi Governorates are employed in the bottom three job categories which yield a lower income usually.

Thus, it is evident that the new redivision of the electoral districts has entrenched the traditional groupings in favor of the tribal deputies who monopolize the votes of the electoral districts in al-Jahra' and al-Ahmadi Governorates and the votes of one half the electoral districts in Hawalli Governorate. It is also evident from our analyses that this sectarian-tribal concentration in the electoral districts results in a similar concentration in the distribution of education, professions and income. The Capital and Hawalli Governorates get the lion's share of the higher professional, educational and income levels while al-Jahra' and al-Ahmadi Governorates get the lion's share of the lower levels of education, professions and incomes.

While accepting the fact that the redivision of the electoral districts has been dictated by a number of factors, not all of which are purely political and some of which are tied to the population movements (such as the normal increase in density and increased naturalization) and others which pertain to the construction expansion and the emergence of new residential areas, the redivision of electoral districts would have been more befitting and beneficial to national unity if it had sought to curtail and loosen the sectarian-tribal action of the traditional political groupings. Such a merger and fusion could be a practical solution in the Capital and Hawalli Governorates. As for al-Jahra' and al-Ahmadi Governorates, the tribal current here must recede in the face of the emergence of educated and vigilant groups seeking to form political and social organizations to replace the tribal institution and tribal affiliations.

See article by Dr Jasim Karam, published in two parts in AL-WATAN: "Consequences Emanating from Change of Electoral Districts," 8 December 1984, and "Intensifying Sectarianism and Tribalism and the Purchase of Votes," 15 December 1984.

We wish to express our deep thanks to the Ministry of Planning, represented by Fu'ad Mulla, the ministry's undersecretary; Musa'id al-'Umaym, the assistant undersecretary; Muhammad al-Sayih, the statistical expert; and the Central Statistics Administration's personnel for facilitating our acquisition of the preliminary data from which we have derived the information shown below.

Chart No 2

Percentages of Kuwaiti Male Population Age 21 Years or Older According to Educational Qualification and Place of Residence, Based on 1980 Census

Educational Qualification	Capital Electoral Districts (1-7)	Hawalli Elec. Dist. (8-17)	Al-Jahra' Elec. Dist. (18-20)	Governorate Al-Ahmadi Elec. Dist. (21-25)	Total Number of Educational Degree Bearers	Percentage to Total Population
Illiterate or Can Barely Read and Write	9.8%	30.8%	34.4%	24.8%	54,214	52.1%
Elementary and Intermediate	15.5%	43.1%	19.9%	21.3%	28,895	27.7%
Secondary and Non-college	31.0%	50.0%	6.9%	11.8%	15,573	14.9%
College & Above	39.6%	49.5%	3.9%	6.8%	5,495	5.3%

Governorate's Total Population	16,830	39,692	25,766	21,889	104,177
Percentage to Total Population	16.2%	38.1%	24.7%	33.1%	Total Population

Chart No 3

Percentage of Kuwaiti Male Population Age 21 Years or Older According to Main Profession and Place of Residence, Based on 1980 Census

	Governorate					Percentage to Total Population
	Capital Elec. Dist. (1-7)	Hawalli Elec. Dist. (8-17)	Al-Jahra' Elec. Dist. (18-20)	Al-Ahmadi Elec. Dist. (21-25)	Total Number of Population in Profession	
1. Technical & Scientific Professions	20.9%	14.4%	2.8%	5.5%	8,636	10.5%
2. Executive & Business Managers	7.2%	3.1%	0.2%	0.7%	2,034	2.5%
3. Office Jobs and Similar Jobs	33.4%	29.2%	9.5%	17.0%	18,246	22.1%
4. Sales Jobs	15.0%	6.7%	2.4%	3.1%	5,023	6.1%
5. Service Jobs	10.9%	29.1%	64.9%	45.9%	32,480	39.4%
6. Production Jobs & Operation of Means of Transportation	12.3%	16.4%	10.5%	23.6%	13,069	15.8%
7. Workers in Agriculture & Livestock Production	0.2%	0.9%	9.4%	3.7%	2,998	3.6%
Governorate's Total Population	12,103	31,206	21,420	17,755	82,484	
Percentage to Kuwait's Total Population	14.7%	37.8%	26.0%	21.5%	Total Population	

Comparison Between Old Division and New Redivision of Kuwait's Electoral Districts

<u>Old Division (10 Electoral Districts) 1963-75</u>	<u>No of Deputies</u>	<u>New Redivision (25 Electoral Districts)</u>	<u>No of Deputies</u>
First: Al-Sharq, Dasman, Bunayd al-Qar	5	First: Al-Sharq	2
Second: Al-Qiblah, al-Mirqab, al-Salihiyah	5	Second: al-Mirqab, 'Abdallah al-Salim Quarter	4
Third: Al-Shuwaykh, al-Sulaybikhat, al-Jahra'	5	Third: Al-Qiblah, al-Shuwaykh, al-Shamiyah Eighteenth: Al-Sulaybikhat Twentieth: Al-Jahra' al-Qadimah	6
Fourth: Al-Shamiyah, al-Farwaniyah, Jalib al-Shuyukh, al-'Umariyah	5	Fifteenth: Al-Farwaniyah Sixteenth: Al-'Umariyah Seventeenth: Jalib al-Shuyukh	6
Fifth: Kayfan, al-Khalidiyah, Abraq Khitan, al-Surrah	5	Seventh, Kayfan Eleventh: Al-Khalidiyah Fourteenth: Abraq Khitan	6
Sixth: Al-Qadisiyah, al-Mansuriyah & al-Fayha'	5	Fifth: Al-Qadisiyah Sixth: Al-Fayha'	4
Seventh: Al-Dasmah, al-Da'iyah, Faylaka & al-Juzur		Fourth: Al-Da'iyah	2
Eighth: Hawalli, al-Nuqrah, al-Jabiriyah, al-Rawday & al-'Udayliyah	5	Eighth: Hawalli Ninth: Al-Rawday Tenth: Al-'Udayliyah	6
Ninth: Al-Salimiyah, al-Rumaythiyah, al-Bida' & al-Sha'b	5	Twelfth: Al-Salimiyah Thirteenth: Al-Rumaythiyah	4

8494 CSO:	Old Division (10 Electoral Districts) <u>1963-75</u>	No of Deputies	New Redivision (25 Electoral Districts)	No of Deputies
4404/206	Tenth: Al-Ahmadi, al-Sabahiyah & al-Fuhayhil	5	Twenty First: Al-Ahmadi Twenty Second: Al-Raqqa Twenty Third: Al-Sabahiyah Twenty Fourth: Al-Fuhayhil Twenty Fifth: Umm al-Hayman	10
	Grand Total	50	Grand Total	50